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Summarv 
1. Summary 
This report contains the findings of a study on the impact of the European Commission's 
measures on the development of telecommunications services open to competition. 
1.1. Scope and aims of the study 
The scope of the study can be represented as in the diagram below, in which VAS stands for 
value added services (L-shaped box): 
Figure 1.1. Value added services 
'ixed Mobile 
Services open to 
competition 
VAS 
Base 
services 
Four kinds of competing services have been chosen. 
1.1.1. Mobile telephony 
This segment has experienced considerable development over the period in question, with the 
emergence and take-off of digital radiotelephony on the global system mobile (GSM) 
standard. The Green Paper on mobile and personal communications1 which has just been 
published is intended to encourage this development. These services are still very much 
confined to the national level, in spite of the possibility of international traffic which was 
opened up by the standardization of the interface with the terminals. However, some 
internationalization is taking place in the sector: foreign players are taking out financial 
shareholdings when new players make their appearance, and some service marketing 
companies (SMCs) evidently have pan-European strategies. 
In this light, we will consider: 
(a) analogue cellular public telephony; 
(b) digital cellular public telephony. 
COM (94) 145. 
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1.1.2. Value added data transmission services 
This segment is certainly the most significant in terms of international exchanges within the 
Community. Moreover, it has been directly affected by the Community measures, 
liberalization of services, Open Network Provision (ONP), and terminals. 
This segment includes, in particular: 
(a) data network services (X.25, frame-relay, etc.); 
(b) electronic data interchange (EDI); 
(c) paging; 
(d) others (Videotex, etc.). 
1.1.3. Added value voice services 
This developing segment is still largely controlled by public operators. Moreover, the services 
which account for the largest revenues (free calls, vocal virtual private networks) are purely 
national in origin. 
This segment includes, in particular: 
(a) call-back; 
(b) calling cards; 
(c) re-routing of calls. 
1.1.4. Services linked to satellites 
Satellite services are essentially international. Over the period in question the Community's 
measures seem to have had little impact on this sector (which is still modest in its earnings, 
and heavily conditioned by the strategy of the few operators in the field). The strategies of 
these players are at present influenced more by profitability factors and the financial risk of 
projects than by the drawbacks of their regulatory environment. 
Under this heading we will examine: 
(a) the space segment: satellite capacity; 
(b) the terrestrial segment: television broadcasting services and very small aperture 
terminals (VSATs). 
These four services account for between 10 and 15% of telecommunications services in the 
European Union, with significant variations as between Member States. 
The geographical scope of the study covers the 15 countries of the European Union (including 
Sweden, Finland and Austria). 
The aims of this study are: 
(a) To assess the degree of progress and of practical implementation of European and 
national provisions to liberalize telecommunications services. 
(b) To arrive at a qualitative and quantitative estimate of the sectoral changes which have 
taken place, and the individual strategies operated by the various parties involved. 
Summarv 
(c) To analyse the impact of the Commission's measures on developments in the sector. 
1.2. The approach followed 
In order to achieve this aim. a four-phase approach has been followed. 
The first phase establishes the level of regulatory development in each of the Member States 
in the light of a number of key regulatory parameters. We describe, in particular, the degree to 
which European directives and Council recommendations have been incorporated into 
national law. and the time taken for transposition into national legislative systems. 
At the end of this phase, it has been possible to classify the Member States according to the 
degree of their regulator)' development for a given type of service (mobile services, satellites, 
data communications, etc.). 
The second phase consists of an analysis of the significant changes found to have occurred in 
the various services under examination, in the four segments on which our study focuses, and 
an analysis of the impact of the Commission's measures. 
This examination takes place through seven focal areas: 
(a) the internationalization of sales and activities; 
(b) the internationalization of supplies and geographical effects; 
(c) productivity and competitiveness: 
(d) scale and dimension effects; 
(e) the concentration and evolution of competitive conditions; 
(f) reductions in costs and prices: 
(g) interrelative ties. 
At the end of each sector, we give an overview of the impact of the Commission's measures 
on that sector. 
We also examine the other factors which go to explain the changes which have occurred. 
The third phase considers the strategies adopted by the players (public telecommunications 
operators (PTOs) and new entrants) in each of the segments under study. 
The fourth phase looks at job losses and gains in the sectors under study, and examines the 
impact of the 'single market" and of technology. 
This sectorial study examines changes in the single market for telecommunication services 
open to competition over the period 1987 to 1994. 
Four kinds of services have been studied, leaving out services which are not yet open to 
competition such as base telephony: 
(a) Mobile telephony services, including changes in GSM services. 
(b) Added value data transmission services, including network services of the X.25 type and 
associated EDI type services and paging. 
(c) Telephony services open to competition, especially call-back, re-routing and calling 
cards for international communications. 
Telecommunications: liberalized services 
(d) Services linked to satellites, TV or VSAT for the space segment and the terrestrial 
segment. 
The EU has undertaken a number of specific actions in this sector since the 1987 Green Paper 
on Telecommunications. 
This regulatory action of Community origin falls into two categories: 
(a) Induction ad ivi I ies, such as the publication of communications and recommendations 
intended to create a consensus on the key topics in communications (for example, the 
Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications 
services and equipment (COM(87) 290). the Green Paper on a common approach to the 
field of satellite communications in the EU (COM(90) 490), the Green Paper on a 
common approach in the field of mobile and personal communications in the EU 
(COM(94) 415). and the Green Paper on the liberalization of the telecommunications 
infrastructure and cable television networks (Parts I and II) (COM(94) 440 and 
COM(94) 682)). 
(b) Regulatory action of a more binding nature, such as: 
(i) directives intended to compel Member States to comply with a number of common 
rules. These include the 46 major directives already adopted.2 including those on 
terminals, services and ONP, and the significant technical interventions, especially 
that on standardization; 
(ii) bilateral action against certain Member States which are behind the rest of the 
Community, in order to ensure that the rules on competition and market opening 
are respected, such as the action taken to open up a second GSM licence in Italy 
and Belgium. 
All the EU countries have now reached a significant but variable level of implementation of 
these European Community rules. 
The study identifies three groups of countries in terms of actual implementation of the EU 
rules in 1994: 
Countries ahead of Community requirements: including the United Kingdom, Sweden, and to 
a lesser extent. Finland. Denmark or even France. A distinguishing feature in these countries is 
the advanced state of liberalization of their telecommunications services, in some respects 
exceeding the current requirements of the Community. The most significant example is that of 
the United Kingdom, which since 1982 has granted a public operating licence to an operator 
competing with British Telecom. 
Countries in an intermediate position: including Germany, the three Benelux countries. 
Ireland and Spain. In most of these countries, transposition of Community measures is held 
back mainly by a lack of independence between the regulatory body and the dominant public 
operator. 
Countries behind the European schedule: including Portugal. Greece. Austria and Italy. There 
are differences in this category between the countries which have already benefited from 
See Directory of Community legislation in force, 29th edition. Luxembourg. Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, 1997. 
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adjustments to the European schedule (Greece. Portugal) and those which have not completed 
the process of opening up to competition (Italy). 
During this period, the single market in non-reserved telecommunications services has 
developed along the following lines: 
1.2.1. Pan-European services have developed and improved for the benefit of users 
The first pan-European services are appearing 
As regards mobile services, the transition to the GSM standard has transformed cellular 
telephony in the EU from a set of fragmented national services, which are not interoperational, 
into a pan-European service pattern for the end-consumer. The number of roaming agreements 
rose from 70 to 471 between 1992 and 1995. 
The liberalization of data transmission services in all countries has enabled operators to build 
up pan-European infrastructures and offer users standardized end-to-end services. 
Competition for international voice message services for the business sector is now prompting 
even the main operators to develop virtual private network offers on a pan-European basis for 
voice telephony. 
Services are improving 
The need to differentiate among offers has prompted operators to improve their services, to the 
greater benefit of the end-users. For instance, the operators are now proposing to offer 
information services linked to calling cards or to mobile telephony, and virtual private 
networks which provide a multiplicity of functions. 
1.2.2. The European service industry has strengthened and has developed a pan-European 
dimension, enabling it to deal successfully with aggressive international competition 
The development of mobile telephony on the GSM standard has enabled European 
manufacturers to acquire know-how in this technology and to develop economies of scale. 
This has made them leaders in the digital market, now exporting to the entire world. The 
internationalization of offers for data transmission has benefited European operators, who 
have been able to compensate for the opening up of their domestic markets with a stronger 
presence on the international scene. 
In the field of voice transmission, the public operators have mostly reacted with defensive 
strategies geared to loyalty selling on their local market, and to developing new uses; and to 
various degrees, with aggressive strategies for deployment abroad (BT is the most advanced 
example in this respect). 
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1.2.3. The establishment of a homogeneous environment facilitating comparisons which 
contribute to the overall efficiency of the sector 
Contraction and convergence of prices 
Prices fall more sharply where the level of deregulation is higher 
The introduction of a more significant level of competition has led to price reductions 
(illustrated particularly in the case of international telephony) and an increase in package price 
offers: prices on international calls to the US have fallen on average by 42% in all European 
countries between 1990 and 1995. 
At the same time, the anticipation by public operators of the liberalization of infrastructures 
has enabled users to benefit from a 22.3% reduction on long-distance calls. 
Prices are also converging, gradually reducing the effect of borders 
Apart from a reduction in prices, which has occurred in the various services open to 
competition, there has also been a discernible convergence in prices. What has happened is 
that the most backward countries have begun to align themselves on the prices prevailing in 
the other Member States. For example, the ratio between the highest and the lowest prices for 
international telephone calls was reduced between 1991 and 1994 from four to two. 
Emergence of new entrants 
Liberalization has enabled new players to emerge, in spite of the predominance of public operators on the 
national scene... 
The development in competitive conditions in the mobile sector has led to an increase in the 
number of players (30 licensed operators in 1994. against 22 in 1991). New operators of 
satellite services for professional use have emerged (especially on the VSAT offers) and 
television broadcasting by satellite has made startling progress (55 channels in 1990. 180 
channels in 1995). New entrants have appeared in the voice segment (call-back companies, 
resellers). 
... but the lack of a European infrastructure is still holding back to a considerable extent the development 
of these new entrants, and tends to promote the domination of public operators 
At present, according to interviews and case studies, new entrants are limited in their 
development by: 
(a) the price and availability of connections leased internationally for international 
telephone services and data transmission; 
(b) the price of connections leased nationally for access to international networks and for 
mobile services. 
In the absence of competition on infrastructures, the public operators have at least the 
advantage over the new entrants that they can plan their development in awareness of the 
future availability and prices of these leased connections, especially for high throughput. 
Summan 
The 1998 date for complete liberalization of voice telephony is therefore being awaited 
impatiently by the new entrants, who will be able to by-pass the routes presently open to them 
and use their own networks, which will have a definite impact on costs. 
Job creation 
All the developments occurring in the field of services open to competition have led to a net 
gain in employment estimated at 28.500 new jobs between 1990 and 1994 both with public 
operators and with the new entrants, especially in the mobile communication services. 
However, these new jobs have not yet compensated for the jobs which at the same time have 
been eliminated by the public operators on non-deregulated services; these are outside the 
scope of the study. These job losses have been estimated at 115.500 over the same period, and 
have occurred chiefly in technical operation areas in the public networks. 
Table 1.1. Illustration of major developments in the single market in 
telecommunications services open to competition between 1987 and 1995 
Sector 
Effect 
of single market 
Creation of 
pan-European 
services 
Reinforcement 
of the 
European 
industry 
Homogeneous 
environment 
and efficiency 
of the sector 
Contracting and 
converging 
prices 
Emergence of 
new entrants 
.lob creation 
Mobile 
GSM standard, and 
increase in roaming 
agreements from 70 to 
471 between 1992 and 
1995 
European industrialists 
and operators have 
become market leaders 
in digital services 
based on the GSM. 
Development of intra-
European agreements 
Annual fall of 12.5% 
in the price per minute 
of GSM 
communications 
between 1992 and 
1995 
Growth in number of 
licensed operators 
from 22 to 30 between 
1991 and 1994 
Creation of 21.000 
jobs at PTOs and the 
new entrants from 
1990 to 1994 
Data 
transmission 
Development of pan-
European 
infrastructures by 
public operators and. 
at a lesser level, by US 
operators 
Growth in market 
share of international 
players of European 
origin from 12 to 23% 
between 1991 and 
1993 
Disparate price 
reduction 
Reduction in the 
market share of the 
live largest players 
from 56 to 48% from 
1991 to 1993 
Creation of 5.500 jobs 
at PTOs and the new 
entrants from 1990 to 
1994 
Telephony 
Development of card 
services and 
international virtual 
private networks 
Creation of 
international consortia 
with a strong presence 
of European operators 
Reduction of prices of 
calls to the US by 42% 
between 1990 and 
1995. 
Reduction in the ratio 
between the highest 
and the lowest price 
from four to two 
Emergence of many 
call-back and traffic 
reselling companies 
since 1993 
Recent creation of 
several hundred jobs 
in Europe 
Satellites 
Pan-European services 
by nature 
Maintenance of the 
European virtual 
monopoly 
Relative fall in prices 
with equal capacity 
Growth in number of 
VSAT operators and 
increase in TV 
channels from 55 to 
180 between 1990 and 
1995 
Not significant 
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These changes of course reflect certain underlying trends in the telecommunications sector, 
more or less independently of the European programme. 
Technological changes have improved the quality and reduced the cost of equipment, thus 
permitting the development of new telecommunications services. For example, the digitization 
of networks and access points, the integration of electronic components and a better command 
of radio techniques have had an impact on the various services studied. 
The industry standards for telecommunications, approved by the International Telephone and 
Telegraph Consultation Committee (CCITT) at international level, influence changes in 
equipment and services. They usually occur as a result of proposals originating in Europe or 
the US. 
The globalization of the economy has had an impact on telecommunications services because 
of the internationalization of trade and the growth in needs, especially for the transmission of 
computer data. 
The strategies of the dominant players, public operators, manufacturers of telecommunications 
equipment and computer designers, are directly associated with changes in the sectors under 
study. 
The role of the national regulators results in certain local changes, especially in the grant of 
licences for services open to competition, and through the local interpretation of Community 
rules. 
Table 1.2. Effect of underlying trends in the telecommunication sector on the key 
changes noted over the period 1987 to 1995 
External factors 
Effects 
of single market 
Creation of 
pan-European 
services 
Reinforcement of 
the European 
industry 
Homogeneous 
environment and 
efficiency of the 
sector 
Technological 
developments 
Improvement of 
services on 
offer. 
Improvement of 
the relationship 
between 
functions and 
costs 
Industry 
standards 
Standards of 
terminals and 
networks for 
homogeneous 
pan-European 
services 
Interoperability 
of networks and 
services. 
Entrv of new 
players 
Globalization 
of the economy 
Development of 
a pan-European 
demand bv 
companies 
Standardization 
bv the market 
(benchmarking) 
Strategy of key 
players 
International­
ization of public 
operators. 
Pan-European 
entry strategy of 
US players 
Opening up to 
the advantage of 
public operators 
Kev role on cost 
chanees of 
leased 
connections and 
the service tariff 
Role of national 
regulators 
Effects sometimes 
negative due to local 
interpretation of 
market opening 
conditions 
However, many of these developments can also be directly attributed to the European actions, 
which have had consequences of two kinds. 
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Through its various actions, whether to encourage or to compel, the Commission has had two 
forms of effect on the development of the single market in telecommunications services open 
to competition. 
(a) A motor effect has speeded up the development of the single market, thanks to: 
(i) action to encourage developments, such as announcements which lead the various 
players in the field to anticipate a new strategic framework. For example, the effects 
of the Green Paper (COM(87) 290) on the development of telecommunications 
services by 1992 and the present positioning of all the key players in anticipation of 
the proclaimed deregulation of infrastructures and services in 1998; 
(ii) regulatory action such as the Framework Services (90/388/EEC) and ONP 
(90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC) Directives, which have led to a simultaneous 
standardization of market conditions in all the Member States, thus bringing about a 
block effect which justifies the development and reinforcement of a European 
service industry. Without this simultaneous opening, it is probable that the US 
players, having already acquired sufficient stature in their large deregulated market, 
would have taken advantage of a gradual opening, country by country. 
(b) A facilitating effect of technical and regulatory standardization has been achieved, 
leading to greater efficiency in the markets in terms of prices, competition and 
employment, through: 
(i) induction of the standardization kind, accompanying key standards; 
(ii) general regulatory actions, such as the ONP Directives. 
These effects have varied according to the sectors under study. 
The mobile telephony sector, although governed by a legal system determined at the bequest 
of the Member States themselves, has benefited from the climate created by the Commission 
for the multiple grant of GSM licences. By supporting the standard, the Commission has 
contributed to the development of a pan-European service from which users have benefited, 
and has enabled European constructors to become leaders. Moreover, some kinds of bilateral 
action have been taken to prompt certain Member States to grant a second licence. 
The market in data transmission services has acquired a pan-European dimension. Since 
Council Directive 90/387/EEC on the establishment of the single market for télécoms services 
through the implementation of open network provision (ONP Framework Directive) and 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services (Services Directive), the market has been internationalized: the share of non-domestic 
actors in deregulated data transmission services has gone up from 24 to 35%, and this trend 
has benefited actors of European origin, whose market share has increased from 12 to 23%. 
The 1990 Green Paper (COM (90) 490) recommending the liberalization of the land segment, 
unrestricted access to space capacity, commercial freedom for operators of satellite systems, 
and the mutual recognition of national permits, as well as the 1994 directive (94/46/EC) which 
liberalizes the system of satellite services, have resulted in some déconcentration in the space 
segment. Above all. however, they have facilitated the arrival of new service providers on the 
land segment. The development of space activity is heavily dependent on the television sector, 
which has really taken off since the 1989 directive on Television without frontiers" 
(89/552/EEC). 
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The Council Resolution of 22 July 1993, on a review of the situation in the 
telecommunications sectors, fixed the liberalization of the telephony market for 1998. 
Anticipation of this date by the call-back companies and resellers of traffic, and a broad 
interpretation of the concept of Closed User Groups, has enabled re-routing and virtual private 
network (VPN) offers to emerge. These have had a marked impact on the development of 
alternative telephony services for international communications, and on price reductions. 
Table 1.3. Impact of the European programme on the various trends observed for 
each of the types of telecommunication services open to competition 
Sector 
Effects of 
single market 
Creation of 
pan-European 
services 
Reinforcement of 
the European 
industry 
Homogeneous 
environment and 
efficiency of the 
sector 
Mobiles 
A motor effect 
through induction. 
standard setting 
through the European 
Telecommunications 
Standards Institute 
(ETSI) and its support 
for allocation of the 
900 MHz waveband 
A facilitating effect 
through bilateral 
regulatory action to 
open up certain 
markets 
A facilitating effect 
through induction. 
standard setting and 
standardization of 
markets 
Data transmission 
A facilitating effect 
through induction. 
Recommendation 
92/283 and regulatory 
action in the 
Directives on Services 
90/388, and ONP 
90/387 and 92/44 
A motor effect 
through regulator)' 
action in the 
Directives on Services 
90/388 and ONP 
Leased Lines 92/44 
A motor effect 
through regulatory 
action in the 
Directives on Services 
90/388. ONP 90/387 
and Leased Lines 
92/44 
Telephony 
A facilitating effect 
through regulatory' 
action in the 
Directives on Services 
90/388. and ONP 
90/387 and 92/44 
A motor effect 
through induction -
1993 Council 
Resolution 
A motor effect 
through induction -
1993 Council 
Resolution 
Satellites 
A facilitating effect 
through regulator)' 
action of the Satellite 
Directive 93/97 
A motor effect 
through induction: 
Green Paper on 
Satellites (COM (90) 
490) and regulator)' 
action in the Satellite 
Directive 93/97 
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Part I: Effectiveness of the measures taken with a view 
to integrating the single market 
Introduction 
The Commission has intervened progressively in the field of telecommunications, dealing in 
turn with the various segments of the sector: 
(a) terrestrial services, forming the main subject of the 1987 Green Paper (COM (87) 290) 
(cf. list below), on the basis of which the relevant harmonization and liberalization 
directives will be implemented; 
(b) satellite telecommunications, in turn the subject of a Green Paper in 1990 (COM (90) 
490). also leading to liberalization and harmonization directives being adopted; 
(c) mobile communications, dealt with in a third Green Paper in 1994 (COM (94) 145); and 
(d) infrastructures, with the publication of a Green Paper in 1995 (COM (95) 158). 
It should be noted that the last two Green Papers have not yet been implemented as directives. 
The 1987 Green Paper is the foundation of the Commission's active intervention in 
telecommunications. It includes ten key points, presented as proposals, which are: 
(a) agreeing to uphold the principle of exclusivity or special rights of the telecommunications 
administrators in terms of tendering and operating the network infrastructure; 
(b) accepting to uphold the principle of exclusivity or special rights to the benefit of the 
telecommunications administrators for the voice telephony service; 
(c) open tendering of all other services; 
(d) strict requirements relating to standards; 
(e) clear definition of the general requirements for use of the network (ONP); 
(0 open tendering of terminal equipment; 
(g) division of the regulation and operating activities; 
(h) application of the Community competition rules to telecommunications administrators; 
(i) application of the Community competition rules to private service providers; 
(j) application to telecommunications of the Community common commercial policy. 
After being debated by the Member States and the Commission, the ten proposals were 
implemented as directives to be transposed to national law. 
This section presents the rules put forward at Community level for terminal equipment, 
services and network access   
It then examines the Community competition rules and the main Commission application 
cases and reviews the actual transposition of these rules to the Member States" legislation 
(detailed in Chapter 3). 
The last part gives an overall examination of the obstacles which are still to be removed, with 
a view to fully implementing the Commission directives and recommendations regarding non-
reserved services. 
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2. Overview of EU rules applicable to non-reserved 
services 
2.1. Rules applicable to terminal equipment 
2.1.1. Liberalization of terminal equipment 
Directive 88/301 /EEC opens the telecommunications terminal equipment markets to 
competition. It abolishes exclusive rights to import, market, connect and commission terminal 
equipment. It requires that operating and regulatory activities be separated. 
Adopted on 16 May 1988. it was to be transposed to the internal legislation of the Member 
States by 1 July 1989 at the latest. 
2.1.2. Mutual recognition of tests then approvals 
In (he terrestrial sector 
The first directive. 86/361/EEC. dated 24 July 1986. was abrogated by Directive 91/263/EEC 
of 29 April 1991. This directive sets up a procedure for mutual recognition of approvals (in 
addition to just tests), the common technical regulations being adopted by the Commission 
and by the regulatory committee ACTE (Approvals Committee for Terminals Equipment). 
Adopted on 29 April 1991. it was to be transposed to Member States* legislation by 
6 November 1992. 
In the satellite sector 
Directive 93/97/EEC of 29 October 1993 extends the last-mentioned directive to ground 
station equipment for satellite communications. This directive was to be transposed before 
29 October 1994. 
2.2. Rules applicable to services 
Pursuant to the proposals of the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission has required the 
liberalization of some telecommunications services. 
2.2.1. Telecommunications services on wired infrastructures 
Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 opens to competition the provision of telecommun­
ications services on wired infrastructures, with the exception of the voice telephony service. It 
grants the Member States the opportunity to wait until 1 January 1993 before opening basic 
data transmission to competition, and grants them the right to subject the use of these services 
to an authorization system provided with a public service schedule. 
On 18 October 1995, the Commission furthermore adopted a directive (95/51/EC) authorizing 
the use of cabled networks for tendering services which had already been liberalized. 
2.2.2. Satellite telecommunications services 
Directive 94/46/EC liberalizes the satellite services sector. 
14 Telecommunications: liberalized services 
2.2.3. Mobile services 
Directive 96/2/EC regarding mobile and personal communications services was adopted on 
16 January 1996. 
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the legal provisions governing telecommunications services in 
Europe, as well as the ways of applying them at Member State level. 
Table 2.1. EU regulations on services 
Legal system for infrastructures and services 
Possible monopoly for infrastructures (until 1 January 1998 
in most Member States. 1 January 1996 for cabled networks) 
Possible monopoly for voice telephony 
Liberalization of package or circuit data switching services -
value added network services (VANS) 
Liberalization of other services (apart from the voice 
telephony service) 
Procedures 
Member States free to choose the procedures 
Member States free to choose the procedures 
Opportunity for the Member States to subject this 
liberalization to authorization or declaration procedures 
entailing a public service schedule intended to respect: 
• essential requirements: or 
• commercial legislation relating to conditions of 
continuity, availability and quality of service: or 
• measures intended to safeguard the general economic 
mandate which they entrusted to a telecommunications 
body regarding data switching, if the action of the 
private service providers risks compromising this 
mandate 
These conditions must be objective, transparent and without 
discriminator)' effects (Article 3 of the Services Directive) 
Opportunity for the Member States to subject this 
liberalization to authorization or declaration procedures 
intended to respect essential requirements. Authorization 
must be granted on the basis of criteria which are objective, 
transparent and without discriminator)' effects 
Table 2.2. Legal regimes for the networks and services not covered by 
the Services Directive 
Mobile sector 
Cable sector 
States free to choose the legal system so long as the 
regulator)' framework of the European Union is respected 
States free to choose the legal system so long as the 
regulator)' framework of the European Union is respected, 
until 1 Januar)' 1996 
2.3. Open Network Provision (ONP) 
The purpose of the ONP is to ensure that the telecommunications bodies and the other 
telecommunications providers have equal access to the new telecommunications markets. It 
appeared necessary to adopt common principles relating to the general network access 
conditions because the historical telecommunications operators are both network monopoly 
holders and providers, in competition with others, of non-reserved services offered using this 
network. 
The general principles of the ONP were defined in a 1990 Framework Directive and were 
subsequently applied specifically to leased lines, to integrated services digital network (ISDN) 
and to packet transmissions (see Section 2.3.1). 
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2.3.1. The Framework Directive 
Directive 90/387/EEC puts forward the principle of providing an open telecommunications 
network. Its purpose is to harmonize the ISDN conditions for public telecommunications 
networks. The conditions for provision of access to the public network and public 
telecommunications services should thus satisfy certain basic principles: 
(a) they must be based on objective criteria; 
(b) they must be transparent and published; 
(c) they must guarantee equal access; 
(d) they must not be discriminatory. 
These conditions apply: 
(a) to technical interfaces; 
(b) to provision and utilization conditions (maximum supply time scale, quality of service, 
capacity resale, shared use conditions and conditions for interconnection with public and 
private networks); 
(c) to the principles governing tariffs. 
It entered into force on 1 January 1991. 
2.3.2. Application to leased lines 
Directive 92/44/EEC applies the ONP concept to leased lines. 
The purpose of this document is to harmonize the conditions for tendering leased lines, and 
thereby to establish open access to these lines (ONP concept). Also to be published are the 
conditions concerning the information relating to the order procedure, the standard provision 
time scale, the contractual period, the standard repair time and any method of reimbursement. 
Any refusal to provide lines can be justified only on the basis of essential requirements, i.e. 
security, integrity and interoperability of the services. 
The same provision conditions are fixed by the Member States. A minimum volume of leased 
lines must be offered in all Member States. The leased line tariffs must respect the principle of 
fair pricing (appropriate accounting system). 
2.3.3. Council Recommendation 92/383/EEC of 5 June 1992 
This Council recommendation relates to the provision of harmonized ISDN access 
opportunities and to a minimum number of ISDN tenders according to the ONP principles. 
The recommendation invites the Member States to give a domestic guarantee of the provision 
of an ISDN offering harmonized access opportunities and a minimum number of services 
according to the ETSI standards, as well as appropriate and efficient interoperability between 
ISDNs so as to allow commercial use throughout the Community. The information relating to 
this tender must be published (order procedure, standard delivery time scale, standard repair 
time, contractual period, reimbursement procedure and target value of the quality indicators). 
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2.3.4. Council Recommendation 92/382/EEC of 5 June 1992 
This Council recommendation relates to the harmonized tendering of a minimum number of 
packet data transmission services (PSDS) according to the ONP principles. The 
recommendation invites the Member States to give a domestic guarantee of a minimum 
number of packet-switched data communication services with harmonized technology, in 
accordance with commercial demand. The information relating to this tender must be 
published (order procedure, standard delivery time scale, contractual period, standard repair 
time, reimbursement procedure and target values of the quality indicators). 
2.3.5. Directive 95/62/EC of 13 December 1995 
This Directive relates to the ONP applied to voice telephony: this directive, relating to the 
harmonization of fixed public telephone networks and services, applies to mobile networks 
and services only in the context of interconnecting them with fixed networks. The document 
includes a very wide range of areas qualifying fixed telephone services, ranging from terminal 
equipment connection to tariff principles, including criteria relating to quality of service, 
advanced service provision, interconnection conditions, numbering principles, etc. 
2.4. Mobile communications frequencies 
The European Community has intervened in the mobile sector by fixing the frequency bands 
to be used in order to offer pan-European mobile services. 
It has adopted the following documents. 
2.4.1. Global system for mobile communications (GSM) 
Council Directive 87/372/EEC of 25 June 1987 on the frequency bands to be reserved for the 
coordinated introduction of pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications 
in the Community (OJL 196, 17.7.1987, p. 85) 
The Member States were required to assign the 905-914 MHz frequency bands, or equivalent 
parts of the 890-915 and 935-960 bands, exclusively to digital cellular public mobile 
communications services before 1 January 1991. This service should eventually use all of the 
890-925 and 935-960 MHz bands. 
Council Recommendation 87/371/EEC of 25 June 1987 on the coordinated introduction of 
pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications in the Community (OJ L 
196, 17.7.1987, p. 81) 
The pan-European digital cellular mobile communications system must satisfy a number of 
conditions relating, amongst other things, to traffic flow, transmission quality, choice of the 
transmission system, network architecture, etc. 
2.4.2. One-way radiopaging (ORP) 
Council Directive 90/544/EEC of 9 October 1990 on the frequency bands designated for the 
coordinated introduction of pan-European land-based public radiopaging in the Community 
(OJL 310. 9.11.1990, p. 28) 
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According to the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations 
(CEPT) Recommendation T/R 25-07, the Member States were to designate four channels in 
the 169.4 to 169.8 MHz band, and preferably the 169.6 MHz, 169.65 MHz, 169.7 MHz and 
169.75 MHz channels, before 18 October 1991. They were to ensure that plans be prepared as 
soon as possible in order to allow the pan-European terrestrial public service for ORP to 
occupy the entire band from 169.4 to 169.8 MHz according to commercial requirements. 
Council Recommendation 90/543/EEC of 9 October 1990 on the coordinated introduction of 
pan-European land-based public radiopaging in the Community (OJ L 310, 9.11.1990, p. 23) 
The pan-European public terrestrial system for one-way radiopaging is to be set up in 
coordination while taking into account the work by ETSI and respecting certain conditions 
relating, amongst other things, to the number of users, connection to PSTN, PSN, etc. 
2.4.3. Digital European cordless telecommunications (DECT) 
Council Directive 91/287/EEC of 3 June 1991 on the frequency band to be designated for the 
coordinated introduction of digital European cordless telecommunications (DECT) into the 
Community (OJL 144, 8.6.1991, p. 45) 
According to CEPT Recommendation T/R 22-02, the Member States were to designate the 
1880-1900 MHz frequency band for European cordless telephony by 1 January 1992. Accord­
ing to the CEPT recommendation, DECT takes priority over other services in the same band 
and is protected in the designated band. 
Council Recommendation 91/288/EEC of 3 June 1991 on the coordinated introduction of 
digital European cordless telecommunications (DECT) into the Community (OJ L 144, 
8.6.1991. p. 47) 
Digital European cordless telephony is to be set up in coordination while respecting certain 
conditions which, amongst other things, relate to user requirements, the number of systems 
which can operate simultaneously, and the choice of transmission system. 
Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with 
regard to mobile and personal communications (OJ L 20, 26.1.1996, p. 59) 
Article 2 of the directive requires the Members States to grant, on request, licences for the 
operation of DCS 1800 systems (by 1 January 1998) and Pointel systems, and to ensure 
effective competition between operators of competing systems in the markets in question. 
2.5. Public contracts in the excluded sectors 
The process of opening the European public markets was initiated in 1971 by the adoption of 
Directives 71/304/EEC and 71/305/EEC, relating to public works and supply contracts. 
However, the telecommunications sector did not enter the field of application of this process 
until 1990. when the Council adopted Directive 90/531 /EEC relating to the procedures for 
awarding contracts in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors. This 
directive concerns both public contracts, and contracts undertaken by private entities holding 
exclusive or special rights. It was later supplemented by Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 
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1992, coordinating the legislative, regulatory and administrative provisions relating to the 
application of Community rules to the procedures for awarding contracts to entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, and by Directive 92/50/EEC of 
18 June 1992, coordinating public service contract award procedures. 
One characteristic of the telecommunications sector, which has long been under monopoly 
control, is the desire in each Member State to conclude contracts with the national providers 
and to protect their respective telecommunications industries. These directives thus have an 
industrial dimension. Contracts are often awarded with unequal competition. In particular, the 
contracting authority often enters into close long-term relationships with a limited number of 
providers and reaches an agreement with them with the aim of achieving certain objectives, for 
example to improve product quality and reliability and to develop new products. Since 
technology develops and products become upgraded, manufacturers have to invest 
considerable resources in research and development, with the result that the customer 
contributes to the financing of research. 
However, walling off the national markets in this field is not conducive to the development of 
an open single market. One of the aims of the Community telecommunications policy is to 
open up the telecommunications supply and works markets effectively. The directives 
mentioned above therefore put forward conditions regarding the procedures to be adopted for 
awarding contracts. The intention is to guarantee transparency and competition. 
2.6. Application of EU competition rules 
The Community competition rules (Article 85. 86 and 90 of the EU Treaty, and the Merger 
Regulation) apply to the telecommunications sector. 
(a) Article 85 prohibits inter-company agreements which may affect trade between Member 
States and whose purpose or effect is to prevent, restrict or vitiate competition within the 
Common Market. An individual exemption may be granted when the Commission deems 
that such agreements which restrict competition may nevertheless help improve 
production or distribution of products or promote technical or economic progress while 
keeping an equitable share of the resulting profit for the users, and without competition 
being fully eliminated. 
(b) Article 86 prohibits any abuse by one or more companies in a dominant position over the 
Common Market or a substantial part of it. 
(c) Regulation No 4064/89, relating to concentration controls, prohibits concentrations which 
create or reinforce a dominant position leading to the restriction of effective competition 
over the Common Market or a substantial part of it. 
The first application of these Community competition rules to the telecommunications sector 
concerned BT in 1985. The case related to the abuse of the dominant position, since BT 
required the telex agencies to pay the message retransmission tariffs. 
In view of the evolution of the telecommunications sector in the 1990s, on 26 July 1991 the 
Commission adopted a communication entitled 'Guidelines concerning the application of EC 
competition rules in the telecommunications sector' (91/C233/2). These guidelines were 
expressly provided for in the Commission programme of 9 February 1988 relating to the 
implementation of the 1987 Green Paper on the development of the single telecommunications 
services and equipment market. 
Overview of the EU rules applicable to non-reserved services 
The purpose is to clarify the application of the competition rules to public and private 
telecommunications operators, so that these operators can quickly decide on their actions 
while respecting the competition rules. 
The guidelines thus set out the general principles of the competition rules applicable to 
telecommunications bodies (Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty on European Union), as well as 
the link between these provisions and the competition rules applicable to the States (Article 
90) and other Community provisions (ONP texts). They present examples of agreements 
which restrict competition, as well as cases in which exemption may be justified. They also 
specify the concept of an abuse of dominant position by giving the following examples: 
refusal to grant access to a network, discrimination, cross-subsidization of non-reserved 
activities, abuse in standardization and refusal to provide interfaces. 
In particular, the Commission specifies that it will take into account the market position of the 
companies in question when determining the impact on competition due to agreements and 
abusive behaviour by companies operating in the telecommunications sector. It will then 
assess this market position by taking into account interrelations between activities (services 
and equipment for public networks) and the interaction between the Community and world 
markets. When the two parties to an agreement are members of the Community, the 
Commission may take into account the competition which may take place outside the 
Community (global competition). So long as competition is not globally compromised, the co­
operation agreements and the joint ventures may therefore be authorized even if the market 
shares which they hold are very considerable within the Community. 
The Commission used this analysis method in the case of the agreement between BT and MCI, 
and in the cases of Eunetcom and Atlas. 
(a) BT-MCI agreement: by its decision of 13 September 1993, the Commission decided that 
the taking of a 20% share in the capital of MCI (US$ 4.3 billion) by BT, and the creation 
of a joint company Newco, did not constitute a reprehensible concentration in the sense of 
the Merger Regulation. 
Newco is to become involved in the high-level or value added network services intended 
for large multinational companies, enterprises with a very wide geographical range and 
major users of telecommunications services nationally and abroad. These services will be 
provided using intelligent international networks. The market in question is to cover a 
number of cross-border global services already in existence, and in particular virtual 
network services, high-speed data transmission services and subcontracted global 
telecommunications solutions especially designed to meet the needs of target customers. 
(b) France Télécom - Deutsche Bundespost Telekom agreement: on 3 June 1993 the Com­
mission received notification of the creation of a joint venture 'Eunetcom' between 
France Télécom and Deutsche Bundespost Telekom. Eunetcom is intended to offer 
international business networks to private users and VANS. After preliminary 
examination, the Commission deemed that this venture could be classed as an agreement 
restricting competition. 
(c) France Télécom - Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (DBPT) agreement: on 16 December 
1994. the Commission received notification of a joint venture project between France 
Telecom and Deutsche Bundespost Telekom, referred to as Atlas. This venture was to 
offer global communications services to companies throughout the world, including data 
transmission services, national and international virtual private networks, global 
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externalization and services using a VSAT microterminal. The parties are to merge their 
current worldwide sales organizations within Atlas, with the exception of France and 
Germany where Atlas is to create its own sales organization and is to conclude 
distribution agreements with France Télécom and DBPT. 
After preliminary examination, the Commission deemed that this agreement could 
constitute an infringement of Community competition rules, since the two operators 
would thereby reinforce their dominant position in their respective country through Atlas. 
The Commission furthermore deems that the Atlas project will not extend beyond 
national markets and questions its European and international dimension. 
The Commission therefore first refused to accept this agreement and demanded 
amendments by the parties. In particular, the two protagonists undertook not to merge 
their packet data transmission activities before 1 January 1998. 
(d) Unisource - Telefonica agreement: the Commission requested clarification of the agree­
ment concluded at the start of 1995 between Unisource and Telefonica. Finally, after 
giving a reasoned agreement to the merger (2 February 1996), the Commission declared 
that the Merger Regulation was not applicable to this operation (1 March 1996). 
The mobile communications sector has also been examined in detail by the Commission: 
(a) CMC-Talkline agreement: the project, concluded on the basis of Talkline (German SMC) 
and Norauto (automotive equipment sales and installation in France) taking a share in the 
capital of CMC (SMC created jointly by Matra Communications and Cellcom), provided 
various arrangements in terms of market sharing, in addition to strict financial details. The 
Commission demanded that some of these arrangements be withdrawn, in particular the 
non-competition agreement between the new shareholders and the consortium, and the 
limitations placed on the activities of CMC in France. 
(b) The Commission has also intervened in the scope of agreements made between industry 
and operators which consisted in integrating components with a view to restricting their 
use to a specified network. After starting in the United Kingdom for personal 
communication networks (PCN), this phenomenon has begun to spread to Germany and 
France. 
2.7. Conclusion 
The Commission therefore intervenes in the telecommunications field at various levels. Its 
lines of action can be broadly categorized into three groups: 
(a) Binding measures (in particular directives) which generally specify the methods and 
timetable for applying target measures throughout the countries of the European Union. 
(b) Measures of encouragement (recommendations, communications) setting out the desired 
directions for the fields in question throughout the European Union. 
(c) Bilateral actions between the European Commission and certain Member States. 
often in the context of improper measures (e.g. abuse of dominant position). 
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3. Application of EU rules in Member States 
There is a great disparity in the degree to which the rules enacted by the European 
Commission have been applied in different countries. Nevertheless, the analysis to which this 
part is given over allows three major patterns to be identified in terms of national legislation 
not conforming to European requirements: 
(a) Regulatory and operating activities which are not separated. This category includes 
Germany. Belgium. Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy. 
(b) VANS and basic data transmission services which are not liberalized. This category 
includes only Italy. 
(c) ONP concepts (transparent tendering conditions, minimum provision) which are not 
applied to leased lines. This category includes - in terms of incomplete transposition -
Belgium. Denmark. Finland, Ireland, and Italy, and - in terms of transposition underway -
Greece. 
3.1. Summary tables 
The following tables summarize the efforts made by the various Member States of the 
European Community to adapt their legislation to the requirements of directives relating to the 
telecommunication fields. 
Table 3.1 : Transposition status of the texts: 
■ texts applied in full; 
▲ texts being transposed; 
O texts partially transposed; 
G untransposed texts. 
Table 3.2: Transposition methods and texts for the European provisions. 
Table 3.3: Text transposition dates. 
Table 3.4: Main problems and deficiencies observed for each country. 
After the tables, the individual situation of each of the Member States of the Community is 
examined in terms of transposition of the European law to its own legal system and in the 
practice of its participants (official bodies and operators). 
Table 3.1. Text transposition status (mid­1996) 
Sectors 
References 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norwav 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
Term 
Directive 
88/301' 
Imposes 
liberal­
ization 
inals 
Directives 
9I/2632 
and 93/973 
Approval 
recog­
nition 
Services 
Directive 90/3884 (terrestrial sector) 
Imposes 
separation 
of 
regulation 
and 
operation 
O 
O 
Imposes 
VANS 
liberal­
ization 
from 1990 
O 
A 
Imposes 
liberal­
ization of 
simple data 
transport 
starting 
1 January 
1993 
State 
selection 
for infra­
structures 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
State 
selection 
for 
telephony 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
ONP 
Network access 
Directive 
90/3875 
(framework) 
Imposes 
liberal­
ization 
■ 
O 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
▲ 
O 
■ 
▲ 
A 
na. 
■ 
■ 
■ 
Directive 
90/387 
(framework) 
Access 
condition 
requirements; 
objective. 
transparent. 
equal access, 
non­
discriminatory 
O 
O 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
▲ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
na. 
O 
■ 
■ 
Directive 
92/446 
(leased lines) 
Imposes 
publication of 
tender 
conditions. 
minimum 
tendering, fair 
pricing for 
tariffs 
■ 
O 
O 
O 
■ 
■ 
▲ 
o o ■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
Recommend­
ation 92/3827 
(packets) 
Advises 
minimum 
tendering. 
publication of 
tender 
conditions 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
Recommend­
ation 92/383" 
(ISDN) 
Advises 
minimum 
tendering, 
publication 
of tender 
conditions 
(quality 
indicators) 
■ 
n.a. 
Public procurement 
Directive 
90/53 Γ 
Directive 
92/13"' 
Competition 
transparency 
O 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
▲ 
n.a. 
■ 
O 
na 
■ 
■ 
■ 
O 
■ 
O 
■ 
O 
■ 
■ 
o 
n.a. 
■ 
O 
n.a. 
delav 
■ 
■ 
M: monopoly. ■ fully transposed (or defacto applied). 
C: competition. ▲ being transposed (or partially applied). 
O partially transposed. 
D not transposed. 
1 OJ L 131.27.5.1988. p. 73. 
2 OJL 128. 23.5.1991, p. 1. 
3 OJL 290. 24.11.1993, p. 1. 
4 OJL 192. 24.7.1990, p. 10. 
5 OJ L 192. 24.7.1990. p. 1. 
6 OJL 165. 19.6.1992. p. 27. 
7 OJL 200. 18.7.1992. p. 1. 
8 OJL 200. 18.7.1992. p. 10. 
9 OJL 297. 29.10.1990. p. I. 
10 OJL 76. 23.3.1992. p. 14. 
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Table 3.2. Transposition methods and texts for the European provisions 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Terminal equipment 
Directive 
88/301 
1993 law 
1991 
operator 
and State 
contract 
law 
1989 and 
1992 law 
and order 
1992 law 
transposed 
1989 law 
1994 law 
transposed 
1991 law. 
1992 
decrees 
transposed 
1989 law 
transposed 
1987 law 
transposed 
transposed 
Directives 
91/263 and 
93/97 
1994 
decree 
not 
transposed 
1992 law 
and order 
1992 law 
1994 
regulations 
transposed 
1991 
decree, 
modified in 
1992 
decision 
pending 
legislators' 
instrument 
pending 
1992 
decree 
transposed 
pending 
1993 
decree 
1994 royal 
decree 
transposed 
regulation 
Services 
Directive 
90/388 
1993 law 
1991 
operator 
and State 
contract 
law 
1990 law 
1992 law 
and decree 
1990 law. 
decree. 
orders 
1989 law. 
amended in 
1994 
1994 law 
1992 
legislative 
instrument 
decree 
pending 
transposed 
1989 law 
transposed 
1992 law 
law. ruling 
of 1993 
de facto 
application 
Directive 
94/46 
not 
transposed 
not 
transposed 
1992 law 
pending 
1990 law 
1989 law. 
amended in 
1994 
decision 
pending 
not 
transposed 
not 
transposed 
transposed 
pending 
information 
not 
commun­
icated 
royal 
decree 
(12/95) 
law. order, 
regulation, 
admin, 
decision 
defacto 
application 
ONP 
Directive 
90/387 
1993 
reform 
1991 law 
operator 
contracts 
concluded 
1987 law 
1990 law. 
terms and 
conditions 
transposed 
in 1992 
1994 law 
1992 
legislative 
instrument 
1993 and 
1994 
decrees 
contracts 
defacto 
no 
information 
1992 law. 
subsequent 
resolutions 
law, order, 
regulation, 
admin, 
decision 
de facto 
trans­
position 
Directive 
92/44 
1993 
reform 
1991 law. 
operator 
and State 
contract 
transposed 
1987 law 
1993 
decree 
orders 
transposed 
in 1992 
decree 
pending 
1994 
legislative 
instrument 
1994 
decree 
contracts 
transposed 
1994 
decree 
decree 
(995) 
law. order, 
regulation, 
admin, 
decision 
1993 
regulation 
Recomm. 
92/382 
applied 
without 
specific 
text 
not applied 
contracts 
applied 
1993 order 
not applied 
defacto 
application 
not applied 
not applied 
contracts 
not applied 
information 
not 
commun­
icated 
1992 law. 
1993 law. 
1993 order 
information 
not 
commun­
icated 
1992 
direction 
Recomm. 
92/383 
applied 
without 
specific 
text 
not applied 
ministry 
operator 
agreement 
applied 
not 
transposed 
not applied 
defacto 
application 
not applied 
not applied 
contracts 
not applied 
information 
not 
commun­
icated 
defacto 
application 
information 
not 
commun­
icated 
transposed 
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Table 3.3. Text transposition dates 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Terminals 
Directive 
88/301 
1993 
1991 
1989-92 
1992 
1988 
1989 
1994 
1990 
1991-92 
not 
commun­
icated 
1989 
not 
commun­
icated 
1987 
not 
commun­
icated 
not 
commun­
icated 
Directives 
91/263 and 
93/97 
1994 
not 
transposed 
1992 
1992-94 
1992 
1991-92 
pending 
pending 
1992 
not 
commun­
icated 
pending 
1993 
1994 
not 
commun­
icated 
1994 
Services 
Directive 
90/388 
1994 
1991 
1990 
1992 
1990 
1989-94 
1994 
1992 
pending 
not 
commun­
icated 
1989 
not 
commun­
icated 
1992 
not 
commun­
icated 
1982 
Directive 
94/46 
not 
transposed 
not 
transposed 
1992 
pending 
1990 
1989-94 
pending 
not 
transposed 
not 
transposed 
not 
commun­
icated 
pending 
not 
commun­
icated 
1995 
1993 
not 
commun­
icated 
ONP 
Directive 
90/387 
1993 
1991 
not 
commun­
icated 
1987 
1990 
1992 
1994 
1992 
1993-94 
not 
commun­
icated 
1989 
not 
commun­
icated 
1992 
1993 
not 
commun­
icated 
Directive 
92/44 
1993 
1991 
1993 
1987 
1993 
1992 
pending 
1994 
1994 
not 
commun­
icated 
not 
commun­
icated 
1994 
1995 
1993 
1993 
Recomm. 
92/382 
(packet) 
indirect 
transpos­
ition 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
not 
commun­
icated 
1993 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
not applied 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
1992-93 
not 
commun­
icated 
1992 
Recomm. 
92/383 
(ISDN) 
not 
commun­
icated 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
not 
commun­
icated 
not applied 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
not applied 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
not applied 
not 
commun­
icated 
not 
commun­
icated 
not 
commun­
icated 
1993 
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Table 3.4. Main problems and deficiencies 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
texts transposed but effective application still limited 
market still not widely open to external access 
interpretation at minimum of Commission directives 
delay in transposing some directives (e.g. satellites) 
-
technical problems and delays in transposing the ONP Framework Directive 
insufficient texts relating to public contracts 
tariffs still high (in particular long-distance telephone and dedicated links) 
cross-subsidization (in particular support for Datex-P) 
extensive definition of "reserved services' 
definition at minimum of ONP specifications 
late text implementation (mostly 1994) 
no public contract text transposition 
Telecom Eireann still holds 'centralizer" role (monopoly on mobile services until the end of 1995, on 
satellite services, management of the ISDN numbering plan, etc.) 
lack of regulatory authority 
significant deficiency in transposing the Services Directive (in particular terrestrial and satellite 
services) 
limited transposition of the ONP texts 
directive transposition mainly based on contract between operator and its clients 
is the ministry really independent of the operator? 
ill-defined legal boundaries between reserved and non-reserved services 
extensive definition of basic services 
virtually no ONP text transposition 
deficiencies in transposing some directives (ONP) 
partial application of some texts 
no legal distinction between the concepts of networks and services 
BT contests ONP/Leased Line Directive interpretation 
3.2. Analysis of the level of implementation nationally 
A detailed examination of the effective transposition of Community directives into law, and 
into practice, in the Member States demonstrates a highly contrasting situation. A summary of 
the situation in the main Member States allows the following distinctions to be drawn. 
3.2.1. Countries ahead of schedule in terms of Community requirements 
The case of the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, that of Sweden are exemplary in this 
regard. 
As early as 1982. the United Kingdom granted a public telephony operator licence to a 
competitor of British Telecom, Mercury. The mobile services market was liberalized at the 
same time (two licences granted to BT/Cellnet and Racal/Vodaphone) together with the 
added-value network services. The year 1991 marked another milestone towards full market 
liberalization, since the 'cosy duopoly' between BT and Mercury was abolished: 111 licence 
applications were filed between the duopoly revision in 1991 and the end of 1994, of which 60 
have been granted and 33 were under appraisal at the start of 1995. 
For its part. Sweden has liberalized its telecommunications market very quickly and very fully, 
starting from a traditional situation with a single public operator monopoly (Televerket, 
renamed Telia when it was made a company in 1993). Placed under the independent authority 
of the Post and Telecommunications Agency, the sector was already widely open to 
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competition even before the Community directives appeared, Sweden not yet having joined 
the European Union when its market was liberalized. It is also interesting to note that the texts 
relating to terminal equipment could not be transposed because a monopoly did not exist in 
this field. 
Although somewhere behind, Finland and Denmark can be ranked together with Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, given that these two countries have fully revolutionized their 
telecommunications systems, and, in the case of Finland, to such an extent that almost all the 
provisions enacted by the Community were applied even before it became a member. 
Lagging somewhat behind, France nevertheless is a country which has undertaken extensive 
action to implement the Community directives, being ahead of schedule for some of the 
Commission requirements (1987 liberalization of VANS and analogue radio-
communications). However, some difficulties encountered by the new entrants show a relative 
delay in effective application of a few directives: 
(a) This is true, in particular, of the ONP Framework Directive (90/387) and the Leased Line 
ONP Directive (92/44), for which application was deemed to be too restrictive. The two 
main complaints were that France Télécom was not sufficiently in line with the 
transparency rules required by the directive, and that there were difficulties in making the 
public operator responsible to the courts. 
(b) Similarly, the Commission has reproached France for not transposing Directive 93/38 on 
public procurement, and has directed a reasoned opinion against them. 
3.2.2. Intermediate status countries 
These are mainly Germany, the three Benelux countries, Ireland and Spain. 
Germany has adopted a slow process for reforming its telecommunications system. 
In spite of its liberalism, Germany has not yet fully implemented the European tele­
communications legislation, and in some regards it is continuing to deviate substantially from 
the principles put forward by some of the directives. This is particularly true as regards 
independence of the regulatory authority from the dominant operator, since the Ministry of 
Post and Telecommunications has the remit both of being a regulator and of protecting 
Telekom AG. Likewise, a detailed examination of German legislation confirms that the 
European legislation for service liberalization and ONP recommendation application is 
lacking. 
For its part, Belgium is marked by tentative or even deficient application of the European 
directives, and by delays in implementing some of the measures (the mobile service market 
was finally opened only under injunction by the Commission). The most critical points are the 
questions of true regulator independence and failure to transpose the ONP directives and 
recommendations. Nevertheless, these points have not yet caused any significant practical 
problems. 
The position of the Netherlands is ambiguous, since although liberalization is relatively 
advanced, the principles enacted by the European Commission do not seem to be obeyed 
strictly. In particular, control of the dominant operator appears lax. 
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Even though an irregularity procedure was brought against Luxembourg for not transposing 
the Services Directive (90/388/EEC) and the Mutual Recognition Directives (91/263/EEC and 
93/97/EEC), it currently seems to be broadly in line with the directives and recommendations 
from the European Community, especially since the Council Resolution of 29 June 1993 on 
the review of the situation in the telecommunications sector and the need for further 
development in that market. 
In Ireland, although the Commission directives and recommendations have essentially been 
incorporated into law. a number of arrangements still seem necessary for the situation to 
become truly equitable (clear pricing rules, quality of service targets, etc.). With a view to 
fully opening the market, Ireland furthermore intends to reduce the grace period (2003) 
obtained from the Commission to the year 2000. 
Finally, Spain is making efforts to catch up quickly, in particular by virtue of the number of 
measures taken in 1994 and 1995. There are still a number of infringements of the principles 
held by the Commission (in particular representatives of the regulator being present in the 
Telefonica Administration Council) but the public authorities are obviously keen to make the 
necessary adjustments, as evinced by the decision to bring the liberalization date forward to 
1998 for the voice telephony market. 
3.2.3. Countries behind schedule in the European timetable 
These are countries such as Portugal, Greece, Austria and, above all, Italy. 
Because of their delay in developing telecommunications compared to most other European 
countries, Portugal and Greece have been granted grace periods for a number of measures. 
In contrast to Sweden and Finland, Austria, which has also recently entered the European 
Union, did not anticipate the Commission measures in terms of telecommunications. The 
country is consequently behind schedule for most of the requirements (in particular ONP). 
The Italian situation is more ambiguous. In spite of a clear effort to modernize the sector, from 
the start of the 1990s (the basic equipment level is currently equivalent to that of Belgium, and 
the development in the cellular service is outstanding), for the most part the non-reserved 
services are still not open to competition. 
There are actually many examples of the failure of Italy to implement European legislation: 
(a) no creation of a specific authority to regulate the sector; 
(b) no effective transposition of Directive 90/388 on Terrestrial Services for lack of decrees 
to apply the transposition law; 
(c) provision of additional restrictions (to cases beyond those provided by the directive) on 
the delivery of leased lines. 
The limitations most frequently put forward in practice essentially relate to three fields: 
defining and applying the ONP principles, tariffs and leased line access, and independence of 
the regulator from the historic operator. 
There are a number of problems regarding the first point. Firstly, some countries, such as 
Germany, have adopted a minimalistic definition of the ONP. with the result that the practical 
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possibilities for interconnection are consistently behind the opportunities afforded by new 
technologies. However, one of the arguments put forward in this case in favour of maintaining 
the status quo is that this matter of principle will in any case become outmoded as soon as the 
infrastructure market is opened. This theory is confirmed by the countries where the market is 
more fully open (United Kingdom and Sweden in particular), in which the obligations created 
by the ONP seem to be a 'luxury* entailing a redundant proliferation of legislation. 
In some countries, for example Belgium and Luxembourg, where the ONP principles are 
unclear or ill-defined, they nevertheless seem to have been applied de facto. The situation in 
France is almost the opposite, since the problem lies with practical application, in particular 
using technical interfaces. 
Regarding the second point (pricing and leased line access), this complaint is raised in almost 
all countries, including those which seem to be the most advanced and where the leased line 
tariffs are lower than the European average. This is so in the case of Sweden and Denmark. 
This question therefore seems to constitute an ultimate barrier after the open market has been 
fully sanctioned by law, and the new entrants will encounter it all the more sharply for having 
benefited from the other aspects of a 'liberal' environment. 
The last point, the question of the regulator being truly independent, is also a recurrent 
problem. Four scenarios can be identified in this regard: 
(a) countries in which the regulator is truly independent, and beyond government influence 
(the typical example is Oftel in the United Kingdom); 
(b) countries in which the regulator is truly independent of the operator but still dependent on 
the government (for example France and Germany, which are proposing an evolution 
towards more autonomous structures in their draft legislation); 
(c) countries in which the regulator and the operator still retain official ties (for example 
Spain, with the Ministry represented on the Telefonica Administration Council); 
(d) finally, countries in which the regulatory authority does not exist per se, for example Italy. 
The main question to be addressed for each of these points basically amounts to the individual 
responsibility of the Member States. 
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4. Barriers to the application of the directives 
4.1. Overview: the general barriers currently remaining in terms of implementing the 
Terminal, Services, ONP and Public Contract Directives 
It is not enough for the directives simply to be transposed: this must also happen on time, 
throughout the Member States and in the spirit of the directives. The following factors 
generally raise problems when transposing the directives: 
(a) differences in interpretation between the Commission and some of the States; 
(b) differences in interpretation between the States themselves; 
(c) differences in the transposition time scale; 
(d) differences in the transposition mechanism; 
(e) differences in the remit assigned to the national regulatory bodies; 
(0 differences in the criteria for the independence of the national regulatory body; 
(g) effects of transposition delays on operator action; and 
(h) even if the rules have been transposed, there may be problems due to misunderstanding 
and lack of knowledge regarding these rules. 
There are still many obstacles to coherent application of the Commission measures, as the 
following analysis shows. A distinction should be drawn between deficiencies relating to the 
texts themselves and those involving application in the Member States. It is also important to 
bear in mind that the Commission policy, intended to harmonize a fairly diverse European 
market, is inherently progressive. Although we have paid particular attention to the measures 
taken at the end of the 1980s (Green Paper, COM (87) 290) and at the start of the 1990s in 
Chapter 3. we have also mentioned a number of actions which were decided upon more 
recently and will not have full impact until the next few years. 
Table 3.4 gives a country by country breakdown of the main problems and deficiencies. 
4.2. The barriers: directive by directive 
4.2.1. Gauging the questions regarding effectiveness of the Commission's measures 
In the 1987 Green Paper (COM (87) 290), the Commission set out the following three goals to 
be pursued by the Community policy implemented in the telecommunications sector: 
(a) to promote the creation of an advanced European telecommunications infrastructure; 
(b) to assist the creation of a single market for services and equipment on a Community-wide 
scale; 
(c) to assist the competitiveness of industry and service providers in Europe. 
The Commission furthermore points out that the 1985 White Paper (COM (85) 310) laid down 
the principle that the telecommunications policy was to improve market efficiency in general. 
The effectiveness of the measures taken by the Commission should thus be analysed in respect 
of the basic constitutional freedoms of the European Union: in particular the freedom of 
movement of goods set out in Article 37 of the Treaty on European Union, and the freedom to 
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provide services, set out in Article 59 of the Treaty. An overview of these questions is given in 
the following tables: 
Table 4.1. Obstacles to the free movement of goods (Article 37 of the Treaty on 
European Union) 
Transposition of the directives governing telecommunications terminal equipment 
Source 
Nature 
Directive 88/301 ' 
Liberalization of the offer of terminal equipment 
Historic operator remains the dominant provider 
Directive 91/263 2 
Mutual recognition of approval 
Delay in adopting standards by ETSI 
1 OJL 131,27.5.1998. p. 73. 
2 OJL 128. 23.5.1991. p. 1. 
Table 4.2. Obstacles to the free provision of services (Article 59 of the Treaty on 
European Union) 
Transposition of the directives governing telecommunications services 
Source 
Nature 
Directive 90/388 ' 
Liberalization of services 
understanding the definition of the 
telephone service 
LL pricing for VANS and data 
transmission services and curbing 
the operators for the latter 
Directive 90/387 2 
ONP framework 
telephony service tariffs 
field of application 
too high 
Directive 92/44 3 
ONP/leased lines 
accounting system 
tariffs too high 
insufficient leased line 
capacity offered 
(LL) 
OJL 192. 24.7.1990, p. 10. 
OJL 192. 24.7.1990. p. 1. 
OJL 165, 19.6.1992, p. 27. 
4.3. Review of the obstacles: directive by directive 
4.3.1. Directive 88/301 : liberalization of telecommunications terminal equipment 
The purpose of this directive is to liberalize the telecommunications terminal equipment 
market, allowing any economic provider to import, market, connect, commission or service 
terminal equipment. However, this terminal equipment should conform to technical 
specifications, and the Member States may impose technical qualification requirements on the 
operators. 
In practice, transposing this directive has had little effect in terms of the first telephone set 
connected. Furthermore, in the vast majority of the Member States, competition exists but the 
historic operator is still the dominant provider. Beyond the 'cultural" reasons for which users, 
in particular residential users, still turn to the operator for an all-in service, the operators 
themselves put forward arguments with varying justification, for trying to impose their 
equipment on the market (maintenance in particular). 
4.3.2. Directive 91/263 : mutual recognition of terminal equipment approval 
The purpose of this directive is to ensure free movement of telecommunications terminal 
equipment and thus to conform with the principle set out in Article 37 of the Treaty on 
European Union. Any terminal meeting the technical specifications laid out by ETSI. and on 
these grounds approved by a body in the State in which it is distributed, must be allowed to be 
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distributed in the other States without any particular control procedures. Approval given in one 
State is therefore to be recognized by the other Member States. 
Effective implementation of this directive is hindered by the delay in ETSI adopting technical 
specifications for approval. The first standard was only adopted in January 1994. 
4.3.3. Directive 90/388 and Directive 94/46: liberalization of some of the 
terrestrial and satellite services 
The purpose of these directives was to liberalize the value added network services market, 
classed as non-reserved services, and the basic data transmission market. This requires that the 
principle of free provision of services, laid out in Article 59 of the Treaty on European Union, 
be respected for all the services. Being a general interest activity in the sense of Article 90(2) 
of the Treaty, the telephone service was exempted from application of this free movement of 
service principle and was classed as a 'reserved service'. 
4.4. Barriers resulting from the choice which the Member States are allowed in terms 
of telephone services 
The choice which Member States are allowed in terms of the legal system for the telephone 
service has raised questions in terms of understanding the definition of a telephone service. 
The Commission has actually put forward the following definition: 
The term 'voice telephony service' means a service available to the public for the commercial provision of direct 
transport of real-time speech via the public switched network or networks such that any user can use equipment 
connected to a network termination point at a fixed location to communicate with another user of equipment 
connected to another termination point. {Source: COM(96) 419 (Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for 
telecommunications in a competitive environment.) 
Not all the Member States have the same interpretation of the concept of 'commercial 
exploitation for the public', and some of them have decided that this definition includes the 
offering of a closed user group (CUG) telephone service, and have therefore not liberalized 
these services. Furthermore, by omission, the text indicates that a service connected to one of 
the ends of a dedicated link is not a reserved service. 
These questions have been debated by the Commission and the following States: Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland. Luxembourg, the Netherlands. Greece, Italy. Portugal and Spain; and have 
been settled by mutual consent. 
4.5. The existing barriers for the liberalization of non-reserved services (VANS) 
In practice, effective liberalization of the VANS is hindered by access and rental pricing of 
leased lines. The historic operators have often tried to impose unjustified delays in providing 
dedicated links to third-party operators, or even to refuse to provide them under some 
circumstances. 
Telefónica first refused to lease a 512 kbit/s link to Esprit Telecom, on the grounds that its use would probably be 
misappropriated to offer telephony. The Commission ruled in favour of Esprit Telecom. 
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For its part, the question of tariffs is one of the major problems found in a number of 
countries, and more particularly in Germany (the cost of dedicated links here being two to 
three times more than in other countries of the Union, cf. Figure 6.10). 
4.6. Existing barriers for the liberalization of basic data transmission services 
Basic data transmission services essentially correspond to X.25 services. In States which have 
not liberalized their infrastructures, these services correspond to the resale of leased lines. 
By the Community compromise of 7 December 1989, the States have obtained the right of not 
having to liberalize these services until 1 January 1993 (with further extensions for some 
countries) in order to have time to re-balance their tariffs and prevent competition from 
causing elitism which would be unfavourable to them. 
In actual fact, opening the market was of further benefit to historic operators who, starting 
from their respective national bases, extended their network to the pan-European level (e.g. 
BT or France Télécom/Transpac). 
4.6.1. Directive 90/387: ONP framework 
Tariffs 
Annex II of this Directive stipulates that 'the tariffs shall be based on objective criteria and in 
particular, for services subject to special or exclusive rights, shall be in principle cost-oriented, 
it being understood that fixing the same tariff level lies within the jurisdiction of national 
legislation ...' It is therefore up to the Member State to ensure that the telecommunications 
bodies apply this principle. 
In practice, a trend towards re-balancing tariffs has been observable, but this is hampered by 
various problems: on the one hand, cost-based tariffs presuppose an accurate method of eval­
uating these costs, and the rules governing this are numerous; while on the other, re-balancing 
tariffs weakens the operators in certain market segments:4 logic therefore frequently dictates a 
compromise between economic and strategic approaches. 
Furthermore, on the pan-European market level, the 'boundary effect' is still very significant: 
a three-minute peak-period call from one Member State to another costs on average 2.5 to 3 
times more than the most expensive long-distance national call. 
Field of application 
Implementing the directive has raised a problem in Finland because, in this State, the 
infrastructures are liberalized and each operator has the right to construct its own 
infrastructure. On the other hand, the operators do not benefit from any particular conditions 
governing access to their competitors' networks. The ONP Directive is therefore difficult to 
apply because of the market structure which this country has chosen. Nevertheless, this 
The success of cable telephony in the United Kingdom is largely due to the new entrants" capacity to offer lower local 
tariffs than BT. 
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situation is being amended, and three operators have recently gained the right to access their 
competitors' networks, without having the right to construct their own infrastructure. 
4.6.2. Directive 92/44: ONP leased lines 
A cost accounting system must be set up, making it possible to distinguish between direct 
costs and common costs and to align tariffs with costs. All the Member States are having 
difficulties in implementing this requirement. 
Tariffs 
The tariffs for high-capacity leased lines (two Mb/s links) in the European Union are on 
average ten times higher than those set for equivalent capacities over similar distances in 
North America. They can vary by a factor of two between different Member States, and in 
many cases lines of this type are not offered at all. Further to the fact that differences in 
network geography may explain some of these disparities, this phenomenon illustrates the 
problem in working with coherent cost calculation methods. 
4.7. Barriers due to institutional problems 
The impact of the Community telecommunications directives is also limited by institutional 
problems. 
4.7.1. Barriers which have been moved: the Commission's competence to impose market 
liberalization 
Implementation of Directive 88/301, relating to liberalizing the terminal equipment market, 
and Directive 90/388, relating to liberalizing the service market, have both been the subject of 
an action before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) to find the 
Commission without competence to alone adopt directives of this type (on the basis of Article 
90(3) of the Treaty on European Union). These actions were initiated by France, Belgium, 
Greece, Italy and Germany, regarding Directive 88/301, and by Spain supported by France, 
Belgium and Italy, as regards Directive 90/388. 
However, the CJEC twice, in 1991 and in 1992, found in favour of recognizing the 
Commission's competence to adopt on its own directives of this type, requiring liberalization 
of the national markets in question. 
4.7.2. Current barriers resulting from the regulation imposed by the directives: delay in 
adopting the texts caused by institutional problems 
The impact of the directives adopted by the Commission may be restricted by other intended 
directives not being adopted. 
The services and ONP directives require other directives to be adopted in order to fulfil their 
objective (creation of a single market in telecommunications services). The 1987 Green Paper 
thus provided for the adoption of a directive regarding mutual licence recognition and the 
adoption of a directive applying the ONP to voice telephony. It has not so far been possible to 
adopt these texts, in particular because of problems in assigning competence between the 
European authorities and the Member States. 
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Mutual recognition of licences: the problem of subsidiarity 
The implementation of Directive 90/388 (Services Directive) as regards the freedom to offer 
services, calls for the mutual recognition of licences among Member States, as licence types 
and licensing procedures vary considerably from one State to another, which limits the options 
for cross-border services. 
A 1992 draft directive (COM(92) 254) proposed the mutual recognition of licences, but the 
directive has still not been adopted, although adoption was initially intended for late 1994. 
This delay has resulted in the key requirements being defined on a national basis, with every 
State being free to include these requirements in its licences, according to the principle of 
subsidiarity. These requirements relate to the security and integrity of the network, the 
prevention of interference between frequencies, the efficient use of the spectrum, the inter­
operability of services, and data protection. 
Community regulatory authority: the problem of subsidiarity 
Likewise, the actual implementation of the Services Directive and the future directive on the 
mutual recognition of licences raises the problem of setting up a European regulatory authority 
to be responsible for regulating telecommunications. This again raises issues of subsidiarity 
among the powers held by the Community institutions and those held by the Member States. 
Open network provision and voice telephony: the problem of the distribution of powers 
between the European Parliament and the European Commission 
The first draft directive on ONP and voice telephony has not been adopted, as the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers have not succeeded in reaching agreement on the 
extent of the Parliament's competence with regard to committology and the framing of 
secondary norms. However, a subsequent draft (COM(95) 575) was successfully adopted on 
27 November 1995. 
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Part II: Impact of EU measures on the performance of 
services open to competition 
Introduction 
This document presents the findings of phase II of our study, a systematic analysis of the 
impact of the integration of the single market on the telecommunications services sector. 
Rapid developments have taken place in the recent years in the telecommunications services 
sector. New services have emerged, multiplying the number of players and possibilities on 
offer. It is therefore of interest to consider the impact of the single market and of the 
directives, recommendations and actions taken by the European Commission on the 
development of markets, on the players, and on the services offered to the end-users. 
Four categories of services have been selected, constituting a full range of telecommunications 
services and meeting criteria for deregulation and liberalization: 
(a) Mobile telephone: 
• public analogue cellular telephone; 
• public analogue digital telephone. 
(b) Data: value added data transmission services: 
• data network services (X.25, frame relay); 
• EDI; 
• paging; 
• others (videotex, etc.). 
(c) Voice services: 
• call-back; 
• calling cards; 
• call re-routing. 
(d) Satellites: 
• space segment: satellite capacity; 
• terrestrial segment: TV broadcasting services and VSAT. 
Each of the above categories of services has been studied according to the seven following 
areas of focus: 
(a) the internationalization of sales and activities; 
(b) the internationalization of supplies and geographical effects; 
(c) productivity and competitiveness; 
(d) effects of scale and dimension; 
(e) concentration and development of competitive conditions; 
(f) cost and price reductions; 
(g) interrelative ties. 
At the beginning of each chapter is a review of the European measures taken in the sector, 
followed by a description of the structural factors underlying the trends identified. 
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For each area of focus, a temporal series analysis of one or more indicators enables us to 
identify the trends on the single market and the breaking or bending points. By putting these 
indicators alongside the Commission's measures (subject matter and dates of introduction), it 
is possible to isolate, among the possible causes, the impact of the EU measures and 
recommendations. 
Finally, we summarize the chief trends noted in the sector, and analyse the changes which can 
be attributed to the 'single market'. 
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5. Mobile telephones 
5.1. Context 
Mobile telephony has expanded considerably in the EU since the introduction of the GSM 
standard (see Figure 5.1). The number of subscribers has risen dramatically, reaching 
21 million in 1995. As so many new licences have been granted, this trend will continue for 
several years. 
Figure 5.1. Number of mobile telephone subscribers in the EU: total number of 
subscribers (in million) 
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Source: Idate. 
In this section, we list the measures taken by the Commission in the mobile telephone sector, 
and in Section 5.2, we identify the main developments in this sector. 
In conclusion, we list the chief trends we have identified on this market in Europe, and 
determine how many of the changes in the sector can be attributed to European measures 
rather than to 'natural' growth. 
5.1.1. List of measures taken by the Commission 
A feature of the mobile sector is that there is no framework directive. However, the 
Commission has taken action in several different ways: 
(a) a 1987 Green Paper on mobiles; 
(b) the establishment of the ETSI (1987 Green Paper); 
(c) the 1987 Council recommendation on the co­ordinated introduction of mobile commun­
ications and the frequency bands to be reserved for them; 
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(d) the 1990 directive on services did not deal explicitly with public mobile telephony. 
However, this service was not described as a 'reserved service', as was fixed wire line 
telephony; 
(e) bilateral action to open up markets; 
(f) a directive on mobile and personal communications, amending Directive 90/388, was 
adopted on 20 December 1995. However, action by the European Commission, especially 
through the Green Paper on mobiles in 1987, was considerably ahead of this publication 
and has contributed to introducing a degree of competition in all countries. 
5.1.2. The structural factors in the sector 
The mobile telecommunications sector has developed under the influence of several factors 
which can be observed at the world level: 
(a) the structural role played by national regulators in granting licences; 
(b) technological progress associated with a better command of radio techniques and a higher 
degree of integration of components, leading to an overall improvement in the cost/quality 
ratio of all mobile systems; 
(c) geographical deployment of the key players: outside their national territories, operators 
are looking to develop in the countries with the most growth potential. Mention might be 
made of Airtouch in Germany and Portugal, US West in the United Kingdom, and France 
Télécom in the Lebanon, Poland and Belgium. 
It should be noted that action taken by the Commission before 1995 was primarily in the form 
of accompanying measures, without binding force. 
5.2. Detailed analysis 
5.2.1. The internationalization of sales and activities 
The market is still built around national players. There are two clear findings: 
(a) The infrastructures are still national ones; there is no pan-European network. 
(b) The service providers continue to be national; foreign operators do not enter the new 
markets except through minority capital shareholdings. 
Figure 5.2 shows that most subscriptions are still held by national capital, with over 85% of 
subscribers. This is due to the influence exerted by historic operators, the procedure for 
granting licences according to qualitative variables, which allows discretionary decision­
making, and the impossibility of reselling licences without the consent of local regulatory 
bodies. 
A genuine pan-European service availability 
However, in spite of the national character of infrastructures, the GSM standard has enabled a 
pan-European service to emerge. Although the networks are domestic and fragmented, a user 
who has taken out a GSM subscription in an EU country can reuse his terminal and gain 
access to the GSM service in all countries where operators have entered into agreements with 
the operator of the initial country. This 'roaming' function, which means that the continuity of 
the service can be guaranteed in a number of different countries, has been made possible by 
the use of a common standard, the GSM, and by the establishment of bilateral agreements 
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among the various mobile operators. The pan­European quality of the GSM service only 
became truly effective from 1994, the year in which most of the agreements were signed (see 
Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.2. Proportion of foreign investments and intra­EU and extra­EU share 
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The proportion of income gained from roaming by comparison with the total income from 
mobile services in Europe varies considerably from one country to another: a small country 
such as Luxembourg makes almost 90% of its income from roaming, whereas in larger 
countries such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom, roaming represents only 10% of 
income. 
Hence the development of the GSM standard has taken European mobile telephony from the 
level of fragmented national services to a pattern of a pan-European consumer service. Figure 
5.4 shows how this has happened. 
Figure 5.4. Impact of frequency management on the structure of the industry 
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Greater internationalization of distributors 
Although non-domestic players have no significant role in the networks, they are more 
important in the distribution segment, a trend similar to that observed in the share of foreign 
SMCs among subscribers. In France and Germany this share is almost 30% on the GSM, and 
in the UK 15% on the GSM and analogue taken together. 
This significant role of foreign SMCs points the way to the development of a pan-European 
end-to-end service for mobiles (single window, standard pricing, pan-European VANS), but it 
would be desirable for them to maintain their independence towards the operators. 
5.2.2. The internationalization of supplies and geographical effects 
The internationalized supplies 
As shown in Figure 5.5, in 1995 operators supplied their service on an open, European basis. 
All countries make use of non-domestic suppliers, and in each country most of the non-
domestic supplies come from intra-EU manufacturers. 
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Figure 5.5. Origin of manufacturers of switching equipment and base stations for 
mobile networks 
i> " χ 
Source: Idate. 
In this respect the cases of France, Germany, Sweden and Finland are illustrative. The 
following developments took place between 1991 and 1995: 
(a) France added three European manufacturers and an international manufacturer to its 
domestic manufacturers. 
(b) Similarly, Germany added to its domestic manufacturers three European manufacturers 
and one international manufacturer. 
(c) Sweden added two European manufacturers and one international manufacturer. 
(d) Finland added two European manufacturers. 
More generally, we note that between 1991 and 1995 the number of manufacturers of 
switching equipment and base stations for mobile networks in the Member States rose from an 
average of 1.5 to 3.5. 
A trend favourable to European industrialists 
The development of the GSM on the European market has been beneficial to European 
industry, as we see from Figure 5.6. Only EU manufacturers are present on the switching 
equipment and the base station markets, and the only non-EU operator, Motorola (with 15% of 
market share), has set up production facilities in Europe. 
European technology is being exported outside the EU: 
(a) Asia/Pacific: the GSM accounted for 20% of digital subscribers in 1994; 
(b) Middle East: the GSM accounted for 80% of digital subscribers in 1994; 
(c) Africa: the GSM accounted for 100% of digital subscribers in 1994; 
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(d) American operators (American Personal Communications, American Portable Telecom, 
Bell South, Intercel, Omnipoint, Pacific Bell and Western Wireless) have joined together 
in an interest group, the NAIG (North America Interest Group) to promote the GSM 
standard in the United States. 
Figure 5.6. European market share of switching equipment and GSM base station ι manufacturers 
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Source: Idate. 
Although the extra­EU markets now represent only 20% of GSM subscribers, 146 operators 
worldwide have adopted the standard. Moreover, the GSM technology has won contracts on 
markets which previously used the traditional analogue technique: some countries have swung 
from the AMPS American analogue standard to the GSM (e.g. Australia, Vietnam) and some 
countries have swung from the TACS (UK) or NMT (Nordic countries) analogue standards to 
the GSM (e.g. Kuwait, Iran). 
Hence the GSM technological breakthrough, a standard promoted by the EU, has proved a 
valuable rival to the experience acquired by suppliers in analogue technology with a much 
larger installed base than the GSM (see Figure 5.7). 
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Figure 5.7. Distribution of cellular subscribers by standard in 1994 
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5.2.3. Productivity and competitiveness 
Productivity increases with the size of the operator 
The number of subscribers seems to have an impact on productivity (see Table 5.1 and Figure 
5.8). For where operators have fewer subscribers than 500,000, productivity varies 
considerably, and tends to depend on the use made of subcontracting (e.g. SFR, when 
launching its GSM tender made heavy use of subcontracting). Where operators have more 
than 500,000 subscribers, there is a discernible scale effect, and productivity increases with the 
number of subscribers. Cellnet stands out very clearly, with a turnover of 800,000 
ECU/employee in 1994. 
It is important to note that the transition from fragmented analogue systems to the pan-
European GSM standard has resulted in: 
(a) a scale effect on the R&D costs of terminals and infrastructures; 
(b) a bunching effect: a fall in the cost of terminals and infrastructures due to a larger volume 
being produced; 
(c) a medium-term technological effect: the cost of digital technology is falling each year by 
between 20 and 30%, because of the falling cost of components. 
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Table 5.1. Turnover per employee according to number of subscribers 
SFR 1990 
SFR 1991 
SFR 1992 
SFR 1993 
SFR 1994 
Mannesmann 1993 
Mannesmann 1994 
Vodafone 1991 
Vodafone 1992 
Vodafone 1993 
Vodafone 1994 
Cellnet 1991 
Cellnet 1994 
DeTemobil 1994 
TMN 1993 
TMN 1994 
Europolitan 1994 
Telecel 1993 
Telecel 1994 
Telia Mobitel 1993 
Telia Mobitel 1994 
Tele Danmark Mobil 1992 
Tele Danmark Mobil 1993 
Tele Danmark Mobil 1994 
Sonofon 1994 
Turnover/employee 
('000 ECU, 1994 rate of exchange) 
463 
700 
688 
592 
333 
207 
349 
352 
367 
351 
340 
519 
799 
296 
291 
318 
90 
143 
245 
255 
271 
641 
744 
672 
103 
Number of subscribers 
(in Ό00) 
53 
85 
. in 
142 
233.2 
495 
850 
689.5 
795 
1062 
1638 
540.6 
1560 
1596 
62 
97 
70 
32.7 
88 
791.4 
1176 
210.4 
276.2 
410.4 
99 
Source: Idate. 
Figure 5.8. Turnover per employee according to number of subscribers 
- 8 0 0 -
| 700-
o 600 ■ 
υ 
ί 500· 
o 
u 400-
r 300-
ω 
■å 200­
ε "g 100­
> Ε η ­
SFR 91 *TeIeDk93 
' **SFR92 ♦Te , e D k 94 
*TeleDk 92 
SFR 93 ♦ Cellnet91 
♦ 
φ ♦ ♦ SFR 94 * *_♦ ' 
♦ ' ♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
1 ( 1 , h 
♦ 
1 
♦—| 
Cellnet 94 
( 
0 200,000 400.000 600,000 800,000 1.000,0001.200.0001.400,000 1,600,000 
Number of subscribers 
Source: Idate. 
Mobile telephones 45 
5.2.4. Concentration and development of competitive conditions 
An increase in the number of players confined to the national framework 
The grant of new licences has enabled non­telecom investors to come on the scene: 
(a) Kinnevik (1981): paper; 
(b) Générale des Eaux (1987): water distribution; 
(c) Mannesmann (1991): heavy industry, energy, machine tools; 
(d) E­Plus (1994) including Thyssen (heavy industry) and Veba (electricity), each holding 
28.4%; 
(e) Bouygues (1995): construction; 
(f) Olivetti (1995): computers. 
The second GSM or DCS 1800 licences for mobile operators in the EU are granted largely to 
consortia led by local investors of the type above, associated with foreign operators. 
This situation is largely brought about by the procedures for granting licences, which are still 
based on qualitative criteria and offer little opportunity to foreign operators wishing to 
compete for licences as leaders of consortia. Shareholding is therefore the only means of 
entering foreign markets. For instance, Veba (operator E­Plus) is present in the capital of One­
2­One and Bouygues Télécom. The strategies for making pan­European tenders may be 
reflected on the secondary market for licences. 
The change in competitive conditions has had beneficial effects on the numbers of subscribers: 
(a) because of the emergence of new operators, as in Germany and Portugal (see Figure 
5.9); 
(b) because of the historic operator making a digital tender to compete with the traditional 
analogue offer, as in Italy and Luxembourg (see Figure 5.10). 
Figure 5.9. Growth in number of mobile subscribers in Portugal and Germany 
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Figure 5.10. Growth in number of mobile subscribers in Italy and Luxembourg 
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5.2.5. Reduction in costs and prices 
Complex price/cost relationships 
Prices for one minute's communication are relatively standard throughout the countries of the 
Union (see Figure 5.11). Apart from Germany, where prices are markedly higher than those in 
the rest of Europe, and in the Nordic countries, where prices are lower, the other countries of 
the Union charge rates within a range of approximately 15% from the European average. On 
the other hand, there is a marked disparity with monthly subscriptions, where the range varies 
between +132% (P&T Luxembourg) and -61% (Radiolinja) from the European average. As 
regards connection charges, here again there is a significant disparity: from +51% (Belgacom 
Mobile) to -552% (Telecom Finland) in relation to the European average. 
Figure 5.11. Price of GSM communications in the EU in August 1995 
* not weighted 
Source: Idate. 
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Since 1992, the price of one minute's communication has fallen by an average of 4% a year, as 
shown in Figure 5.12. Hence no fall in the price of communications can be discerned, except 
in France where, since the DCS 1800 licence has been granted to Bouygues, the prices charged 
by France Télécom and SFR for one minute's communication have fallen quite markedly. 
Figure 5.12. Trend in the price of GSM communications per minute in the EU: 
1992 and 1995 
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Figure 5.13 compares the price of GSM communications in the EU with the PSTN price. It 
will be seen that the GSM price increases slightly with the PSTN price. This interrelationship 
is due to the interconnection tax component, which generally increases with the price of the 
PSTN, but also to the fact that, from a marketing point of view, the GSM price is closely 
linked to the fixed telephone price. 
On the other hand, the impact of dedicated lines is more difficult to demonstrate, and there 
seems to be no obvious relationship between the price level for dedicated lines in the various 
countries and the price of GSM communications (see Figure 5.14). However, the cost of 
dedicated lines represents at least 20% of the cost of mobile operators. 
The price of roaming is still higher than the price of the domestic mobile telephone, and 
involves a communications surcharge for the customer of about 15%. This is due to the 
number of processes involved between operators (declaration, reinvoicing, etc.). 
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Figure 5.13. Prices of GSM communications compared with the price of one minute 
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Figure 5.14. Price of GSM communications compared with the price of two Mbit/s 
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Competition has had the effect of reducing prices to the public 
The introduction of competition (new operators or new licences granted to existing operators) 
has several effects on pricing. Firstly, the price of communications is falling: 
(a) a 50% fall in prices between 1993 and 1995 for France Télécom et SFR in France, 
following the announcement of the grant of the licence to Bouygues; 
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(b) an anticipatory effect in the case of the United Kingdom: a 28.5% fall in Vodafone prices 
before the competing Cellnet service was launched; 
(c) in Germany, the introduction of the E-Plus DCS 1800 service has led to a 7% fall in 
Mannesmann prices. 
There has also been a fall in the cost of access to services, through cross-subsidies between 
services and terminals, so that terminals can be offered at much reduced or nil prices. This is a 
decisive factor in the decision of subscribers to buy. 
The third effect is a segmentation of pricing offers, through niche price setting which enables 
more subscribers to be brought in. The operators quote different prices for subscriptions and 
for communications, according to the pattern of consumption by users. Table 5.2 illustrates 
this price diversification, which sometimes involves three or even four offers by a single 
operator. 
Table 5.2. Price segmentation depending on monthly consumption for 
GSM and PCN services in Europe 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Operators 
PTV Austria 
Belgacom 
Sonofon 
Tele Danmark 
Radiolinja 
Telecom Finland 
FT Mobiles 
SFR 
DeTemobil 
E-Plus 
Mannesman 
Panafon 
Stet Hellas 
Eircell 
Telecom Italia 
PTT Luxembourg 
Dutch post and telecommunications service 
TMN 
Comviq 
Europolitan 
Cellnet 
One-2-One 
Orange 
Vodafone 
Number of packages 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
Source: Operators- September 1995. 
These effects all contribute to the increase in the total number of subscribers. Users are in fact 
highly sensitive to price, as shown in Figure 5.15. 
A strong relationship between the price of the service and its penetration 
In Sweden, Finland and Denmark it is found (Figure 5.15) that the rates of penetration of 
mobile telephones are markedly higher than in the rest of Europe. These rates are not due to 
any significant fall in prices, which dropped only slightly between 1992 and 1995 (cf. Figure 
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5.12) in the Nordic countries, but rather to the fact that the level of prices was always very 
low. This reflects the operators' business strategy of opting for a longer term rate of return on 
investment. 
Figure 5.15. Relationship between price of GSM service and rate of penetration of 
public mobile telephony taking account of purchasing power parity 
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5.2.6. Interrelative ties 
The operators used the services of SMCs to distribute the services more effectively. In 
Germany and France, the share of SMCs accounts for 35% of all subscribers, but they sell only 
GSM. In the United Kingdom, SMCs offering both digital and analogue handle 45% of 
subscribers. 
However, the tendency is for the operators to take over the SMCs, in order to control the entire 
chain of added value. Some major takeovers have occurred, in particular on the British market 
in recent years. 
The need for access to the public at large has resulted in the emergence of new players in 
traditional large scale distribution: the CDCs (central distributing companies), which do not 
manage subscriptions and whose role is confined to ordering the service. 
The 1995 Green Paper states the intention of giving distributors greater freedom of manoeuvre 
vis-à-vis the operators, but the effects are still limited. 
Mobile telephones 
In addition, as a result of competition in mobile services, the operators are tending to 
differentiate what they have to offer through added value services. On top of the basic 
telephone service, there are now information services (financial and traffic reports, etc.) which 
result in link­ups between operators and those who provide the contents. 
5.3. Conclusions 
Figure 5.16 summarizes the main lessons learned about developments in the mobile telephony 
sector and the influence of the Commission's measures on these developments. 
Figure 5.16. Mobile telephony: conclusions 
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5.3.1. Main trends observed 
The main trends observed in the sector of mobile telecommunications in Europe are: 
(a) Infrastructures continue to be national. 
(b) The procedures for granting licences (assignment of frequencies) continue to be national, 
and are largely based on qualitative criteria which permit discretionary decisions. 
(c) The operators are mostly national. 
(d) The new licences have been granted to the historic mobile operators, or to consortia led by 
major local investors, in association with foreign operators with minority shareholdings. 
(e) New players are appearing on the scene, some being strangers to the telecommunications 
sector, such as Mannesmann in Germany. 
(f) The development of competition has had several effects. It has led to a fall in the price of 
communications, a fall in entry duties (a reduction in subscriptions, cross-subsidies for 
terminals and services) and price diversification (segmentation of rates according to 
consumption). The consequence of all three effects is to increase the number of 
subscribers, who are especially sensitive to the price of the service. 
(g) A pan-European service offer is emerging. 
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(h) Although the networks continue to be national and fragmented, roaming allows for pan-
European service coverage. In 1995, the number of GSM roaming agreements within the 
EU was 17 times what it had been three years earlier. Mannesmann, for instance, signed 
roaming agreements in 1995 with 35 operators in 22 countries (see case study in 
Appendix A.3). 
(i) The development of the GSM standard is favourable to the European producers, who hold 
85% of the market for switching equipment and base stations in Europe (Motorola 15%) 
and export their technology outside the EU (almost 150 operators worldwide have 
adopted this standard). 
5.3.2. Changes attributable to the single market 
In the light of our analysis, we believe that the Commission has had a threefold impact in the 
field of mobile telephony services: 
A basic standardization role as regards the GSM, with the result that a pan-European market 
has been created and a European mobile telephony industry 
The GSM standard is undeniably the product of strong European collaboration, in which ETSI 
has played a distinct role. The Commission cannot itself insist on the standard being set. But 
its action in support of ETSI, and subsequently its action in support of pan-European 
allocation of the 900 MHz band, has made a major contribution to the preparation and 
adoption of a single pan-European standard. The Commission's action to encourage the 
opening of markets for equipment has also encouraged the effective introduction of the 
standard on all European markets. 
Nowadays users enjoy a genuinely 'pan-European' mobile telephony service, which is freeing 
itself from the domestic character of infrastructures; a user can telephone with his GSM 
equipment wherever he happens to be in Europe (the roaming function). The extra cost of this 
function is about 15%, representing approximately the extra management cost. Without the 
GSM, the market could develop in two ways: 
(i) using analogue norms, which are not mutually compatible - this would result in markets 
being fragmented from one country to another or between groups using different 
standards; and 
(ii) using a US digital standard, which would have made it impossible to develop a 
European industry, as it would have had two drawbacks: a lack of experience and lower 
volume. 
It therefore seems certain that the GSM has succeeded in creating a pan-European telephony 
service. 
The development of the GSM has taken place in tandem with the diversification of supplies of 
cellular operators from a large number of European manufacturers. This trend has created a 
strong and effective European industry, able to export its technology successfully (about 150 
operators worldwide have already adopted or are testing the GSM standard). 
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The role of a catalyst and accelerator of the development of mobile telephony in Europe, 
resulting in the creation of a dynamic telephone service industry throughout Europe, which 
has subsequently proved a successful exporter 
In the first place, the Commission's active promotion of competition in the mobile telephony 
sector has resulted in strong and homogeneous development of mobile telephony in most 
European countries. Each Member State has always remained in charge of its own cellular 
licensing policy. However, the Commission has sometimes engaged in sustained bilateral 
action to ensure that the market is opened quickly (Italy, Belgium). In almost all cases, our 
information shows a rapid market development following the announcement of forthcoming 
competition, or once it has been introduced. The introduction of competition into the sector 
cannot be attributed to the Commission. Some countries have done it very early on their own 
initiative (United Kingdom, France). But the Commission has standardized the introduction of 
competition, thereby contributing to the European market becoming more homogeneous and 
more dynamic. 
This broad-based action by the Commission for the development of the European mobile 
market and the adoption of the GSM standard has also contributed to strengthening the 
European cellular service industry. This has produced two results: 
(i) intra-European agreements, giving rise to a pan-European industry (agreements between 
Vodafone and SFR, Vodafone and E-Plus, Lyonnaise des Eaux and Mannesmann); and 
(ii) successful exports (South Africa, Poland, etc.). 
Without a GSM standard, and without a dynamic European industry, it is likely that the US 
operators would have held the great majority of licences sold. Their advantages are experience 
of cellular telephony, significant financial influence and a large domestic market. In spite of 
the handicap of the standard, digital technology and a fairly dynamic market, they often have a 
presence in the consortia in Europe (Air Touch, BSC, US West). It therefore seems probable 
that outside Europe, the European industry would have had few successes. The know-how of 
the European operators has been turned to particularly good account in exports, because the 
standard adopted by foreign countries has been a European standard (the success of the GSM) 
and they have themselves been dynamic operators with a sound knowledge of the GSM 
standard. Through its role in promoting the GSM standard, and its role in the construction of a 
dynamic European industry, the Commission has therefore been partly responsible for the 
export successes of the European operators. 
A contribution to the efficiency of the sector 
The standardization of market conditions for mobile telephony services has made 
benchmarking among operators in the countries of the Union easier. Even if the market for 
each operator remains a national one, comparisons among markets are facilitated by their 
homogeneity. These comparisons serve to spur productivity, to reduce costs and cut prices, 
and could be described as competition via osmosis. In this respect, there has been a striking 
convergence in cellular rates over the past five years. It is probable that this competition by 
osmosis will continue to operate in areas such as interconnection terms, the establishment of 
fixed infrastructures, roaming rates, etc. 
Before the adoption of the GSM, the analogue market involved major disparities among 
countries (the prices of terminals varying by a factor of ten between France and the United 
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Kingdom), and prices per minute were very different as between Germany and Sweden, etc. 
The Commission, through its induction activities which have resulted in standardizing and 
homogenizing the European market, has therefore contributed to the overall efficiency of the 
sector. This contribution has not had equal benefits for all operators, having tended to benefit 
most the least dynamic countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium) which are thus enabled to 
rejoin the more dynamic. It will also be noted that the GSM operators in Europe are as 
efficient as the US cellular operators: in 1994 Vodafone, SFR and TMN had a turnover per 
employee of, respectively, ECU 340,000, 333,000 and 318,000 (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.8) 
compared with ECU 327,000 for the US operator SBC Communications. 
Table 5.3. Summary of effects on the mobile telephony segment 
National infrastructures 
A majority of national 
operators 
Emergence of new players 
Fall in prices and 
diversification of services on 
offer, along with a more 
marked penetration than was 
expected 
Emergence of a pan­
European service offer 
Creation of a pan­European 
industry of equipment and 
servicing 
Development of added value 
services 
Commission measures 
Directives 
• 
Recom­
mendations 
• 
■ 
α 
Bilateral 
action 
O 
O 
External factors 
National 
regulators 
■ 
■ 
D 
D 
Techno­
logical 
progress 
D 
Activity by 
key players 
α 
Η Strong motor effect. 
D Moderate motor effect. 
• Strong facilitating effect. 
O Moderate facilitating effect. 
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6. Data 
In this chapter we define the main changes in the data transmission sector in Europe. In the 
last part, Section 6.3, we show how far these changes are attributable to European measures 
rather than to natural growth in the sector (as a result of factors which are also discernible in a 
global sense). 
6.1. Context 
6.1.1. The structural factors in the sector 
Regardless of the Commission's measures, the data transmission sector has developed under 
the impact of several factors. 
Standardization 
The main standards have been approved at the international level (CCITT) and taken up by 
industry in general, both in Europe and in the other major regions. In particular, for suppliers 
the X.25 standard has been used as a reference for the packet transmission of data for more 
than ten years. 
Actual standards for a large amount of specialist equipment, especially modems, have also 
been approved by the CCITT: most developments in this field have benefited chiefly the US 
industry. 
Technological development 
The large number of networks and modes of access has made it possible to offer higher rates 
of throughput and to improve the reliability of transmission, and this has directly resulted in an 
expansion of the services on offer. 
Development of user enterprises 
The growing needs of users for data transmission is closely associated with the increasing 
recourse to computers, a general phenomenon throughout the industrialized world, which is 
especially marked in North America. 
The globalization of the economy, and the growth in services in relation to industry, have 
increased the need for international exchanges, consisting partly of trade in physical goods but 
also, and increasingly, exchanges ofinformation. 
Development strategy of the key players 
The key national players, the PTOs, have endeavoured to promote new applications (e.g. 
Videotex) to make the best use of the new infrastructures available. 
The world players, who are usually of US origin and come from the computer world (e.g. 
IBM, EDS, GEIS), have striven for development at the international level, and since the mid-
1980s Europe has been one of their favourite areas for growth. 
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6.1.2. General trends on the European market 
A rapid growth sector 
The value added network services linked to data (VANS), with a market of ECU 6.3 billion in 
1993 (see Figure 6.1) account for 6% of the total market in telecom services in Europe. This is 
a very dynamic sector with growth rates of 22% and 26% for 1992 and 1993 respectively. In 
this market, the share of data network services (headed by X.25 packet switching) is still 
predominant (70% in 1993), although its growth is less vigorous. 
Figure 6.1. The market for VANS in Europe 
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The 1990 directive on services dealt directly with the development of this market, and 
recommended: 
(a) complete liberalization of the data transmission services; 
(b) the elimination of local barriers which require a minimum threshold of service activity to 
be maintained, the ratio turnover (service) : turnover (service + transport) to remain above 
a threshold level. 
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6.2. Detailed analysis 
6.2.1. The internationalization of sales and activities 
There has been an internationalization of sales and activities which has benefited 
EU operators 
The internationalization of sales and activities is effective within the EU. Foreign operators, 
such as IBM, BT, AT&T, SITA, are present mostly through pan-European infrastructures and 
international services. 
The trend towards internationalization is growing, as shown in Figure 6.2, and EU operators 
are losing market share on their domestic market. 
Figure 6.2. The market share of VANS operators1 in the EU 
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However, the losses on domestic markets are benefiting other EU operators, who are 
internationalizing the services they offer. Between 1991 and 1993 the turnover of EU 
operators rose by ECU 1 billion for local services and ECU 1 billion for international services, 
whereas the turnover of operators outside the EU grew by only ECU 0.3 billion at the same 
time. Hence, since the 1990 directive, the market has been becoming increasingly 
international, and European operators are benefiting. 
A necessary time lag between deregulation and the actual entry of foreign operators 
into the new markets 
The market is currently opening up, and all markets became open in 1995. However, following 
deregulation, it takes two or three years in each country (as can be seen in Figure 6.3), before 
there is any significant growth in competition. 
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Figure 6.3. Increase in the number of foreign operators in European countries as a 
function of the number of years following deregulation 
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6.2.2. The internationalization of supplies and geographical effects 
Contrasted realities 
There are two distinct trends in the supply of materials for the production of data (see Table 
6.1). 
On the traditional domestic networks, the operators supply themselves for preference from 
national suppliers (e.g. TRT, OST and Alcatel materials for Transpac, Siemens material for 
Deutsche Telekom). 
On the international data networks, on the other hand, the supplies come almost entirely from 
US operators (e.g. Stratacom, Tymnet, NET, NT, Telenet, used by IBM, Sprint, BT, 
Unisource, etc.). 
Table 6.1. Main suppliers for data networks 
Network operators 
AT&T 
BT 
Deutsche Telekom 
GEIS 
IBM 
Infonet 
SITA 
Sprint 
Swift 
Transpac 
Unisource 
Stratacom 
Telematics 
Siemens 
Stratacom 
NET 
NET 
NT 
Telenet 
NT 
Alcatel 
Stratacom 
Supp 
Stratacom 
NT 
NET 
TRT 
iers 
OST Cap Sesa 
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6.2.3. Productivity and competitiveness 
A 'competition ' effect which is difficult to identify 
Reliable relationships on the pattern of productivity of the operators in the light of external 
parameters are difficult to identify. However, Figure 6.4 illustrates the fact that competition 
appears to have stimulated Transpac, an operator which is already highly productive. 
Figure 6.4. Income per employee on VANS services in Europe 
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6.2.4. Scale and dimension effects 
Two distinct realities 
The companies present are the traditional international operators who are familiar with the job 
and the market and who enjoy high investment capacity (e.g. IBM, BT, AT&T, Sita). This 
situation illustrates a scale effect which is crucial in supplying data transmission services. 
As for dimension effects, two kinds of added value services are in evidence. In the first place, 
services akin to transmission, or the dimension effects with the latter, are significant. This 
applies to EDI and paging, in which, as shown in Figure 6.5, there are no independent service 
providers. In the second place, content services where there is no dimension effect with the 
transmission activity. 
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Figure 6.5. Top ten of the VANS in 1991 
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The 1990 directive, by liberalizing both transmission and VANS, did not therefore constrain 
these dimension effects. 
6.2.5. The concentration and development of competitive conditions 
The introduction of competition has led to the déconcentration of the sector and 
the diversification of the players 
The introduction of competition has brought about a tendency for the added value services 
available to be split up into a number of different players, and for the standardization of the 
size of the dominant players, as shown in Figure 6.6. The market share of the five largest 
suppliers in the EU fell from 56% in 1991 to 48% in 1993, with a 6% loss in market share of 
the dominant operator. These levels of concentration are also found in the main VANS 
services (see Figure 6.7). 
The trend among data network operators is to diversify into services with higher added value 
where there are advantages of scale: EDI and paging (see Figure 6.8). 
There is still virtually no European on-line industry, the 'Europe On-line' service, the main 
initiative so far, was scheduled for launch at the end of 1995 (but failed before being 
launched). On the other hand, US competition is being stepped up: by the end of 1994 the 
CompuServe network already had 100,000 subscribers in Europe, and the US On-line service 
(in association with Bertelsmann) was scheduled for launch in Germany and France in early 
1996. The lack of a directive on these services is therefore already being keenly felt. 
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Figure 6.6. Market share of the top VANS suppliers in the EU 
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Figure 6.7. Market share of the top five in 1991 according to type of service 
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Figure 6.8. Diversification of 
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6.2.6. Cost and price reductions 
Price effects not clearly discernible 
In 1992 there was an almost universal fall in the price of leased connections at the 
international level, prices having been stagnant for many years. This fall, shown for six 
countries in Figure 6.9, has been followed by an average fall in prices of 5% a year since 1995. 
However, the falling price of international connections has not been reflected in the price of 
international X.25 communications, as Table 6.2 shows. Some variations can be distinguished 
in 1992 for the price of the kilo segment, but the variations are as much upwards as 
downwards, and for most operators the price of the kilo segment is still between ECU 2 and 3. 
At the national level, price disparities for leased connections remain very marked (see Figure 
6.10). Price ranges for domestic leased connections are between 1 and 10 for 2 Mbits/s and 1 
to 14for64Kbits/s. 
Domestic X.25 tariffs are a poor reflection of the cost of leased connections (e.g. they are 
expensive in the United Kingdom), and they depend on the operator's attitude to the 
positioning of his X.25 network services and dedicated lines, and on the degree of competition 
on the market. In Spain, for instance, Telefonica introduced a new tariff offer in 1994, two 
years after BT had bought up the Santander Bank, resulting in a two-thirds cut, in some cases, 
of the cost of X.25s. 
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Figure 6.9. Average cost of 2 Mbits/s semi­circuits from certain countries to all other 
EU countries 
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Table 6.2. Trend in prices of international X.25 transmissions between 1988 and 1995 
Country 
Germany 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom ­ BT 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
% price change 1988­95 
15 
0 
0 
7 
­8 
­9 
22 
0 
0 
­13 
56 
­4 
56 
0 
0 
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Figure 6.10. Price of leased domestic connections in 1995 
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6.3. Conclusion 
6.3.1. Key trends identified 
The key trends identified in the field of data services in Europe during recent years are 
therefore: 
(a) a splitting of the market, which has mainly benefited the major historic European 
operators (in the context of their internationalization strategy, following the example of 
Transpac), and also players of US origin; 
(b) a pronounced opening of the market, enabling foreign players to apply directly for 
licences outside their countries of origin (unlike what we note in, for instance, the case of 
mobile telephones); 
(c) the maintenance, and indeed the strengthening, of European industry, at the expense of the 
specialist US groups who have been trying since the mid­1980s to build up their presence 
on the European market; 
(d) a continuing marked dependency on US manufacturers as regards the supply of specialist 
equipment, especially end point equipment and the private networks; 
(e) the establishment of pan­European end­to­end networks and services to ensure that 
systems are interoperational. 
These trends are illustrated in Figure 6.11. 
The EU directive on services, and its transposition in the various countries, has enabled 
markets to be opened up to competition. The first consequence of the opening up of markets 
has been the internationalization of offers. EU operators have lost market share on their 
domestic markets. However, the losses on the domestic markets have taken place to the 
advantage of EU operators, who have internationalized their offers. Finally, the market being a 
positive one overall (with a growth rate of over 50% in two years), the earnings of EU 
operators have risen considerably (+ ECU 2 billion in two years). 
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The EU directive on services has enabled operators, through the virtually simultaneous 
opening up of all markets to competition, to devise strategies based on the deployment of 
international infrastructures. These infrastructures provide the end-users with pan-European 
end-to-end services. 
On the other hand, the emergence of new networks of international data has not benefited 
European manufacturers, as for the moment the international infrastructures consist almost 
entirely of equipment of US origin. 
The very sizeable investment called for in setting up these infrastructures, and the relatively 
modest scale of the markets connected with them, has dampened the zeal of new operators and 
confirmed the predominance on this market of the major historic operators who possess 
significant financial capacity. 
Figure 6.11. Data: conclusions 
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6.3.2. Changes attributable to the single market 
Each of the major trends identified depends more or less heavily either on the Commission's 
measures or on the 'external' factors listed in the introduction to this part. Table 6.3 attempts 
to bring out the weight of each of these factors by distinguishing, as for the other sectors, 
between activities which have had a motor function (either strong or moderate) and those 
which have had a facilitating role. 
As regards the fragmentation and the opening up of European markets (especially through the 
directive on services), it is clear that the Commission's measures have played a crucial 
galvanizing role, while progress in standardization and technology has naturally had a 
facilitating role. 
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As for the reinforcement of the European industry, this is due both to certain Commission 
measures (above all the special conditions in the Services Directive on the grant of licences) 
and to the strategies of the European players themselves (see Part III). 
The dependency on US suppliers is, of course, largely due to the shortage of European 
supplies. The European Commission must without doubt focus its endeavours on enhancing 
the availability of European network equipment supplies. 
Finally, the presentation of a pan-European offer is dependent on a combination of many 
different factors. It seems, however, that the Commission's measures have tended to play a 
facilitating role, while the 'external' factors (especially standardization and strategies of 
players) have been the most decisive. Transpac in particular has definitely relied on regulatory 
advantages to put into effect a strategy aimed primarily at creating an international network 
from a national base which is already very strong. 
Table 6.3. Impact of the Commission's measures on the data sector 
Fragmentation of 
the market 
Opening up of 
markets 
Reinforcement of 
European industry 
Dependency on US 
manufacturers 
Pan-European 
networks and 
services 
Commission measures 
Directives ' 
■ 
■ 
■ 
• 
Recommendations2 
• 
• 
Horizontal 
measures3 
O 
'External' factors 
Standardization 
■ 
O 
■ 
Technology 
□ 
• 
Strategies of 
players 
■ 
• 
■ 
M1 Strong motor effect. · Strong facilitating effect. 
U Moderate motor effect. O Moderate facilitating effect. 
1 Directives on Services (90/387) and ONP Leased Lines (92/44). 
2 Council Recommendation of 5 June 1992 (92/383). 
3 Articles 85, 86, 90 of the Treaty on European Union, and Merger Ruling 
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7. Voice telephony 
7.1. Context 
The total turnover of traditional public switched telephone network (PSTN) services, 
amounting to ECU 80 billion in the EU in 1995 (including 10 to 15% for international calls), 
still accounts for 80% of the earnings of telecommunications operators. 
7.1.1. Inventory of measures taken by the Commission 
A market still largely reserved 
Two interventions by the Commission have exerted an impact mainly on the development of 
this market: 
(a) The broad interpretation of the concept of the closed user group (CUG) adopted in various 
countries means that offers can be made for the re-routing of traffic and VPNs 
internationally. This interpretation shows marked disparities from one state to another: for 
instance, Germany has opted for a strict definition of the concept of CUG, with France 
adopting a more flexible position. 
(b) The Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the review of the situation in the tele­
communications sector set the date for liberalizing the telephony market as 1998 (with 
transitional periods for some Member States). 
7.1.2. Structural factors in the sector 
Other factors not of a regulatory origin have influenced the sector. 
The development strategies of independent entrepreneurs 
The development entry strategy of US entrepreneurs is based on brokerage in international 
rates: call-back and re-ro%ting offers. These strategies are practised initially by US, then by 
national players. 
The development strategies of the dominant players 
(a) An aggressive internationalizing strategy: to ensure growth and offset the market share 
losses which can be forecast on their own market. 
(b) A defensive strategy: the re-balancing of rates and the development of loyalty offers 
(these two points are explained in Part III). 
Technological change 
Several technological developments have resulted in new services being placed on the market 
(call-back, re-routing, VPNs) based on the infrastructures of the public operators: 
(a) digitization, which enables the necessary information for re-routing to be transferred; 
(b) compression, which means that more traffic can be directed along fewer infrastructures, 
reducing the cost of transport; 
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(c) intelligent routing, reflected in new functions developed on the Private Automatic Branch 
Exchange (PABX), represented in the emergence of intelligent operating centres. 
7.2. Detailed analysis 
In the rest of this chapter we will be looking at call-back services, the re-routing of calls and 
calling cards. It is important to use qualitative analysis here, because of the scarcity of 
information and of temporal series about services which have emerged only very recently. 
7.2.1. The internationalization of sales and activities 
Offers which have emerged recently have only so far captured a marginal share of 
the turnover of the key players 
The market for calling cards is extremely open to foreign operators, who have been first in 
offering them in Europe, with US operators now holding 36% of the total stock (see Figure 
7.1). 
There are virtually no cards available for the whole of Europe. European operators such as BT 
offer calling card services, but they are sold only in the countries of origin of the operators. So 
far, the US operators have been selling mainly to expatriates (most of the cards sold in the UK 
are used by employees of the United States army). In 1994 Unisource was the first company to 
introduce calling cards. Two other pan-European operators, Ameratel and Interglobe, have less 
than 3% market share between them. 
Call-back activities are intended for the international communications market, with a 
preference for communications directed to the American continent. In France, call-back 
emerged in 1991 and experienced real growth from 1992 onwards, reaching a turnover figure 
of FF 100 million in 1994, the equivalent of 0.7% of France Telecom's international turnover. 
Re-routing services, introduced more recently (Spring, 1994 in France and the United 
Kingdom, 1995 in Germany and the Netherlands), already account for a more significant 
share. In France Sprint has a turnover of FF 75 million via its Fondirect service, which 
represents about 0.5% of the international traffic of France Télécom. 
In France overall, France Télécom estimates that 3-5% of its turnover on international 
business has been eroded by foreign operators and re-routing companies. 
7.2.2. The internationalization of supply and geographical effects 
The internationalization of supply has benefited US operators 
The supply question which arises here is the purchase of minutes: who is selling the traffic. 
In call-back activities, minutes are bought by local companies from US operators, involving a 
loss of traffic and therefore of turnover for the PTOs. This lost turnover is partly offset by the 
system of allocation taxes now practised among the international operators. However, this 
system is obsolete and is likely to be overhauled in the near future. 
In the re-routing activity of Sprint or the equivalent for BT or C& W, minutes are bought in the 
United States or in the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 7.1. Market share of calling card operators in Europe 
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7.2.3. Scale and dimension effects 
Large operators exist alongside small companies 
Size plays a significant role in the business of calling cards related to traditional telephony. 
The major traditional operators are virtually the only players. 
Call-back is an activity which generates significant scale effects. The price obtained by the 
call-back company depends directly on the total volume generated. In France, ITC, the biggest 
retailer, offers the most attractive prices. 
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The rule of proportionate returns plays an important role in the scale effects generated by the 
US operators5 and is incorporated in the calculation of production costs for minutes of 
communications. 
7.2.4. Concentration and development of competitive conditions 
The introduction of competition has led to a reduction in prices and has increased price offers 
On the calling card market AT&T, MCI and Sprint control 35% of the European market (in 
numbers of cards). 
The call-back companies are mostly small, independent companies which engage in retail 
selling of minutes of telephone time. However, call-back services are designed only for 
sections of SMEs and individuals, as they are too inflexible for large organizations. The large 
companies prefer the highly functional virtual private networks (VPN) or re-routing services. 
In the VPN segment, some pan-European services are emerging (BT's Concert, France 
Telecom's GVPN, Unisource) and the sector is becoming heavily concentrated, tending to the 
establishment of three global offers, with linkages between the extra-EU and intra-EU ones: 
(a) AT&T/Unisource; 
(b) Deutsche Telekom/France Télécom/Sprint; 
(c) BT/MCI. 
7.2.5. Reduction in costs and prices 
The emergence of new players on the international communications segment has had an 
impact on the prices per minute of international calls. Figure 7.2, showing the development in 
the prices of calls to the United States, illustrates this very clearly. Prices fell on average by 
8% a year between 1988 and 1995. However, the fall was very uneven between 1988 and 1991 
(an average annual fall of 1%) and 1991 and 1995 (an average annual fall of 13%). The 
transition between these two periods is in fact marked, between 1991 and 1992 (the 
breakpoint), by the emergence of call-back operators and resellers of calls in most EU 
countries. The competition effect is very evident here. 
The fall in prices is observable throughout the EU countries (see Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3). It 
has led to a relative standardization in pricing (see Figure 7.4), which has most benefited the 
users in countries which started off with the highest prices. For example, the following 
dramatic falls have taken place: 
(a) Belgium: 57% in two years; 
(b) Spain: 54% in three years; 
(c) Luxembourg: 63% in four years. 
The three US international operators (Sprint. MCI and AT&T) divide the traffic coming in from another country in 
proportion to the volumes of traffic sent towards that country. So. the more traffic one of the three operators sends to a 
third country (via call-back or calling cards), the more it will get in return. On this return traffic, it will invoice the 
sending country' according to the rule for allocation taxes in force, and will thus increase its turnover. The prices per 
minute offered by the operator will also take account of this extra turnover, and will be calculated as a 'net settlement*. 
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As we see from Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3, the emergence of the call-back companies on the 
one hand, and the Council Resolution on the other, have had a marked impact on 'price 
convergence' and on the standardization of European international calling rates. 
Figure 7.2. Development in the average price of calls to the United States from 
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Table 7.1. Trend in the price of calls to the United States 
Germany 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Average 
88-95 (%) 
-10.5 
-4.5 
-13.1 
-10.5 
-10.9 
-6.3 
-5.8 
-3.8 
-9.7 
-10.4 
-11.5 
-9.2 
-6.5 
-1.5 
-9.1 
-8.2 
88-91 (%) 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.7 
0.0 
1.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-8.1 
0.7 
0.0 
-6.9 
-0.9 
91-95 (%) 
-17.6 
-7.8 
-21.7 
-17.6 
-17.9 
-10.8 
-11.0 
-6.5 
-16.3 
-17.5 
-19.2 
-10.1 
-11.6 
-2.6 
-10.7 
-13.3 
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Figure 7.3. Trend in the price of calls to the United States (extreme and average 
examples) 
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Figure 7.4. Price of calls to the United States in 1995 
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Only two countries have experienced significant falls between 1988 and 1991, caused by 
regulatory reforms: 
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(a) a 20% fall in communications prices in the United Kingdom following the abolition of the 
BT/Mercury duopoly in 1991, which allowed new players to enter the market (call­back 
companies, resellers); 
(b) a 23% fall in communications prices in the Netherlands, following the 1989 Law on the 
organization of the telecommunications sector. 
The general fall in prices after 1991 has been spread variably over time from one country to 
another, as shown in Figure 7.5. 
Figure 7.5. Comparative fall in the cost of calls to the United States in the periods 
1991­93 and 1993­95 
35% 
3 0 % < L I R L 
,n 25% 
Φ 2 0 % · -
O 
I 15% 
a 10% 
5% f 
0% 
■­>* UK 
G 
♦ 
♦ s 
F 
NL 
'DK 
♦♦ 
-+-
­ ­ FIN 
-+-
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Rate of decline between 1991 and 1993 
- H — 
30% 35% 
Source: Idate. 
The second effect set off by the arrival of the new entrants is the increase in the price offers 
made by various operators. In France, for instance, France Télécom has the following offers: 
(a) international virtual private network (Colisée International); 
(b) tariff packages (Modulance, Primaliste); 
(c) calling cards. 
It is important to emphasize the tax factor. The difference in VAT between the United States 
and European countries increases the attractiveness of call­back services. For instance, 
Mastercom, a call­back company in France, offers reductions to the US which rise from 52% 
without tax to 60% inclusive of tax if VAT is included. The reduction for calls to the other 
countries of Europe rises from 24% without tax to 36% with tax. 
7.2.6. Interrelative ties 
Many partnership agreements 
The need to find local networks for selling calling cards (in order to reach a wider public) has 
encouraged foreign operators to use national players for distribution. These national players 
are recruited either within the telecommunications sector (e.g. the distribution of AT&T cards 
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by Mannesmann in Germany) or outside it (e.g. negotiations by Unisource with travel agencies 
and airlines). 
Competition in the market for calling cards impels the operators to differentiate their services 
by providing value added services. They become more complex in terms of content, providing 
information services such as MCI's World Phone (financial information) or AT&T's World 
Plus (travel advice and paging). 
Invoicing is another area of differentiation, and the operators join with banking groups in order 
to invoice calling cards: 
(a) BT with Visa; 
(b) Mercury with American Express. 
Hence, the introduction of competition has led to the emergence of new players indirectly 
involved in the sector. 
7.3. Conclusions 
7.3.1. Major trends observed 
Emergence of new services 
VPNs designed for large multi-site enterprises, loyalty pricing schemes for all segments. 
Emergence of new players 
Arbitrage services are offered by small domestic companies, whereas calling cards or re­
routing of calls, which require heavy investment, are offered by traditional 
telecommunications operators (in the United States or the United Kingdom). 
Reaction of the key operators: two approaches 
(a) Defensive: re-balancing prices and developing loyalty pricing schemes. The increasing 
intensity of competition which has resulted has set off a reaction among European 
operators, who have reduced the cost of international calls, increased their price offers, 
and developed services linked to telephony (calling cards, virtual private networks, etc.), 
positioning themselves internationally. 
(b) Aggressive: a strategy of forming alliances and developing subsidiaries abroad. The 
determination of US operators to penetrate the European market, on the one hand, and the 
need to have European or indeed world infrastructures in order to offer services on the 
international scale, on the other hand, has led to the creation of world consortia with one 
or more European players in each consortium. 
Net gain for the consumer 
(a) A fall in international call charges: these charges (to New York) fell on average by 42% 
in all European countries between 1990 and 1995. There has been a fall in prices for 
long-distance calls following the price re-balancing exercise (see Chapter 6). 
(b) Availability of pan-European services. 
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Figure 7.6 summarizes what has been learnt about changes in the voice telephony sector and 
the influence of the Commission's measures on these changes. 
Figure 7.6. Voice telephony: conclusions 
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services: cards. VPN. etc. 
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at the European level 
(FT. BT, Unisource) 
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1 Involvement of players 
related to telecom­
munications in the field 
of calling cards 
Creation of consortia 
containing one European 
member in each case 
However, the lack of liberalization in infrastructures in Europe is now tending to hold back the 
development of pan­European voice telephony services such as cards or IVPN (international 
virtual private networks). Moreover, access by the historic operators to dedicated lines is felt 
by some new entrants to be discriminatory (see the Esprit Telecom case study in 
Appendix A.2). The year 1998 is therefore being awaited with impatience by the new entrants, 
who will then be able to bypass the routes presently open to them and use their own networks. 
This will have a definite impact on costs. 
In the present situation, and until that date, the domination of the PTOs in their own countries 
is assured, for the following reasons: 
(a) the US operators (MCI, ATT, Sprint) are obliged to route calls via nodes which are not 
economically optimal, and therefore offer international prices (cost per minute) which are 
not competitive with those offered by the domestic operators; 
(b) the European operators benefit from the distribution of their cards, which are used by 
Europeans abroad and are invoiced at very advantageous rates. (The distribution of the 
cards is a means of deploying abroad without infrastructures.) 
7.3.2. Changes attributable to the single market 
The Council Resolution of 1993 calling for the liberalization of telephony in 1998 has had an 
accelerating effect: 
(a) on the re­balancing of prices undertaken in the European countries (a drop in international 
and long­distance call changes and a rise in subscriptions), 
(b) on the development of loyalty pricing schemes (pricing options), 
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(c) on the development of European alliances undertaken by the PTOs. 
The liberal interpretation of the concept of CUG has had a facilitating effect: 
(a) on the development of VPN offers intended for large multi-site companies, 
(b) on the development of competition focused on re-routing services. 
Table 7.2. Impact of the Commission's measures on the voice telephony segment 
1 Fall in prices 
2 New players 
3 Internationalization of players 
4 Pan-European services 
Global impact 
H Strong motor effect. 
U Moderate motor effect. 
Impact of single market 
Services 
Directive 
• 
O 
O 
o 
ONP 
90/387 
92/44 
O 
O 
O 
1993 
Council 
Resolution 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
β Strong facilitating effect. 
O Moderate facilitating effect. 
Other impacts 
Entrepreneur 
strategies 
□ 
■ 
■ 
PTO 
strategy 
■ 
■ 
■ 
Technology 
O 
O 
O 
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8. Satellites 
In this chapter we identify the main changes in the satellite services sector in Europe. 
In the last part of this chapter (Section 8.3) we determine how far these changes are 
attributable to the European measures by comparison with natural developments in the sector, 
associated with globally identifiable factors. 
8.1. Context 
8.1.1. The structural factors in the sector 
Irrespective of the Commission's measures, the satellite services sector has evolved under the 
influence of several factors: 
Technological change 
(a) Progress in compression, together with the numbering of the signal, have made it possible 
to gear down transmission capacity, which has resulted both in a considerable 
development of services on offer and in a reduction in the size of receiving equipment 
(e.g. VSAT aerials). 
(b) In connection with the progress mentioned in point (a), direct broadcasting has spread, 
both in the audiovisual field (for residential viewers) and in telecommunications (for 
professional use). 
A change in habits 
(a) The growing need of users for private networks has prompted a quest for alternative 
solutions appropriate to each case. Especially where point-multipoint connections are 
concerned, satellites seemed to be one of the best solutions. 
(b) Because satellites can reach some areas which are difficult for land networks to reach (for 
topographical or economic reasons), they are increasingly being used as relays for cable or 
wire broadcasting (for example, multipoint multichannel distribution service (MMDS) for 
television or the future low earth orbit (LEO) networks for global mobile 
communications). 
(c) The development of telecommunications in the emerging countries (the Eastern Bloc and 
Latin America) depends, in meeting initial demand (in this case professional demand), on 
networks which can be rapidly established; mobiles and satellites then seem to be the 
most immediate answer. 
Development strategy of the key players 
The 'historic' satellite operators are increasingly becoming 'capacity suppliers' and depend 
largely on the suppliers of content or service providers who lease access; consequently, the 
new entrants seek to combine the various activities in the field, especially through financial 
partnerships (e.g. the capital organization of LEO projects or TV broadcasters). 
78 Telecommunications: liberalized services 
8.1.2. General trends in the European market 
The satellite sector can be divided into two segments: the space segment and the terrestrial 
segment. 
The space segment is occupied by operators of satellite systems (Intelsat, Astra, TDF, etc.) 
which own, manage and exploit satellites and resell capacity. In 1995, the income of operators 
of satellite systems in Europe amounted to ECU 1.2 billion. 
The terrestrial segment is occupied by companies providing services by buying satellite 
capacity: 
(a) television and radio services, which account for most of the earnings of satellite operators 
(see Figure 8.1 which presents their share of the market); 
(b) voice services to transport the traffic of telephone calls, mainly international; and 
(c) professional services (TV for professional use and VSAT), which are rising steadily (see 
Figure 8.2). 
Figure 8.1. Use of satellite capacity in 1994 (in percentage of turnover) 
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Source: CIT research. 
The field of satellite telecommunications is awash with regulations. The Green Paper of 
December 1990 on satellites (COM (90) 490) and the Council Resolution of November 1991 
recommend: 
(a) the liberalization of the terrestrial segment; 
(b) unrestricted access to the capacity of the space segment and commercial freedom for the 
operators of satellite systems; 
(c) mutual recognition of national permits or licences. 
The Satellite Terminal Equipment Directive (93/97/EEC) was published in 1993. The year 
1994 saw the emergence of the Directive on Satellite Services and Terminals (94/46/EEC) to 
put an end to exclusive and special rights and to liberalize the regime of satellite services and 
equipment. 
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The Directive on Television Without Frontiers (89/552/EEC) was published in 1989, to 
liberalize the supply of cross-border satellite television services. 
Figure 8.2. Growth in the number of VSAT aerials in Europe 
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8.2. Detailed analysis 
8.2.1. The internationalization of sales and activities 
A pan-European market 
As Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show, there exists pan-European satellite services market. Of the 12 
operators (apart from Inmarsat) which operated above Europe in mid-1994, seven were 
offering pan-European coverage and two (Eutelsat and Astra) were making it their prime 
target. 
European players are first in the field for total satellite capacity available above Europe, with a 
share of transponders which by mid-1994 had reached 83%. 
Operators outside the EU have only a very marginal share of the VSAT segment. As for the 
terrestrial segment, the services are sold almost exclusively by companies from within the 
Community (the market share of VSAT operators outside the EU is below 5%). Finally, for 
the space segment, the only non-European supplier is Intelsat, which holds 15% of the market, 
but where European operators hold 40% (see Figure 8.3). 
The television services are mainly national programmes, and of the 180 television channels 
using the satellite in Europe, the pan-European channels (CNN International, MTV Europe, 
etc.) represent less than 5% of the turnover. 
The use made by the PTOs of satellite capacity for transmitting voice messages is primarily -
84% - for international calls. 
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Table 8.1. Satellite systems covering Western Europe in mid-1994 
Coverage 
Eutelsat 
Intelsat 
Pan-European Domestic 
": cour 
Europe and the rest 
of the world 
Astra 
DFS-1&2. TV-SAT2 
Telecom 1&2 
Hispasat 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | 
PanAmSat: PASI 
THOR 
TDF1&2 
Statsionar4 
ORION ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | 
Italsat 
Turksat 
= Principal market targeted. 
= Secondary market targeted. 
= Not active on this market. 
Source: Euroconsult, Logica, Idate. 
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Table 8.2. Satellite systems covering Western Europe in mid 1994 
Satellite capacity in Europe 
Operator 
Cutelsat 
Intelsat 
Astra 
DFS-1&2 
TV-SAT2 
Telecom 1&2 
Hispasat 
Tele-X 
PanAmSat: 
PASI 
THOR 
TDF 1&2 
Statsionar4 
ORION 
Italsat 
Turksat 
Consortium 
Europe 
Consortium 
Monde 
Société 
F.uropéenne des 
Satelites 
DT 
FT 
Swedish Space 
Corp. 
Panamsat 
Telenor 
TDF 
Intersputnik 
ORION Satellite 
Corp. 
Telecom Italia 
Turkish post and 
telecommunicatio 
ns service 
Country 
Europe 
World 
Luxembourg 
Germany 
France 
Spain 
Denmark 
US 
Sweden/Finland 
France 
Russia 
UK/Japan/ 
Canada/US/Italy 
Italy 
Turkey 
Total 
No. of operational 
satellites 
End 
92 
5 
9 
2 
3 
3 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
4 
0 
1 
0 
31 
Mid-
93 
8 
9 
2 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
0 
1 
0 
37 
End 
93 
7 
10 
3 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
0 
1 
0 
39 
No. of transponders 
Mid-
92 
7 
9 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
36 
End 
92 
112 
106 
32 
31 
28 
0 
7 
6 
0 
4 
4 
0 
6 
0 
336 
Mid-
93 
150 
126 
32 
44 
28 
15 
7 
6 
6 
4 
4 
0 
6 
0 
428 
End 
93 
136 
132 
50 
44 
29 
28 
7 
6 
6 
4 
4 
0 
6 
0 
452 
M i d -
94 
128 
108 
50 
44 
29 
28 
12 
6 
6 
4 
1 
0 
6 
0 
422 
Source: Euroconsult. Logica. Idate. 
Figure 8.3. Market share1 of satellite system providers for VSAT in Europe 
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Source: Idate. 
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8.2.2. The internationalization of supply and geographical effects 
The growing share acquired by constructors is now threatened 
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show that the growth of the space industry has benefited European 
constructors. The share of the European industry on the world satellite market went up from 
0% in the 1970s to 26% in the period 1986-94. 
Figure 8.4. Market share1 of European satellite constructors in the world 
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Figure 8.5. Market share of constructors of satellite systems in the world in 1994 
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Source: Tribune Desfossés 1994. 
However, it is likely that in future years this share of the European market will contract, as the 
new consortia in mobile communication satellites (Iridium, Globalstar and Odissey) rely 
mainly on US technology. European constructors have not yet devised any investment strategy 
for integrated service offers. 
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8.2.3. Scale and dimension effects 
Obvious scale effects 
Figure 8.6 shows a very marked volume effect in space activity: the cost of acquiring the 
transponder falls sharply with the total capacity of the satellite launched. 
Figure 8.6. Cost of acquiring satellites according to size 
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Source: CIT research. 
Hence, the increased demand resulting from the accelerated development of television services 
has stimulated volume effects. 
Among operators of satellite systems, providing capacity for VSATs remains a secondary 
activity. Apart from Intelsat, which derives most of its income from voice services, the chief 
activity of those supplying capacity for the VSATs is the transport of television programmes: 
(a) Eutelsat (60% of turnover); 
(b) DFS(66%); 
(c) Hispasat (63%); 
(d) Télécom 1 (75%). 
Television is and will remain the largest market. The introduction of VSAT services at 
competitive prices will therefore invariably be linked to the growth in television; dimension 
effects are crucial. In the United States, the GTE strategy illustrates this phenomenon: the 
GTE operator offers competitive prices on VSAT while keeping 70% of its turnover in 
activities associated with television. 
8.2.4. Concentration and change in competitive conditions 
Space segment: a highly concentrated market 
The market for satellite system operators is highly concentrated, although it is tending to open 
up. In mid­1994, the leading player, Eutelsat, had 30% of total capacity (33% in 1992) and the 
top five operators had 85% (92% in 1992). 
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The low level of dispersal of this market is due to its capital intensive nature and the risk 
inherent in the activity. The significant technological risk, which requires insurance premiums 
of between 10 and 15% of the cost of the satellite, and the need for a back-up satellite (FF 600 
million at least for each satellite) has led to the cooperative management of systems (e.g. 
Intelsat, Eutelsat). 
However, new players with considerable potential are emerging such as: 
(a) Turksat, which has very high pan-European capacity; 
(b) Inmarsat, which is opening up to the provision of mobile terrestrial services (which 
already account for 31% of income) and which is the only European virtual operator of 
mobile services as compared with the Iridium, Globalstar and Odissey projects. 
Liberalization has brought about some déconcentration of the space segment, but by the very 
nature of the sector, it is bound to remain limited. 
The terrestrial sector: a greater division of the market 
The concentration of the market on VSAT services is declining (see Table 8.3) and new 
players are making rapid progress. On the interactive VSAT segment, Hub/star for example, 
Kingston Satellites has a 15% market share after eight months' activity, and BT has 6% after 
one year. 
Table 8.3. Concentration of the VSAT market 
VSAT market share (in number of stations) 
Top five 
1st player 
5th player 
February 1994 
64% 
33% 
6% 
February 1995 
53% 
25% 
6% 
Source: Analysis. 
8.2.5. Television: diversification without a change of players as yet 
The number of television channels using the satellite has increased steadily, from 55 in 1990 
to 180 in Europe in March 1995. This has been made possible by advances in technology, and 
has been encouraged by the liberalization of the sector and the Directive on Television without 
Frontiers which, by setting up single windows for the registration of channels, has brought 
about a simplification in procedures. However, the market is still fairly concentrated, the five 
largest broadcasters possessing 72% of the European market in 1994 (see Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4. Concentration of the TV market using satellites 
TV broadcasting market share (in turnover) 
Top five 
1st player 
5th player 
1993 
74% 
30% 
5% 
1994 
72% 
27% 
5% 
Source: CIT research. 
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Thus, the Green Paper of 1990 and the directives of 1993 and 1994 have enabled new players 
to emerge in the VSAT services segment. As for the growth in TV services, it has been chiefly 
the outcome of liberalization concerning contents. 
8.2.6. Reduction in costs and prices 
A reduction in observable costs 
The price of satellite capacity has fallen partly because of a marked technological effect (see 
Figure 8.7), but also because of a better division of the pass band (customization), which has 
been made necessary by the increase in demand. 
Figure 8.7. Change in the cost of the transponder on construction 
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8.2.7. Interrelative ties 
The satellite capacity sector has been directly influenced by the growth in television, which 
accounts for most of the satellite capacity in use (see Figure 8.8). 
Barriers which are now in existence, or which will be created in future, will be, as far as the 
programmes are concerned, largely responsible for the future of the satellite services. 
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Figure 8.8. Division of income of satellite operators per type of transponder use 
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Source: Logica. 
8.3. Conclusion 
8.3.1. Major trends observed 
The major trends observed in the field of satellite services in Europe in recent years are: 
(a) the déconcentration of VSAT services; the simplification of consent procedures and the 
freeing, in some cases, of new frequency bands for the VSAT networks have enabled the 
market to develop rapidly; 
(b) in parallel, the emergence of new service providers has set off a process of competitive 
imitation; 
(c) in order to respond to the new demand for capacity, the use and division of the pass band 
have been optimized; 
(d) at the same time, the rise of competition has brought about a reduction in costs and, in 
correlation, in the prices of satellite services; 
(e) finally, the space segment being partitioned geographically, the European industry has 
profited directly from the development of the regional market. 
These tendencies are shown in Figure 8.9. 
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Figure 8.9. Satellites: conclusions 
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The Green Paper of 1990 (COM (90) 490), and the anticipation in several countries of the 
1994 Directive on the Liberalization of Services (94/46/EC), have resulted in a simplification 
of the procedures for access to space capacity and the emergence of new services associated 
with satellites, as for example the VSATs. 
However, it is mainly because of the development of television broadcasting by satellite that 
the growth in demand for satellite capacity has occurred. This development has itself been 
made possible by the Directive on Television without Frontiers (89/552/EEC) which 
liberalizes the provision of cross-border television services. 
The space segment, although it has been opened up, will remain relatively concentrated. Of its 
nature, it is a field reserved to a small group of companies. On the other hand, there has been a 
genuine rise in the number of players in terrestrial services, which have taken off very rapidly. 
This increase in demand for capacity has had several consequences. It has resulted in a better 
division of the pass band in the short term and a fall in construction costs in the longer term. 
This, in turn, has reflected on the price of the space capacity bought by the operators of the 
terrestrial segment. 
Finally, the rise in demand for capacity has enabled the European space industry to develop 
and strengthen. 
8.3.2. Changes attributable to the single market 
Each of the major changes noted depends to a greater or lesser degree either on the 
Commission measures or on the 'external' factors defined in the introduction to this section. 
Table 8.5 attempts to bring out the importance of each of these factors by distinguishing, as for 
the other sectors, between activities which have played a motor role (strong or moderate) and 
those which have played a facilitating role. 
The déconcentration of the market for VSATs, associated especially with the simplification of 
procedures for access to space capacity, results largely from the 1990 Green Paper, 
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technological progress (the reduction in the size of receiving equipment in particular) having 
played a facilitating role. 
The emergence of new service providers, especially in the field VSATs, is the direct result of 
the Commission's actions (the Green Paper on Satellites and the Services Directive) and of the 
express intention of some groups to diversify. 
The better use of the pass band therefore seems to be the consequence of previous actions and 
is made possible, in particular, by technological progress (compression, channelling, etc.). 
Another consequence of the expansion in demand and competitive pressure, the fall in costs, is 
an indirect consequence of the Commission's measures and of technological development. 
Finally, the development of the European industry is closely associated with the Commission's 
actions to harmonize and de­partition the single market, and with the strategies of some 
particularly dynamic players (see the case study on Astra in Appendix A.l). 
Table 8.5. Impact of the Commission's measures on the satellite sector 
Déconcentration of VSATs 
New service providers 
Optimization of the pass 
band 
Falling costs 
Development of a European 
industry 
Commission measures 
Directives1 
■ 
D 
α 
■ 
Recommend­
ations2 
■ 
O 
Horizontal 
measures3 
'External' factors 
Standard­
ization 
Technology 
• 
• 
• 
□ 
Strategies 
of players 
■ 
■ 
D 
■ Strong motor effect. 
D Moderate motor effect. 
1 Satellite Directives. 
Green Paper on Satellites. 
1 Abuse of dominant position. 
• Strong facilitating effect. 
O Moderate facilitating effect. 
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9. Overview of the impact of the single market 
During this period, the single market in non-reserved telecommunications services has 
developed along the following lines. 
9.1. Pan-European services have developed and improved for the benefit of users 
9.1.1. The first pan-European services are appearing 
As regards mobile services, the transition to the GSM standard has transformed cellular 
telephony in the EU from a set of fragmented national services which are not interoperational, 
into a pan-European service pattern for the end consumer. The number of roaming agreements 
rose from 70 to 471 between 1992 and 1995. 
The liberalization of data transmission services in all countries has enabled operators to build 
up pan-European infrastructures and offer users standardized end-to-end services. 
Competition for international voice message services for the business sector is now prompting 
even the main operators to develop virtual private network offers on a pan-European basis for 
voice telephony. 
9.1.2. Services are improving 
The need to differentiate among offers has prompted operators to improve their services, for 
the greater benefit of the end-users. For instance, the operators are now proposing to offer 
information services linked to calling cards or to mobile telephony, and virtual private 
networks providing a multiplicity of functions. 
9.2. The European service industry has strengthened and has developed 
a pan-European dimension, enabling it to deal successfully with aggressive 
international competition 
The development of mobile telephony on the GSM standard has enabled European 
manufacturers to acquire knowledge in this technology and to develop economies of scale. 
This has made them leaders in the digital market, now exporting to the entire world. The 
internationalization of offers for data transmission has benefited European operators, who 
have been able to compensate for the opening up of their domestic markets by a stronger 
presence on the international scene. 
In the field of voice transmission, the public operators have mostly reacted by defensive 
strategies geared to loyalty selling on their local market and developing new uses, and to 
various degrees by offensive strategies for deployment abroad (BT is the most advanced 
example in this respect). 
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9.3. The establishment of a homogeneous environment facilitating comparisons 
contributing to the overall efficiency of the sector 
9.3.1. Contraction and convergence of prices 
Prices fall more sharply where the level of deregulation is higher 
The introduction of a more significant level of competition has led to price reductions 
(illustrated especially in the case of international telephony) and an increase in package price 
offers: prices on international calls to the US have fallen on average by 42% in all European 
countries between 1990 and 1995. 
At the same time, the anticipation by public operators of the liberalization of infrastructures 
has enabled users to benefit from a 22.3% reduction on long-distance calls. 
Prices are also converging, gradually reducing the effect of borders 
Apart from a reduction in prices which has occurred in the various services open to 
competition, there has also been a discernible convergence in prices. What has happened is 
that the most backward countries have begun to align themselves on the prices prevailing in 
the other Member States. For example, the ratio between the highest and the lowest prices for 
international telephone calls was reduced between 1991 and 1994 from four to two. 
9.3.2. Emergence of new entrants 
Liberalization has enabled new players to emerge, in spite of the predominance of public 
operators on the national scene 
The development in competitive conditions in the mobile sector has led to an increase in the 
number of players (30 licensed operators in 1994, against 22 in 1991). New operators of 
satellite services for professional use have emerged (especially on the VSAT offers) and 
television broadcasting by satellite has made startling progress (55 channels in 1990, 180 
channels in 1995). New entrants have appeared in the voice segment (call-back companies, re­
sellers). 
However, the lack of a European infrastructure is still holding back to a considerable extent 
the development of these new entrants, and it tends to promote the domination of public 
operators. 
At present, according to interviews and case studies, new entrants are limited in their 
development by: 
(a) the price and availability of connections leased internationally for international telephone 
services and data transmission; 
(b) the price of connections leased nationally for access to international networks and for 
mobile services. 
In the absence of competition on infrastructures, the public operators have at least the 
advantage over the new entrants that they can plan their development in awareness of the 
future availability and prices of these leased connections, especially for high throughput. 
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The 1998 date is therefore being awaited impatiently by the new entrants, who will be able to 
by-pass the routes open to them at present and use their own networks; this will have a definite 
impact on costs. 
9.3.3. Job creation 
All the developments occurring in the field of services open to competition have led to a net 
gain in employment estimated at 28,500 new jobs between 1990 and 1994 both with public 
operators and with the new entrants, especially in the mobile communication services. 
However, these new jobs have not yet compensated for the jobs which at the same time have 
been eliminated by the public operators on non-deregulated services, and which are outside the 
scope of the study. These job losses have been estimated at 115,500 over the same period, and 
have occurred chiefly in technical operation areas in the public networks. 
Table 9.1. Illustration of major developments in the single market in 
telecommunications services open to competition between 1987 and 1995 
Sector 
Effect 
of single market 
Creation of pan-
European 
services 
Reinforcement of 
the European 
industry 
Homogeneous 
environment and 
efficiency of the 
sector 
Contracting and 
converging prices 
Emergence of new 
entrants 
Job creation 
Mobile 
GSM standard and 
increase in roaming 
agreements from 70 to 
471 between 1992 and 
1995 
European industrialists 
and operators have 
become market leaders 
in digital services 
based on the GSM. 
Development of intra-
European agreements 
Annual fall of 12.5% 
in the price per minute 
ofGSM 
communications 
between 1992 and 
1995 
Growth in number of 
licensed operators 
from 22 to 30 between 
1991 and 1994 
Creation of 21.000 
jobs at PTOs and the 
new entrants from 
1990 to 1994 
Data transmission 
Development of pan-
European 
infrastructures by 
public operators and at 
a lesser level by US 
operators 
Growth in market 
share of international 
players of European 
origin from 12 to 23% 
between 1991 and 
1993 
Disparate price 
reduction 
Reduction in the 
market share of the 
five largest players 
from 56 to 48% from 
1991 to 1993 
Creation of 5.500 jobs 
at PTOs and the new 
entrants from 1990 to 
1994 
Telephony 
Development of card 
services and 
international virtual 
private networks 
Creation of 
international consortia 
with a strong presence 
of European operators 
Reduction of prices of 
calls to the USA by 
42% between 1990 and 
1995. 
Reduction in the ratio 
between the highest 
and the lowest price 
from four to two 
Emergence of many 
call-back and traffic 
reselling companies 
since 1993 
Recent creation of 
several hundred jobs in 
Europe 
Satellites 
Pan-European services 
by nature 
Maintenance of the 
European virtual 
monopoly 
Relative fall in prices 
with equal capacity 
Growth in number of 
VSAT operators and 
increase in TV 
channels from 55 to 
180 between 1990 and 
1995 
Not significant 
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These changes have, of course, reflected certain fundamental trends in the telecommunications 
sector, more or less independently of the European programme. 
Technological developments have improved the quality and reduced the cost of equipment and 
therefore brought about the development of new telecommunications services. For example, 
the digitization of networks and access points, the integration of electronic components and a 
better command of radio techniques have had effects on the various services studied. 
The industry standards for telecommunications, approved by the CCITT at the international 
level, influence development in equipment and services. They usually result from proposals of 
European or US origin. 
The globalization of the economy has had an impact on telecommunications services because 
of the internationalization of trade and growing needs for computer data transmission, in 
particular. 
The strategies of key players, public operators, telecommunications equipment manufacturers 
and computer designers are directly linked to the changes in the sectors studied. 
The role of national regulators is responsible for certain local changes, especially through the 
grant of licences to services open to competition and through the local interpretation of 
Community rules. 
Table 9.2. Effect of underlying trends in the telecommunication sector on the key 
changes noted over the period 1987 to 1995 
External factors 
Effects 
of single market 
Creation of pan-
European services 
Reinforcement of the 
European industry 
Homogeneous 
environment and 
efficiency of the sector 
Technological 
developments 
Improvement of 
services on offer. 
Improvement of 
the relationship 
between 
functions and 
costs 
Industry 
standards 
Standards of 
terminals and 
networks for 
homogeneous 
pan-European 
services 
Interoperability 
of networks and 
services. 
Entry of new 
players 
Globalization of 
the economy 
Development of 
a pan-European 
demand by 
companies 
Standardization 
by the market 
(benchmarking) 
Strategy of key 
players 
International­
ization of public 
operators. 
Pan-European 
entry strategy of 
American players 
Opening up to 
the advantage of 
public operators 
Key role on cost 
changes of leased 
connections and 
the service tariff 
Role of national 
regulators 
Effects 
sometimes 
negative due to 
local 
interpretation of 
market opening 
conditions 
9.4. Many of these developments can also be directly attributed to the European 
actions, which have had consequences of two kinds 
Through its various actions, whether to encourage or to compel, the Commission has had 
effects of two kinds on the development of the single market in telecommunications services 
open to competition. 
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9.4.1. A motor effect has speeded up the development of the single market 
This is due to: 
(a) Action to encourage developments, such as announcements which lead the various players 
in the field to anticipate a new strategic framework. For example, the effects of the Green 
Paper on the development of telecommunications services by 1992 and the present 
positioning of all the key players in anticipation of the proclaimed deregulation of 
infrastructures and services in 1998. 
(b) Regulatory action, such as the Framework Services and ONP directives, has led to a 
simultaneous standardization of market conditions in all the Member States, thus bringing 
about a block effect which justifies the development and reinforcement of a European 
service industry. Without this simultaneous opening, it is probable that the US players, 
having already acquired sufficient stature in their large, deregulated market, would have 
taken advantage of a gradual opening, country by country. 
9.4.2. A facilitating effect of technical and regulatory standardization has been achieved 
This has led to greater efficiency in the markets in terms of prices, competition and 
employment, through: 
(a) induction of the standardization kind, accompanying key standards; 
(b) general regulatory actions such as the ONP directives. 
These effects have varied according to the sectors under study, and are summarized in the 
following table. 
Table 9.3. Impact of the European programme on the various trends observed for 
each of the types of telecommunication services open to competition 
Sector 
Effects of 
single market 
Creation of pan-
European services 
Reinforcement of 
the European 
industry 
Homogeneous 
environment and 
efficiency of the 
sector 
Mobiles 
A motor effect through 
induction, standard 
setting through ETSI 
and its support for 
allocation of the 
900 MHz waveband 
A facilitating effect 
through bilateral 
regulatory action to 
open up certain 
markets 
A facilitating effect 
through induction. 
standard setting and 
standardization of 
markets 
Data transmission 
A facilitating effect 
through induction, 
Recommendation 
92/283 and regulatory 
action in the Services 
Directive 90/388 and 
ONP Directives 
90/387 and 92/44 
A motor effect through 
regulatory action in the 
Services Directive 
90/388 and ONP 
Leased Lines Directive 
92/44 
A motor effect through 
regulatory action in the 
Services Directive 
(90/388) and ONP 
(90/387) and Leased 
Lines (92/44) 
Directives 
Telephony 
A facilitating effect 
through regulatory 
action in the Services 
Directive 90/388 and 
ONP Directives 
90/387 and 92/44 
A motor effect through 
induction - 1993 
Council Resolution 
A motor effect through 
induction - 1993 
Council Resolution 
Satellites 
A facilitating effect 
through regulatory 
action of the Satellite 
Directive 93/97 
A motor effect through 
induction: Green Paper 
on Satellites (COM 
(90) 490); and 
regulatory action in the 
Satellite Directive 
93/97 
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The following tables review again the summaries contained in the analysis, with the emphasis 
on the four effects: 
(a) a fall in prices and costs; 
(b) the emergence of new players; 
(c) the development of pan-European services; 
(d) the development or reinforcement of the European industry. 
Table 9.4. Overview: impact of the Commission's measures on the four effects 
analysed 
1. Reduction in prices/costs 
2. New players 
3. Pan-European services 
4. Development of European 
industry' 
Commission measures 
Directives 
Voice: strong facilitator 
Data: moderate motor 
Satellites: moderate motor 
Data: strong motor 
Voice: moderate facilitator 
Satellites: strong motor 
Data: strong facilitator 
Voice: moderate facilitator 
Mobiles: strong facilitator 
Data: strong motor 
Satellites: strong motor 
Recommendations 
Mobiles: strong facilitator 
Data: strong facilitator 
Voice: moderate facilitator 
Satellites: strong motor 
Mobiles: strong motor 
Data: strong facilitator 
Voice: moderate facilitator 
Mobiles: moderate motor 
Satellites: moderate 
facilitator 
Horizontal measures 
Bilateral action 
Mobiles: moderate facilitator 
Data: moderate facilitator 
Voice: strong motor 
Mobiles: moderate facilitator 
Voice: strong motor 
Voice: strong motor 
Table 9.5. Overview: impact of 'external factors' on the four effects analysed 
1. Reduction in prices/costs 
2. New players 
3. Pan-European services 
4. Development of European 
industry 
'External' factors 
Standardization 
Mobiles: moderate motor 
Data: strong motor 
Mobiles: moderate motor 
Data: moderate motor 
Data: strong motor 
Technology 
Satellites: moderate motor 
Data: moderate motor 
Voice: moderate facilitator 
Satellites: strong facilitator 
Mobiles: moderate motor 
Data: strong facilitator 
Voice: moderate facilitator 
Satellites: strong facilitator 
Strategies of players 
Voice: strong motor 
Mobiles: moderate motor 
Voice: strong motor 
Satellites: strong motor 
Data: strong motor 
Data: strong motor 
Voice: strong motor 
Satellites: moderate motor 
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10. Mobiles 
10.1. Introduction 
Since the arrival of the GSM standard, mobile telephony has undergone marked expansion. In 
the EU. the total number of subscribers in 1994 was 13 million, growing at a rate of 63%. 
Because of the many new licences granted, this trend is expected to continue for several years. 
10.1.1. A non-deregulated sector, but heavily influenced by Community policy 
The legal system covering the mobile telephony sector is for states themselves to decide, but it 
must fit within the regulatory framework of the European Union. 
The Green Paper on mobile and personal communications (COM (94) 145), which is intended 
to support current developments, was published in April 1994. However, action by the 
European Commission was largely ahead of its publication and has contributed to introducing 
a degree of competition in all countries. 
10.1.2. Three main kinds of players 
The provision of mobile telephony services to end-users implies three kinds of principal 
players (see Figure 10.1). 
Figure 10.1. Mobiles: added value chain 
Supply of materials 
Use of networks 
Sales 
Manufacturers 
Operators 
Service companies 
C^^ Clients J) 
ψ = shareholding 
The manufacturers 
Mobile telephony systems in Europe are provided by companies which are mainly European 
and employ over 10,000 people. There are between one and six suppliers in each country, and 
a total of eight companies in the EU. Some manufacturers share in operating activities (e.g. 
Alcatel) or distributing activities (Motorola). Manufacturers of network equipment (switching 
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equipment and base stations) do not form part of this study, which focuses on services, but are 
mentioned here as players upstream in the sector. 
The operators 
The operators of mobile networks open to the public employ between a few hundred and a few 
thousand staff. In each country there are one to four operators, for a total of 30 licensed 
companies in the EU in 1994, and 50 networks in operation. The operators possess their own 
distribution channels (direct selling) and/or have shares in service marketing companies (see 
Chapter 5 and the Mannesmann Mobilfunk case study in Appendix A.3). 
The service companies 
The service marketing companies (SMC) employ several hundred people each. There are two 
or three dozen SMCs in each country. The SMCs are often present in several European 
countries at a time. They were originally developed in the United Kingdom to sell analogue 
services, and appeared in Germany and France only when the GSM standard was introduced. 
10.2. The manufacturers 
10.2.1. Strategy of the manufacturers 
The manufacturers tend to form a closed circle, and there have been no new entrants in recent 
years. Supplies in the EU are open, and all countries use foreign suppliers. The share of non-
domestic supplies is almost entirely accounted for by Community manufacturers and 
Motorola. The latter is the only non-European manufacturer, and has a 15% market share in 
base stations. There is one obvious leader, Ericsson, which alone has more than a third of the 
market in GSM equipment. 
Under the direction of ETSI, European manufacturers have shared in the development of the 
GSM standard. They then have continued to develop individually, sometimes setting up 
consortia: 
(a) DCMS (ANT, Bosch, Philips); 
(b) ECR 9000 (AEG, Alcatel, Nokia). 
The European manufacturers which lead in developing equipment and benefit from economies 
of scale have been able to become leaders in the GSM standard in Europe, and have exported 
to world markets, especially to south-east Asia (at the end of 1995. about 150 operators are 
testing the GSM standard or have already adopted it). 
Motorola is diversifying its activities in services: it owns marketing companies in significant 
European markets (Germany, France, United Kingdom). 
10.2.2. Impact of EU measures 
By supporting the development of the GSM standard, the European Commission has enabled 
European manufacturers to take a leading role in technology. They have been able to keep 
their intra-EU market and to export their expertise throughout the world. 
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10.3. The operators 
10.3.1. Strategy of the operators 
Growth in competition 
GSM and DCS 1800 (digital cellular system for 1800 MHz) licences have been granted to the 
historic analogue operators and to new entrants. This has had two effects: an increase in the 
number of services on offer (both analogue and digital) and an increase in the number of 
licensed operators, which has risen from 17 in 1990 to 30 in 1994 (see Figure 10.2). The 
number of networks in operation rose from 17 to 50 over the same period. 
Figure 10.2. Growth in the number of licensed cellular operators in the EC 
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Source: Idate/Devotech analysis. 
Targeted market segments 
As the national regulator generally imposes strict constraints where licences are concerned 
(occupation of frequencies, minimum standards for reception), once the licences are granted 
the operators have only limited room for manoeuvre; the requirements of profitability call for 
the largest possible number of customers and therefore for maximum coverage. Hence, it is 
not possible for an operator to target a specific geographic market segment. This may change 
in the future, especially with the emergence of local radio link-ups. 
Aggressive strategies 
The main aggressive strategies deployed by historic operators faced with the new entrants are: 
(a) to bring in a maximum number of subscribers before the new services are opened up 
commercially, through: 
(i) a reduction in the price of communications; 
(ii) an increase in price offers; 
(iii) a development of intensive marketing. 
(b) to increase coverage, which is a major criterion of differentiation by comparison with the 
'new' offers; 
(c) to offer linked complementary services: 
(i) financial information; 
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(ii) traffic information; 
(iii) general information. 
The following figure illustrates the trends in marketing strategies by operators over time: 
Figure 10.3. Development priorities for mobile services 
Relative importance of client 
satisfaction components 
Customer loyalty programme 
Networks/Price 
Time 
Launch 2 years After 2 years 
Source: Bossard Analysis. 
The priority given to different activities may change depending on the customer satisfaction 
components: the deployment of networks and communication on pricing take priority during 
the 'conquest' phase, and customer loyalty programmes and service development then tend to 
replace them. 
Defensive strategies 
The operators buy up service marketing companies in order to achieve maximum added value. 
The PTOs which own the historic mobile operators tend to hold back the arrival of new 
entrants by keeping the cost of dedicated lines and interconnection high, and offering the 
mobile operators connections at levels too high up in their networks, which has a strong 
impact on the cost of dedicated lines. This type of defensive strategy is a double weapon, 
because it applies both to independent mobile operators and to subsidiaries of the PTOs. 
However, the latter have one advantage, that the PTOs and the mobile operators are sited 
together. The technical conditions for the interconnections proposed by the PTOs are also 
criticized by the mobile operators. 
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Alliance strategies adopted 
The new operators which appeared with the grant of GSM and DCS 1800 licences are often 
consortia led by major local investors. These domestic companies have been joined by foreign 
operators gaining a foothold on international markets through financial participation, as the 
following examples show: 
(a) the presence of Airtouch, an American operator, on seven European networks; 
(b) the presence of Veba (a German E-Plus service) in the capitals of One-2-One, a British 
operator, and Bouygues Télécom, a French operator. 
This situation can be explained: 
(a) firstly, by the reasoning of the players, who believe their chances will be better if they put 
a local player in the lead; 
(b) secondly, by the methods of granting licences, based on qualitative criteria. 
This prompts the following conclusions: 
(a) there are no foreign operators leading consortia (e.g. BT is not present for the DCS 1800 
licence in France), the exception being where there are no local players (e.g. FT in 
Belgium); 
(b) shareholding remains in this context the most appropriate method for penetrating new 
markets. 
Therefore, although there is no regulatory prohibition, the non-tariff barriers which already 
exist have prevented certain kinds of conduct and have not enabled pan-European 
infrastructures to be set up on the primary licence market. 
In the present state of regulation, the emergence of pan-European mobile operators will only 
be possible in the context of the secondary licence market. However, the resale of mobile 
telephony licences is subject to the authorization of the regulators. 
In the United States, inter-state networks have been set up as a result of a new method of 
granting licences on the primary market: AT&T bought licences throughout the eastern states 
during the auction sale of 1994. On the secondary licence market, AT&T, by buying up the 
operator MacCaw Cellular, has been able to cover the west of the country, thus obtaining 
global coverage. 
Mutual independence of the regulators and the national operators 
The independence of the national telephone operators from the regulators has had a very 
marked impact on the strategy of the mobile players, enabling fair competition to take hold. 
Requests for arbitration have become relatively frequent, and have often been to the advantage 
of the new entrants. 
In France, for example, SFR filed a request for arbitration with the postal and télécoms 
authorities, the DGPT: the invoiced price of dedicated lines provided by France Télécom was 
considered to be too high. The DGPT agreed with SFR, and forced France Télécom to reduce 
its prices. The costs due to dedicated lines, which accounted for 50% of the budget of SFR 
before the arbitration, were brought down to 30%. In this example, it is important to appreciate 
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that the French regulator went to observe the German example for comparative purposes, 
which illustrates that there is a pan-European regulatory consciousness. 
The regulators have also authorized recourse to alternative infrastructures and even, in some 
cases, to construction and operation by mobile operators of infrastructures specially designed 
to handle calls (with the possibility of reselling capacity to third parties). 
10.3.2. Impact of EU measures 
The Commission has played a significant role in the strategies of the mobile operators 
described above. 
The Commission has also played an important role in the independence of regulators from 
public operators, and this has made it possible to seek out fair competition among players in 
the market, thus benefiting the end consumer. 
As the procedures for granting licences are still based on qualitative criteria, there has 
inevitably been a national fragmentation of infrastructures. On the other hand, the EU support 
for ETSI on the GSM standard has made it possible, despite the national character of 
infrastructures, to offer users a roaming pan-European service. 
10.4. The service companies 
10.4.1. Strategy of the service companies 
Growth in competition 
The service marketing companies (or SMCs) belong to three categories of player: 
(a) the operators (Vodafone, Hutchinson, etc.); 
f\ 7 R (b) the independent service companies (Martin Dawes, Debitel, Talkline, etc.); 
(c) the equipment suppliers (Motorola, etc.). 
There has been a growth in the number of SMCs in recent years. A new kind of player has also 
emerged: the central distribution companies or CDCs (which sell but do not manage 
subscriptions). 
Aggressive strategies 
In recent years, the main initiatives taken by the service marketing companies have been 
geared to a fall in entry subscriptions for the end-user. Accordingly, thanks to cross-
subsidizing between subscriptions and terminals, there have been many new offers of 
terminals at very reduced or nil prices. 
However, this kind of practice is subject to the views of the regulator, who controls dumping 
practices. 
Including FT. 
Including Daimler Benz and Metro. 
Including RWE. 
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Alliance strategies adopted 
The marked presence of foreign SMCs (in France and Germany almost 30% of the total 
number of GSM subscribers) and the presence of certain distributors in several European 
countries (e.g. Hutchison in Germany, France and the United Kingdom) implies that an end-
to-end pan-European service may soon be available (single window, standard pricing, etc.). 
10.4.2. Impact of EU measures 
The growth in competition has been influenced by the EU, because the SMCs have appeared 
in certain countries thanks to the introduction of the GSM standard. 
The Green Paper on mobiles encourages a high degree of freedom in marketing: 
(a) the provision of mobile services must not be subject to the grant of licences, and must at 
most be declared to the local regulator; 
(b) there should be no obligation or restriction on the supply of services through independent 
companies or subsidiaries of operators; 
(c) the marketing companies must be free to offer combined services (e.g. telephony and 
paging) and services on the scale of the European Union. 
However, the true impact is still difficult to verify and cannot be quantified for several years. 
10.5. Barriers still to be removed 
As we have seen, the Commission's actions have had a marked impact on the strategies of 
players in the EU. However, there are still certain areas calling for improvements. 
To ensure that access to frequencies at the local level is open to genuine competition, it would 
be desirable to put an end to the grant of frequencies solely according to qualitative criteria. 
This can be done by bringing the grants together in the form of bids for services, including 
qualitative criteria and, to some extent, monetary criteria. One possibility would be, for 
example, to set up minimum specifications and to grant licences to the most promising 
operators. A procedure of this kind would also enable operators to establish pan-European 
strategies. 
It would also be desirable to authorize the reselling of licences, to encourage the emergence of 
a second method of setting up pan-European infrastructures. 
Given the impact of the price of communications on penetration by mobile telephony, the EU 
can also step up its pressure on the terms for interconnection of the mobile operators to the 
operators of fixed infrastructures. Action has already been taken at the instigation of the EU 
(through the obligation to keep local regulators independent of the PTOs) and this has brought 
about a reduction in the cost of dedicated lines. On the other hand, the interconnection charges 
have not yet been subjected to any form of arbitration by the regulators. 
As regards the marketing of services, the purpose of the recommendations in the Green Paper 
is to give the distributors more room for manoeuvre; however, the effects are still limited. It 
would be desirable to bring in a more fundamental form of competition among distributors, for 
instance, by requiring separate accounting and a profitability requirement as between operating 
and sales activities for mobile operators. 
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11. Data 
11.1. The regulatory environment 
Directive 90/388/EEC opens to competition the supply of telecommunications services on 
fixed line infrastructures, except for voice telephony: it was therefore initially geared to the 
transmission of data and the value-added networks, which were to have been opened up by all 
Member States no later than 1 January 1993. However, each country remains free to include 
special clauses in the specifications of new operators, who may therefore be subject to 
different rules, both in the field of basic transmission (essential requirements, especially 
conditions of interconnection) and in the field of VANs (a mere declaration or an 
authorization in particular). 
Moreover, apart from the ONP Framework Directive, the application to leased lines (Directive 
92/94/EEC) and the Council Recommendation of 5 June 1992 on the offer of packet data 
services specify the conditions in which the public tender for data transmission support should 
operate. 
Finally, transversal rules, especially on competition, have had a particular impact on certain 
operations (for example, the rejection of the planned combination of the X.25 activities of 
France Télécom and Deutsche Telekom in the framework of Atlas). 
11.2. Growth in competition 
11.2.1. A closed circle competition 
The liberalization of the European market has reinforced protectionist tendencies among the 
main players on the scene. The tendency has been, in particular: 
(a) first, for the major national players, to take advantage of the opening up of foreign 
markets to expand their geographical hold (e.g. the strategy of Transpac in most European 
countries, or BT in France); 
(b) second, to look for cooperation among European players (e.g. Atlas, Unisource). 
The strategies of extra-European entrants merely confirm this tendency. Although AT&T was 
able to gain a foothold directly in the services area, by buying up Istel, it chose the path of co­
operation where the network was concerned, just as IBM has decided to join up with STET. 
11.2.2. Possible conflicts of interest 
The opening up of markets creates the possibility of increasing intervention for all players. 
Hence, some operations undertaken at a particular time may be regarded as 'competitive' or at 
least present certain areas of conflict with later developments. For instance, the position of 
Infonet, in which most of the major European PTOs join (with the noteworthy exception of 
BT) has been difficult to reconcile with groupings such as Unisource or Eucom/Atlas (France 
Télécom and Deutsche Telekom have transferred their holdings following their bilateral 
agreement). In this example, the absence of BT is itself open to question, because the main 
shareholder in Infonet is MCI, its key partner. 
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11.2.3. Growth limited by technical constraints 
There is no real new development, mainly because of technical constraints in materials (there 
is some distrust with regard to 'foreign' materials, which may not work properly) and 
applications, which are often 'customized' and therefore specifically adapted to certain 
configurations. 
11.2.4. Hegemony on the part of certain players on the scene 
On the base segments, the influence of traditional players, in terms both of investment and 
market, is such that competition cannot develop in conditions of reasonable profitability (e.g. 
the position of Transpac in France). 
11.2.5. Impact of Commission measures 
The opening up of the market in data has admittedly created a new competitive framework, 
but it has to be recognized that: 
(a) for the genuinely competitive part, most of the movements had started before the 1990 
directive; 
(b) liberalization is mainly to the benefit of the traditional operators who, on the pan-
European level, form an oligopoly which is becoming more and more obvious. 
The abuses of a dominant position are not defined as such, and before any alliance is 
authorized the Commission ascertains that the open market rules are being respected (e.g. the 
negotiations regarding Atlas in 1994-95 or those now taking place regarding the IBM-STET 
agreement). But the concrete impact of the operations certainly seems to be a limitation on 
availability. 
11.3. Markets targeted by the new entrants 
11.3.1. Targeting around customer size and network structures 
For the new entrants, the competitive advantage lies in two main aspects: how closely 
provision matches the market, and the service/price relationship. Hence, targeting is done 
more in the light of company size and network structure than according to sectors. Thus, the 
new entrants address themselves initially to small and medium-sized enterprises, the large 
enterprises tending to be the focus of market rivalry among traditional operators or the 
establishment of cooperative networks. Moreover, genuine competition has developed in 
relation to special structures such as the VSAT. Only limited development has occurred, 
however, in the terrestrial networks because of the investment required. 
11.3.2. The general imposition of sectoral targeting 
The sectoral approach is not confined to the new entrants; it is found among all the players: 
(a) The traditional operators have attempted to respond to the segmentation of demand, either 
by joining together through specific sectoral developments (for example, FN A in the 
financial field) or through associations with service providers to develop dedicated 
applications (for example, participation by France Télécom in joint projects with GSI). 
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(b) Private cooperative networks were established before public markets opened up (Swift, 
SITA). They were initially developed to meet specific sectoral needs. Today, the same 
networks are seeking to take advantage of the liberalization of markets in order to open up 
to third parties. Company networks (Air France or Daimler Benz) are following the same 
path. 
11.3.3. Impact of Commission measures 
The ONP rules allow the various providers to gain market access under equitable conditions, 
and have therefore clarified the competitive base. However, the market is still opaque, because 
the new entrants have only their flexibility and speed of action to rely on when confronted 
with the inertia (a decreasing phenomenon) of the traditional operators. On the other hand, the 
latter have an obvious advantage in their commanding upstream position, which will only be 
challenged if draconian rules are introduced - which would doubtless be unacceptable. 
11.4. Strategies used 
11.4.1. Defensive strategies initiated by the PTOs 
The PTOs had to react before the liberalization of markets, since they had to reply at an early 
stage to competitive offers coming mainly from the other side of the Atlantic, such as those 
from GEIS, IBM IN or EDS. Although to some extent this competition did not appear to be a 
destabilizing factor (the networks used PTO support and the markets gained were relatively 
small), it did bring home to the PTOs how important it was to control the network, and above 
all, the strategic nature of the control exercised by the end-user. 
This concern prompted the PTOs to look for partnerships with developers of applications, or 
to go as far as possible themselves down the service road. One of the most significant 
examples in this area remains the example of Videotex in France, where the historic operator 
has succeeded in maintaining its central position although most of the added value is brought 
by the partner service providers. More precisely, the PTOs have attempted to remain in charge 
of the industry by acquiring shares in computer companies or controlling them (see Section 
11.4.2). 
11.4.2. Aggressive strategies 
Positioning on foreign markets 
The PTOs have also operated dynamic strategies by leaving their home markets and 
positioning themselves on foreign markets. There are two specific routes open to the PTOs: 
(a) first, an individual strategy of direct positioning, usually through takeovers, on the foreign 
market (for example, Transpac or BT); 
(b) second, a partnership strategy, by negotiating agreements with players already present on 
the various markets targeted. 
In another field (the use of cable networks to provide telecommunications services), the possibility of PTOs being 
prohibited from sharing in the cable market had been mentioned, but was quickly stalled. 
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These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; indeed, as level-setting approaches, they 
seem to be complementary. Thus, on the network level, partnership takes pride of place (it is 
often the only economically viable approach) whereas in the field of applications, there is 
greater justification for control and acquisition strategies: AT&T is buying Istel but is 
negotiating a partnership with Unisource. On the other hand, when conducted together in the 
field of networks and services, the two strategies can be problematic (e.g. the obligation on 
Transpac to sell its German subsidiary Info AG because of the formation of Atlas). 
A takeover of computer companies 
The same PTOs have taken an interest in taking over companies, especially in the computer 
field, which give them the necessary additional skills to control the chain of added value. 
France Télécom has bought a 19% share in Sema-Group, one of the principal European SSIIs, 
STET has taken control of Finsiel, the main Italian holding company for computer services, 
and among the non-Europeans, AT&T has bought up Istel in the United Kingdom, followed 
by Infoplan in Germany and Dataid in France. 
11.4.3. Impact of Commission measures 
The Commission's measures play only an indirect role in the conduct of the PTOs, which 
tends to be dictated by reactions to the strategy of the new entrants and to the development of 
markets. 
The Commission also has a right of inspection, through the investigation of planned 
partnership agreements (see Section 11.4.4). 
11.4.4. Partnership strategies 
Partnership strategies have taken various forms. 
Vertical agreements to gain access to end markets 
Each of the groups of players has an interest in these partnerships: 
(a) the network operators, most of whom do not possess the skills and flexibility needed to 
develop applications; 
(b) the service companies, which in any case have only a narrow margin of manoeuvre to gain 
access to the networks; 
(c) the users who, through these associations, have only to deal with one contact point. 
Horizontal agreements for geographical expansion 
Although most of the players are seeking to develop their international portfolio, few of them, 
except for the large PTOs, are capable of doing so individually. BT is virtually alone in having 
chosen this path. 
On the contrary, most of them adopt a partnership model: France Télécom/Deutsche Telekom 
have set up Eucom, followed by Eunetcom and Atlas, and the Dutch and Swedish post and 
telecommunications bodies have set up Unisource. But these partnership agreements need to 
be backed up by cooperative arrangements with the service providers. 
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Sectoral agreements to respond to specific needs 
These agreements are often entered into by large users who combine together or join with 
developers in order to obtain 'tailor-made' solutions to their needs. In most cases, some initial 
work is done on the standards, which may result in defacto norms being established. 
Impact of Commission measures 
Although the Commission has only a monitoring role with respect to significant partnership 
agreements (compliance with the competition rules, no abuse of the dominant position), it 
seems that some of these operations have been made necessary by the lack of fluidity on the 
market. The PTOs are still controlling the essential workings (base networks, 
interconnections, tariffs, etc.). Beyond the ONP rules on the liberalization of services, a 
number of measures are now under discussion (the liberalization of infrastructures) which 
seem likely to bring about more fundamental changes in the sector. 
11.5. Mutual independence of the regulatory bodies and the national operators 
Separating out the regulatory function has ultimately made it possible to offer the necessary 
guarantees to spur the interest of new entrants. The regulators have been called upon to define 
precisely the terms of competition on every market and to ensure that they are complied with. 
Taken as a whole, the machinery seems to have functioned well, in the field of added value 
services and in the field of networks, where virtually all requirements have been met (in some 
cases, these were mere formalities). 
11.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the opening up of the data market in Europe has produced mitigated effects: on 
the one hand, the arrival of new entrants on specific market segments or for specific kinds of 
provision and, on the other hand, a strong reaction on the part of the traditional operators who 
are tending, especially through partnership agreements, to bolster their own position. But 
although the organization of the industry has not been radically altered, the users will 
gradually be able to take advantage of this opening up through a regular steady fall in prices, a 
more appropriate range of offers and the concept of a 'single window'. 
One feeling is particularly marked among the large users and the new entrants: the opacity and 
the control of the market by the PTOs still acts as a major constraint on the provision offered. 
From this point of view, the liberalization of the infrastructures will mark an important turning 
point. 
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12. Voice telephony 
The strategie analysis of the sector focuses on two kinds of players: 
(a) the PTOs (European or otherwise); 
(b) the resellers of traffic (European or other). 
12.1. Strategy of the resellers of traffic 
12.1.1. The regulatory context 
Directive 90/388/EEC authorizes resellers of telephone traffic to set up in the Member States. 
The resale of traffic on a specialized connection is permitted if one end of the connection is 
outside the national public network. 
Against this background, with international voice telephony traffic being opened up to 
competition, many 'enterprising' operators have been encouraged to come onto the European 
market, offering discounts on international telephone charges. The chosen objective is to 
operate price brokerage, taking advantage of the 'pricing imbalance' which exists for a limited 
period in most European countries (low subscriber rates and high prices for long-distance 
calls). 
in this light, there are two technical possibilities: 
(;i) call-back: 'call-backers' buy traffic wholesale from the American PTOs AT&T, Sprint or 
MCI or from wholesalers (e.g. MTC) and pass on these rates to their customers through 
an automatic call-back procedure; 
(b) re-routing: the resellers use the United Kingdom as a transit point for transatlantic 
destinations. Traffic is routed directly through international connections from the country 
of departure (France, Germany, etc.) towards the transit country: the United Kingdom 
(transfer onto the BT/MCI network) or directly to the United States. 
The resellers of traffic have adopted a two-phase entrance strategy: 
(a) Phase 1 : setting up, focusing provision on profitable destinations. 
(b) Phase 2: increasing the offers made, deploying European networks. 
12.1.2. Description of Phase 1 
The strategy of these new entrants is based on prospects of profitability by destination 
There are two elements to note: 
(a) The volume of accessible traffic. The resellers have focused their offers on destinations 
with a high volume of traffic (the United Kingdom and the United States) in order to 
take advantage of economies of scale (which are associated with investment and the 
degressive cost of circuits on dedicated lines). 
(b) The gross margin sought by destination. The reseller's margin is the gap between his 
prices and his costs. He therefore has to broker the PSTN prices of the country in which 
112 Telecommunications: liberalized services . 
he sets up business (and from which he makes his offer: ­30% on PSTN) against the 
dedicated line rates and the cost of national access on departure and arrival (the factors 
which determine his costs). 
Figure 12.1. Gross margin by destination for resellers 
Τ Reseller's price policy 
Gross 
margin 
France 
Télécom 
rate 
Reseller's 
rate 
Located dedicated 
line or 
PSTN France 
Dedicated line 
rate transport 
Foreign 
PSTN rate 
Source: Bossard Analysis. 
In this context, the resellers have given priority to the following countries: France and 
Germany. 
(a) The volume of exiting traffic to the destinations (United Kingdom, United States) is 
significant, allowing a rapid return on investment. 
(b) The price gap between the PSTN in these countries and the rates applied in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom also makes it possible to offer services of the 'call­
back' type. 
The size of these players ranges from ECU 1 million to ECU 50 million for the largest 
(Telegroup and Viatel). 
By focusing mainly on the large SMEs/SMIs with an annual international consumption of 
between ECU 4,000 and ECU 100,000 
(a) Below ECU 4,000 administrative and commercial expenses are difficult to recoup. 
(b) Over ECU 100,000 national operators have a 'virtual private network' offer which makes 
the reseller's offer non­competitive. 
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The present picture is now favourable to these resellers, since in countries like France, the 
proportion of exiting international traffic which escapes the national operators is around 5% 
for destinations like the US (Source: FT interview). 
Conclusion 
This initial entry phase has now been completed. 
Between 1992 and 1995, the resellers made good profits. Their strategy is now developing 
towards Phase 2. 
12.1.3. Description of Phase 2: increasing the range of services offered by 
deploying European networks 
(a) The profitable resellers have quickly strengthened their base offer by added value 
services: cards, an invoicing tool, a digitizing plan. For example, players such as Viatel, 
Telegroup or France Call-back (in France) offer services like these. Esprit Telecom (see 
Appendix A.2) focuses on operations of the intelligent network type. 
(b) The availability of discounted destinations is expanding, from the Asian and American 
regions to small European countries and the large Italian, German and Spanish urban 
areas. 
(c) Some companies are tending to deploy a dedicated line network, as in the case of resellers 
such as Viatel, which are locating increasingly in the main European cities. 
Only players of the critical size needed to go beyond mere call-back service will withstand the 
complete opening-up which is forecast for 1998. In principle, the entry of the PTOs and the 
development of alternative operators should prove fatal to the small actors who are positioned 
merely as 'call-backers'. Among the alternative operators, the new entrants who have 
specialized in the international segment, like Esprit Telecom, will doubtless have great 
difficulty in imposing themselves,10 'imprisoned' between the PTOs which are organizing in 
partnerships and national competitors who will probably look for direct methods of 
interconnection. 
Conclusion 
Directive 90/388/EEC and the positive effect of the announcement that 1998 is to be a final 
date have in fact encouraged the emergence of new players on the international voice 
telephony segment. 
However, the 'resale of traffic' has been mainly beneficial to actors of US origin and in the 
United Kingdom, since the traffic is routed on their networks. 
Although the overall size of these 'new players' has remained marginal, the mass 
communication which they have undertaken in the media has created a climate of competition. 
This has clearly incited PTOs in less deregulated countries to reduce their rates, and thus has 
directly: 
10 The ambition of Esprit Telecom is ultimately to become the 'European MCI" 
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(a) permitted an alignment of prices on costs; 
(b) proved of great benefit to European consumers. 
12.2. Strategy of the PTOs 
12.2.1. Introduction 
The regulatory environment has already been described. It has two main aspects: 
(a) The free interpretation of the concept of a closed user group (CUG). A CUG is equivalent 
in its composition to a stable economic grouping. The association between a company and 
its subsidiaries holding concessions or its suppliers meets this definition. 
(b) The liberalization of voice telephony value added services. 
This environment enables the PTOs to offer voice telephony products such as cards, private 
networks and virtual private networks. 
Attacked on their domestic market, the PTOs have launched a two-pronged strategy: 
(a) a defensive strategy in their country of origin with two objectives: to keep customer 
loyalty and to develop new practices; 
(b) an offensive strategy abroad to develop the traffic. 
12.2.2. The defensive strategy of the PTOs in their country of origin 
Two kinds of action have been carried out by PTOs in their country of origin to respond to the 
entry of resellers of traffic. 
Rebalancing prices: reducing the price of the international PSTN in conjunction 
with a rise in local rates 
This policy has considerably reduced the profitability of resellers and has made up for losses 
on international traffic by the gains recorded on local traffic. Table 12.1 illustrates the effects 
of the price rebalancing carried out in the United Kingdom by BT between 1982 and 1990. 
Table 12.1. Effects of the price rebalancing in the United Kingdom (1982 = 100) 
Subscription 
Local communications 
Long-distance communications 
International communications 
1982 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1990 
106 
70 
51 
57 
Annual variation 
+ 0.7 % 
- 4 % 
- 8 % 
-7% 
Source: Analysys. 
It is reflected in a slight increase in subscriber rates and very marked reductions in prices, 
especially for international and for long-distance calls. 
This price rebalancing has been felt chiefly in the deregulated countries (Sweden, United 
Kingdom, Denmark) but has also taken place by anticipation in the main European countries 
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(Germany, France). In the two latter countries the prospect of alternative operators appearing 
by 1998 has encouraged operators to reduce their margins on the segments at greatest threat. 
This price rebalancing (which is part of a defensive approach by the public operators) is also 
usually accompanied by an aggressive approach to the supervisory authorities in order to 
obtain a contribution by the new operators to financing the 'access deficit'. Table 12.3 
summarizes the mechanism of price rebalancing and the argument about the 'access deficit'. 
Apart from price rebalancing, the offer of increased services is an approach used by the PTOs 
in the framework of their strategy. 
Increasing the offer of services in order to secure customer loyalty 
This offer has developed around three types of products: 
(a) the international virtual private networks (IVPN); 
(b) price options: products with price reductions for some destinations, offered to customer 
segments threatened by competition; 
(c) the offer of associated VANS (value added services): developing an offer of associated 
services: a free breakdown of charges made, a digitizing plan, network management, 
incident management (these latter offers being developed more specifically in the context 
of the IVPN). 
Table 12.2. Trend in PSTN rates over the period 1990/95 in Europe 
UK/BT 
France 
Sweden 
Germany 
Denmark 
Austria 
Finland 
Luxembourg 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Italy 
Portugal 
Greece 
Long distance (%) 
-52.70 
-36.80 
-36.00 
-25.00 
-20.50 
-20.10 
-18.90 
-13.00 
0.00 
0.00 
17.20 
25.00 
29.00 
51.40 
Subscription (%)' 
14 
15 
14 
0 
0 
0 
37 
-12 
35 
17 
16 
27 
18 
0 
Commentary 
Deregulation 
Anticipation of 1998 
Deregulation 
Anticipation of 1998 
Deregulation 
Deregulation 
1 Period 1992/95. 
Source: Bossard/ldate. 
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Table 12.3. Strategy of the PTOs 
Reducing margins on highly profitable competitive segments (international and long distance) 
To remain competitive, the PTO reduces its rates on these segments (first phase) 
With a constant volume of calls, the share of earnings from communications which was used to finance the fixed 
costs of the local network is reduced 
The historic operator then seeks to 'compensate' for the share of lost revenue, and increases rates on services in the 
non-competitive segments 
The PTO asks to increase subscription rates and the price of local calls (second phase) 
6. On this sector, where the subscriber is captive, the PTO recovers the 'lost margin' 
The PTO calls for the supervisory authorities to set up a compensation system, which is justified by the 'access 
deficit' 
Source: Bossard Consultants 1995. 
12.2.3. Aggressive strategy of the PTOs abroad 
Development of centres abroad: attack on the large accounts 
The strategies used by the PTOs to deploy abroad have typically involved the establishment of 
subsidiaries of different sizes which usually run at a deficit, as Table 12.4 shows with the 
examples of operators active in France (1994). 
Table 12.4. Presence of foreign operators in France 
Operator 
BT France 
MCI 
Sprint 
Number of employees 
354 
9 
20 
Turnover in million FF 
375 
7.4 
20 
Net earnings in million FF 
-34.7 
0.2 
-6.4 
Source : Business reports. 
The targeted segments are mainly the large accounts with considerable international traffic 
(more than FF 500,000 a year) or some sectors where the degree of maturity of 
telecommunications enterprises is very high (for example, the 'dealing rooms' in the banking 
sector). 
The offers which are available are VPN, integration of voice and data, detailed statements, a 
volume rebate for off-net and on-net traffic, and cards. 
The strategy of partnership agreements between national operators 
From the viewpoint of the operators, access to lower cost infrastructures (in and outside their 
country of origin) is the 'warring element' in being able to become genuinely competitive. 
From the viewpoint of demand, the clientele of the large international accounts (which 
contribute substantially to the operator's margin) is expecting a genuinely international offer 
from a single interlocutor. 
In order to meet this need for a 'single window' and be able to offer international voice 
services at lower costs, since 1992 there has been a race to enter into partnership. 
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The result now is that the world has been more or less divided up into three dominant groups: 
(a) Uniworld (Unisource/AT&T) and AT&T World Partners (KDD, Singapore Telecom, 
Korea Telecom , DGT Taiwan); 
(b) the 'Phoenix' project, which has become Global One: FT/DT/Sprint; 
(c) the 'Concert' project: BT/MCI/VIAG. 
Table 12.5. Review of the 'voice' offers of the main operators in France 
Re-routing of international 
traffic 
Virtual private network 
Cards 
Remarks 
AT&T 
-
Limited to 
interconnection with 
the VPN. 
Cards sold mainly to 
US residents. 
A discreet operator 
in France up to now. 
The merger with 
Unisource and the 
Générale des Eaux 
should enable AT&T 
to establish itself 
from 1998. 
BT 
Offer intended 
mainly for the large 
accounts. 
Virtual network 
services joint offer. 
Not sold. 
This affects mainly 
the 300 large 
accounts in France. 
MCI 
-
VNET in the US 
interconnection of 
the VPNs. 
Cards sold to US 
residents. 
The partnership 
agreement with BT is 
holding back the 
development of the 
French subsidiary 
MCI. 
SPRINT 
'19BIS'offer 
-
Cards sold to US 
residents. 
In spite of ambitious 
marketing and a full 
range of provision. 
Sprint is basically 
selling international 
telephony. 
Source: Bossard analysis/interviews. 
The partnerships between telecommunications operators, reflected in the creation of joint 
subsidiaries and overlapping shareholdings as Figure 12.2 illustrates, are giving rise to the 
development of world offers based on the exploitation of interconnected networks. 
Europe as a whole benefits from this, being the seat of deployment of European networks, 
such as 'Cyclone' for BT/MCI or 'Açores' for France Télécom/Deutsche Telekom. 
In parallel, we see the emergence in the main European countries of alternative operators who 
have not come from the telecommunications world, but who usually have rights of passage. 
In Germany, the major electricity groupings (Viag, Veba and RWE) have formed partnerships 
respectively with BT, Cable & Wireless and Mannesmann/AT&T. 
In France, CGE and Lyonnaise des Eaux et Bouygues have a wide strategic manoeuvre 
margin: CGE has joined with AT&T/Unisource by setting up Siris, a joint subsidiary, which is 
offering brokerage. Bouygues has linked up with Cable & Wireless/Veba for some re-routing 
services. EDF, SNCF and Sociétés Concessionaires d'Autoroutes (SCA) are also acting as 
alternative suppliers of infrastructures. 
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Figure 12.2. Main linkages among telecommunications operators 
Europe North America Asia-Pacific 
Financial shareholding. 
Intended share. 
No share. 
Source: Bossard database 1995. 
12.2.4. Conclusion 
On the European market, we have found the following: 
(a) the development of voice services offered by the PTOs such as the IVPNs; 
(b) the creation of international consortia in which the dominant European players participate; 
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(c) the development of an international offer based on 'European backbones' interconnected 
with the networks of the American or Asian partners; 
(d) the accelerating development of alternative operators looking towards the 1998 
deregulation: for example: VIAG, VEBA in Germany, Compagnie générale des Eaux, 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, EDF. SNCF, and Sociétés Concessionnaires d'Autoroutes in France. 
12.3. Impact of Commission measures 
The contribution of the Commission, marked by the opening of voice telephony VANS and 
the definition of the concept of CUG, has had a beneficial effect in Europe: 
(a) by enabling new entrants to come into specific segments, with the emergence of call-
backers on the SME segments and the development of re-routing services; 
(b) by stimulating competition, with the direct consequence of a steady drop in international 
prices for the benefit of European users; 
(c) by compelling the dominant players to react by developing the services they offer. 
Through partnership strategies initiated by the dominant operators, the Commission's role is 
being felt more downstream than upstream. 
The Commission does not initiate this type of agreement, but plays a subsequent monitoring 
role in order to prevent abuses of a dominant position. 
12.4. Barriers still to be eliminated 
The new entrants are emphasizing the lack of clarity in the concept of a CUG. If this idea were 
clarified, they would be able to define their strategy more clearly (a demand voiced especially 
by Viatel). 
Another point of view is still being expressed by the large users and the new players: the 
opacity of the market and its control by the PTOs continues to place strong constraints on the 
development of offers on the market of voice telephony services. The reactions of operators 
such as Esprit, which has filed a case with the European Commission, illustrate well the 
difficulties encountered by new entrants in developing (see the case study on Esprit Telecom). 
It is therefore important to consider how interconnection charges can be reduced and prices 
brought closer to costs. From this point of view, the liberalization of infrastructures should be 
a major new landmark. 
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Part IV: Analysis of employment in the sector and the 
impact of technology 
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13. Employment trends in the sector 
13.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact of the single market on employment in the 
sector of deregulated services. 
In Section 13.1. we attempt to calculate the numbers of jobs created in the new services and to 
compare them with jobs lost in traditional activities, while in Section 13.2 we look at the 
nature of the factors which explain these changes. We focus particularly on the two factors 
'liberalization' and 'technological change'. 
Taking all segments together, the telecommunications sector lost almost 87,000 jobs between 
1990 and 1994. 
Table 13.1. Employment trends in Europe among service operators 
Germany 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Sweden 
Total 
PTOs 
13.230 
-1.173 
1.085 
-1,300 
-3,143 
-2.012 
949 
-3.946 
-882 
2.208 
147 
2,125 
-3.139 
-89.400 
-15.378 
-100.629 
Of which 
mobiles 
2.000 
140 
150 
181 
600 
351 
2,000 
0 
117 
3,400 
140 
478 
142 
1,900 
812 
12.411 
Of which 
VANS 
818 
0 
60 
0 
358 
0 
675 
0 
0 
178 
0 
0 
0 
219 
85 
2.393 
Other 
PTOs 
(wired 
telephony) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-1.311' 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.2122 
0 
1.901 
Other 
operators 
mobile 
4.180 
0 
0 
260 
0 
450 
575 
306 
0 
0 
0 
0 
333 
1.930 
686 
8.720 
Other 
VANS 
761 
0 
200 
0 
376 
0 
930 
0 
0 
336 
0 
0 
0 
360 
113 
3,076 
Total 
18.171 
-1.173 
1,285 
-1.040 
-2,767 
-2.873 
2454 
-3.640 
-882 
2,544 
147 
2.125 
-2.806 
-83.898 
-14,579 
-86.932 
Finnet. 
" Mercury. 
Sources: Information provided by the operators. For Italy. Spain and Portugal: UIT data. For Vodafone: Mannesmann 
Mobilfunk. SFR. DeTeMobil: UIT source, confirmed with OECD. For the new activities, where no Figures are 
available: estimates made on the basis of average productivity ratios (physical output for mobiles: number of 
subscribers/employees, financial output for the VANS: turnover per employee). For the mobiles, these ratios have 
been calculated on the basis of the operator data, taking account of the development of the network. For the VANS, 
they are calculated from the data of the 40 leading European operators. 
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(a) Over 100,000 jobs have been cut in the European PTOs in traditional activities (wired 
telephone network). 
(b) Over the period, 26,500 jobs were created in the new services: far from enough to make 
up for jobs lost in the traditional activities. 
(c) In the PTOs, the development of new activities in mobiles and in the VANS have 
generated in total almost 12,400 and 2,400 jobs respectively over the four years. 
(d) The jobs created among the new operators total 1,900 for the alternative operators, 8,700 
for the other mobile operators, and 3,100 for operators on the VANS. 
Figure 13.1. Contribution of sectors of activity to job creation in Europe: 1990/94 
1 2 · 4 1 1 8.720 
2,393 1,901 ' 3,076 
115,433 
Traditional 
activities 
PTO 
Mobile 
activities 
PTO 
VAN 
PTO 
Others 
PTO 
Others 
Mobiles 
Others 
VAN 
Source: Idate/Bossard. 
However, these activities are growing rapidly, and will continue to generate new jobs in the 
years to come (see the Bipe study for an estimate of jobs generated by the year 2000). 
The United Kingdom and Sweden have contributed most to the figures for job losses in 
Europe between 1990 and 1994. 
When we look at these growth rates, we can distinguish three groups. 
Countries which deregulated 'before time ' 
Over the period 1990-94: 
(a) In the United Kingdom, BT has cut its staff by 34.7 %. 
(b) In Sweden, Telia has cut its staff by 29.1 %. 
(c) In Finland, job cuts amount to 15.2 %. 
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Countries which have been able to maintain stable or even increasing employment 
One may mention: 
(a) Italy, which has benefited directly from the deficiencies of the Italian wired telephony 
network and the effort to catch up which started during the 1980s. Hence, over the period 
1990 to 1994 Telecom Italia saw an increase in employment of 2.3%. 
(b) Germany, which has benefited from the efforts made by the network of the former GDR 
to adapt, and where employment has risen by 8.4%. 
Intermediary countries 
France or France Télécom initiated a modernization policy on its network at an early stage (the 
size of the network has doubled since 1978), while rapidly digitizing its infrastructures. Hence, 
steady growth has been possible, without any need for increasing staff. 
Figure 13.2. Contribution of European countries to employment trends (jobs χ 000) 
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Source: Idate/Bossard. 
Figure 13.3 shows the relationship between growth of the network and the level of 
employment. It appears that countries which have some way to go to adapt and to increase the 
size of their networks have been better at maintaining the level of employment than countries 
which have already reached maturity such as Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and, to a 
lesser extent, France. 
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Table 13.2. Employment trends from 1990 to 1994 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Total 
% change 
­6.4 
4.7 
­5.7 
­15.2 
1.4 
8.4 
­12.9 
­6.5 
2.3 
20.3 
6.6 
­12.2 
­3.5 
­29.1 
­34.7 
­8.3 
Source: Idate/Bossard. 
Figure 13.3. Relationship between employment trends and growth of the network 
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13.2. Analysis of the impact of structural factors in the sector 
Technological change has had a paradoxical impact on employment: 
(a) a positive impact due to the emergence of new services: these are mainly 'mobile' 
services and VANS; 
(b) a negative impact due to induced pooling of productivity. 
When networks are digitized, the cost of maintaining the networks can be reduced, resulting in 
staff cuts in maintenance and repairs. In theory, digitizing networks means that maintenance 
costs can be reduced to a quarter of those incurred by similar systems. It therefore naturally 
generates productivity pools. 
Technological progress therefore has a positive impact on the productivity of the operators, 
but a negative impact on employment. 
The productivity gains recorded by certain European Union countries, especially Spain, are 
largely attributable to the digitizing carried out on the networks. 
Operators with an expanding network can count on constant levels of staff, while improving 
their productivity. Operators with a stable network are obliged to resort to staff cuts if they 
want to improve their productivity. The good results recorded by Telefonica are associated 
with the growth in its network. The number of main lines increased in fact by 4.3% in 1994, as 
compared with 1.9% in France, 1.8% in the United Kingdom and 1.6% in Italy. 
It is now found that only countries which are ahead in deregulation have so far exploited these 
productivity pools by getting rid of surplus jobs. 
An important link between employment trends and the degree of implementation of the 
measures exists, as is shown in Figure 13.4. 
The extent to which the productivity pools are exploited varies considerably from one country 
to another: 
(a) The countries which are ahead in regulation, and are therefore competitive with 
traditional activities (the wired telephone network) have used them to considerable 
effect. These are the United Kingdom and Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, Finland. 
(b) The intermediary countries where the PTOs have few rivals for wired telephone 
activities have been able to maintain jobs. Network quality improvement has enabled 
them to develop new activities and to improve service quality. Hence, they have been 
able to improve customer loyalty, looking towards greater competition by the year 1998. 
(c) The countries which are backward in implementing the directives form a separate 
category: most of them have needed to deploy their network and for this purpose have 
used a sizeable labour force. 
Other variables have been analysed to bring out the impact of technology on employment. The 
following conclusions emerge: 
(a) There is no apparent link between the level of a digitization achieved and staffing trends. 
(b) There is no apparent link between the growth in digitization and staffing trends. 
128 Telecommunications: liberalized services 
Figure 13.4. Link between employment trends and degree of implementation of the 
measures 
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Figure 13.5. Link between level of digitization and trends in staffing patterns 
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Figure 13.6. Link between growth in digitization and staffing trends 
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Conclusion: the negative effect of technology on employment occurs only in circumstances of 
high deregulation 
Technological change does not directly explain employment trends. What it actually gives 
operators is productivity pools, which are exploited depending on the degree of competitive 
intensity on the market. 
Without competitive pressure, the operators rely solely on the quality of the network to secure 
customer loyalty. In a competitive situation, the pressure on prices has a negative impact on 
the operators' margins and market shares. Maintaining the margins involves a reduction in 
costs and therefore a pressure on staffing. 
The foregoing analysis illustrates well this phenomenon and brings out the existing correlation 
between employment trends and the implementation of the Commission's measures: the 
countries which are 'ahead' (the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark) are the 
countries which have reduced their staffing most. 
However, we find that in most of the aforementioned countries, deregulation has been initiated 
by the Member States themselves, the European Commission not being involved in the 
process. This fact considerably limits the negative role which might be attributed to the 
Commission. 
13.3. Impact on allied sectors 
Other fields of allied activity have benefited indirectly from technological advances and 
liberalization, thus creating jobs. 
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Manufacturers of mobile equipment have benefited greatly from the growth in this sector, and 
their workforces have increased. 
Likewise, in the field of electronic information services, almost 20,000 jobs have been created 
over the period 1990/94. Although some of these jobs are in value added services and have 
already been accounted for, another significant proportion stems from the availability of 
systems (access providers) or platforms (server centres). 
Other sectors which may be mentioned are those where telecommunications provide a 
strategic tool: telemarketing or trading. 
Finally, we note that in the user sectors, specialist internal functions are gradually being 
introduced in the purchasing and management of telecommunications services: at an initial 
estimate, the jobs created over the period under study total almost 1,500 for the whole of 
Europe. However, there are many specialist 'telecommunications' functions which actually 
represent transfers from existing computer functions. The final estimate should be brought 
down to 800 new jobs. 
Alongside the productivity efforts mentioned above, the operators have increasingly resorted 
to skilled subcontracting or external services for some of the low added value functions, and 
this has resulted in staff being transferred to outside companies. 
Services such as line installation or maintenance are now carried out by specialized 
companies. BT started the process by contracting out some of its logistical services in the early 
1980s. 
Other functions, such as sales or invoicing, may also be the subject of contracting out: on the 
commercial level, the example of the development of SMCs in 'mobiles' in Europe illustrates 
this desire (or necessity) of operators to contract out some of their functions. 
13.4. Changes in employment structure 
Throughout the sector, there has been an upheaval in the structure of employment and wages. 
Technological change has primarily affected low-skilled jobs: maintenance technicians, cable 
layers. At the same time, operators in a competitive environment or anticipating deregulation 
have recruited heavily in the 'support' functions of marketing, sales or finance. 
These changes have not been entirely easy: the disappearance of low-skilled jobs is not 
compensated for by the number of skilled workers recruited, and the creation of new jobs does 
not help those whose jobs have been eliminated. Hence, the main problem to be dealt with by 
the PTOs is to remedy the mismatch between jobs and job seekers, by placing the emphasis on 
training or flexibility of work. 
This change in the structure of employment is a phenomenon not confined to Europe, being 
found in all the mature countries. 
Highly-skilled posts are increasing rapidly, especially among operators who have anticipated 
deregulation. The rate of highly-skilled employment is increasing among all the operators 
under review. However, with operators whose status has evolved 'before time' or who are 
already in a competitive situation, the waves of job cuts which affected staffen masse initially 
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are now affecting skilled workers. Reorganization schemes (inspired by re-engineering) which 
are being set up, aim in fact to reduce the intermediate hierarchical levels. For example, the 
proportion of skilled workers at France Télécom rose from 37% in 1976 to 52 % in 1990. 
Figure 13.7. Changes in employment structure: Dutch post and telecommunications 
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Figure 13.9. Employment trends 1992-94: France Télécom 
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13.5. Conclusions 
13.5.1. Main changes in employment 
In conclusion, the positive effect of the creation of 26,500 jobs in the new activities (new 
operators, mobiles, VANS) is far from enough to compensate for the jobs lost in traditional 
activities, totalling 100,600 jobs over the period 1990/94. 
These losses are more significant in the countries which are ahead in deregulation and 
therefore subject to a high degree of competition. In fact, the negative impact of technology on 
employment occurs only where there is marked deregulation. 
Deregulation also has a significant impact on the structure of jobs and wages in the sector: 
recruitment occurs in the commercial and marketing functions, and redundancies mainly affect 
maintenance technician posts and cable layers. 
13.5.2. Impact of Commission measures 
Up to now, the measures taken by the Commission have mainly affected the deregulated 
sectors (mobiles, data and satellites). However, these are the very sectors which create jobs. It 
may therefore be reasonably said that the Commission, by promoting the development of these 
services, has indirectly created new jobs (almost 12,000 in mobiles and data). 
In the traditional sectors of telephony (voice services), the operators which have cut back on 
their staff have done so because of market conditions (intensity of competition) and the 
productivity pools brought about by digitization. The competitive conditions in these countries 
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(UK and Sweden) have been caused by initiatives taken there, not by recommendations from 
the European Commission. 
Confining the period under review to 1990/94 of course makes it difficult to reach firm 
conclusions on the subject. 
(a) The countries which still have monopoly over wired telephony activities have not yet 
reacted to the entry of competition into their sector: in future years there will certainly be 
major job losses in the operators' traditional activities, as has been the case in the United 
Kingdom and Sweden. The recent announcement by Deutsche Telekom of the loss of 
almost 50.000 jobs gives a foretaste of the changes to be expected. 
(b) On the other hand, the mobile, data and satellite services, which are still far from 
maturity, continue to enjoy growth rates in two figure percentages and the creation of 
many jobs. 
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APPENDIX A 
Case studies 
Al. SES/Astra 
A 1.1. Profile 
Société Européenne des Satellites 
Château de Betzdorf 
L-6815 Luxembourg 
Principal directors 
Chairman: Mr Romain Bausch 
Financial Director: Mr Schulte 
Technical Director: Mr Milton Torres 
Marketing Director: Mr Yves Elsen 
Shareholders 
Luxembourg State 
Deutsche Telekom 
Pearson 
Tractabel 
Others 
20% 
17% 
6% 
3% 
54% 
The other shareholders of SES/Astra include more than 20 organizations, most of them from 
Luxembourg: Société Nationale de Crédit et d'Investissement, Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de 
l'Etat (Luxembourg), Deutsche Bank Luxembourg and Dresdner Bank Luxembourg, AXA, 
UAP, Aachener & Münchener, etc. 
A 1.2. Principal dates 
1985 Establishment of SES, Société d'Exploitation de Satellite, the first private 
operator in Europe. 
December 1988 Launch of the first Astra satellite, Astra 1A. 
Luxembourg grants SES an exclusive contract for satellite television at 
the orbital position 19.2° East. This contract will run until 2010. 
February 1989 Astra broadcasts begin. 
April 1990 3Sat is retransmitted from the Astra satellite and is the first public 
channel to link up with a private satellite. 
February 1991 Launch of Astra IB. 
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December 1991 
April 1992 
June 1992 
February 1993 
May 1993 
September 1993 
May 1994 
October 1995 
November 1995 
The Council of Ministers of the post and telecommunications services of 
the EUR-12 adopts a new directive on the European television 
broadcasting standard D2 Mac. 
CNN links up with Astra. 
Banexi joins the French SG Développement, Investissement, Finance et 
Développement, and the Compagnie Financière de Robas to take over the 
7.6% holding of Kinnevik in Astra. 
Astra borrows FF 220 million to finance its fifth satellite, Astra IE. This 
follows the loan taken out in September 1992 for FF 135 million to 
finance Astra 1C and Astra ID. 
Launch of Astra 1C. 
TNT Cartoon links up with Astra. 
The Deutsche Bundespost Telekom takes a capital share of FF 1.5 billion 
in SES. There is a rider to the concession agreement to authorize the 
telephone operator to take 16.7% of the capital. 
Launch of Astra ID. 
Launch of Astra IE, the first satellite fully dedicated to digital 
broadcasting. 
A subsidiary opens in France, Astra Marketing France, to develop 
services on the French market. 
A 1.3. Key figures 
Table Al. Financial values (in million LF) 
On 31 December 
Turnover 
Operating profit 
Net profit 
Materials investment 
Staff numbers 
1990 
1.523 
ns 
361 
ns 
95 
1991 
3.488 
ns 
1,306 
ns 
110 
1992 
5.443 
ns 
2,446 
ns 
126 
1993 
6.714 
ns 
2.920 
ns 
nd 
1994 
8.881 
ns 
3.991 
ns 
170 
ns = figure not supplied 
A 1.4. Comments 
Astra, the first satellite company in Europe, is one of the most successful satellite operating 
companies in the world. This good position is due largely to the diversity of services offered 
via the five Astra satellites which are now operational. At the end of 1995, these satellites 
were reaching about 60 million households across Europe, 20 million by direct reception and 
40 million via cable network. According to Continental Research/Carat Astra Forecast, the 
number of households served by Astra would more than treble by the year 2000. The chief 
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markets for this operator are Germany, Central Europe, the United Kingdom, Scandinavia and 
Finland respectively. Southern Europe is also a promising market; in Spain for example, the 
direct reception market is almost entirely geared to Astra. 
Astra's key activity is television and radio broadcasting. It is divided among three entities: the 
Satellite Operations Centre (SOC), the Network Operations Centre for analogue (NOC), and 
the Digital Network Operations Centre (DINO). The company has four satellites each with 16 
channels; Astra IE was launched last October, and is the first satellite entirely dedicated to 
digital broadcasting. A sixth and seventh satellite operating on the high band (11.70 to 12.75 
GHz) are to be launched in mid-1996 and mid-1997, thus bringing Astra's digital capacity to 
56 repeaters (sold). The leasing contracts for a repeater are generally concluded for a period of 
10 years. In total, LF 81 billion have been invested in the development of digital television. 
In order to increase its fundholding for new satellites, SES extended its range of shareholders 
in 1995 by selling 16.7% of its shares to Deutsche Telekom for about DM 500 million. The 
second stage is to be the quotation of the SES shares on the stock exchange in the first half of 
1996. Astra is also intending to take full advantage of the synergy between cable, satellite and 
telephone, and may develop this latter activity. 
A1.5. Future positioning 
In spite of, or because of, its success, SES Astra has experienced (and is continuing to 
experience) quarrels among its shareholders. In 1994 the main (Luxembourg) shareholders of 
SES rejected the group chairman's project to grant all the channels in the next three satellites 
to four programmers associated with Murdoch and Kirch. In fact, they did not want a group of 
industrialists outside SES to take a controlling share in satellites and in the development of 
digital television in Europe. Pierre Meyrat was replaced in 1995 by Romain Bausch; SES 
finally transferred some of its shares to Deutsche Telekom; for the German operator, this is a 
highly profitable operation since the group is planning to develop multimedia services. 
However, it seems that this instinct for independence may one day meet its limit. In fact, when 
a company includes, among its five main clients, audiovisual companies on an international 
scale, it is highly likely that they will want to take a share in their 'service company'. 
The development of digitization, and the fact that Astra, with Telepiu, launched the first 
European offering in early 1996, should strengthen the development of the operator. However, 
SES may soon come up against technical problems. In fact, although the company is the only 
one in the world to offer such a wide range of services on the same orbital position, the 19.2° 
East position will be saturated with eight satellites. Luxembourg has asked ITU to give it eight 
new orbital positions, but this request will take some time to process. In the meantime, SES 
might share the orbital position of Deutsche Telekom, but this will no doubt raise legal and 
technical problems. 
Today, the only aspect which enables the company to preserve a degree of unity in its 
shareholding is its profitability. The company needs new funds to finance its development. 
SES shares are soon to be launched on the stock market, but this will necessitate a change in 
the concession contract since it requires that no shareholder may hold more than 10% of the 
capital (except where a waiver is granted by the government of Luxembourg). This procedure 
is still the subject of stormy debate within the company's board of governors. 
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Moreover, if it sees the opportunity, SES may diversify its activities and its area of coverage. 
A1.6. Pan-European problems 
Astra's problems on the pan-European level are considerably different from areas dealt with in 
the other case studies. 
First, from a technological point of view, the satellite makes it possible to offer pan-European 
coverage from the outset, either by direct reception or indirectly via cable networks. 
From the linguistic point of view, which is an important natural barrier in audiovisual media, 
the capacity for offering programmes dubbed in the languages of each country are promising 
elements for the development of the system. 
Again, from an economic point of view, Astra benefits from economies of scale due to the 
wide range of population it serves: more than 120 million households and a total of 60 million 
subscribers in 1995. The user interest has, moreover, been especially emphasized because the 
system, through its pioneer aspect, has received a unique orbital position which gives access to 
a very wide range of programmes in an extremely simple manner (there is no need for multi-
heads or motorized receiving equipment!). 
Thus, Astra seems to be the only system which has succeeded at the pan-European level, and it 
has a virtual monopoly: only Eutelsat is posing as a rival. Its success is based on its strong 
internal momentum, but above all on the inconsistencies of government policies in the field of 
satellite broadcasting, which has eliminated most serious competitors. 
The Directive on Television without Frontiers adopted in 1989, presented a (minimum) 
regulatory framework in an attempt to harmonize the varying national regulations, or 
sometimes to substitute for them where they did not exist. For satellite television services 
which can be received in several states, the European Parliament is asking Member States to 
ensure that the cooperation rules initiated by the ITU are respected, relating to the allocation of 
frequencies and the ONP. In fact, satellite services often enjoy a more flexible regulatory 
framework than cable networks, which are subject to national regulation which is sometimes 
more restrictive. 
Naturally, the development of domestic systems used for TV broadcasting tends to limit 
Astra's market power, but these systems are by nature confined to national markets and are 
based on a balance with the other uses of satellite. Hence, Astra preserves its head start, and its 
attraction will be intensified by the demand for pan-European broadcasting, including the 
share of national channels. 
One risk for Astra is renewed competition for pan-European broadcasting, with the return of 
Eutelsat or at the initiative of a major private channel. From a more global point of view, the 
linkage between the broadcasting function and the programming function seems to have been 
reversed to the disadvantage of Astra, which is increasingly becoming a lessor of capacity, 
whereas the number of its customers tends to be confined to major operators of pay-TV in 
Europe. 
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A2. Esprit Telecom 
A2.1. Profile 
Esprit Telecom BV 
World Trade Centre 
Stravinskylaan 929 
1077 XX Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Principal directors 
Chairman: Michael Potter 
DG Esprit Telecom UK: J. Hudson 
Shareholders 
Mitel 
Walt Anderson (founder) and directors 
Apax Partners (venture capital) 
A2.2. Comments 
Based in the Netherlands, the Esprit Telecom group carries out most of its activities in the 
United Kingdom, where in 1993 its local subsidiary obtained one of the first reselling licences 
for international traffic (ISR: International Simple Resale). 
Its activities focus on providing international telecommunications services (telephone and fax) 
to large enterprises, but the group hopes to extend quickly to SMEs and to residential 
customers. 
Esprit Telecom is also extending its geographical reach. Outside the United Kingdom, it 
already has offices in four other European countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and 
France) in which it has obtained permission to operate, and a network which extends beyond 
the Atlantic to the United States and Canada. It is also planning to establish a foothold in four 
new markets (Germany, Ireland, Italy and Switzerland) over the next 18 months, through a 
capital increase launched in November 1995 subscribed by Apax, which is increasing its 
shareholding, and by Hancock Venture, a new shareholder. 
The company has ten years' experience on the American market. Esprit Telecom is resolutely 
within the spirit of the opening of the European market encouraged by the Commission. In its 
commercial presentation, one of the arguments is exactly that: 'the time of monopolies is 
over'. 
A2.3. Development 
Esprit Telecom has its own network between the main European capitals, which enables it to 
offer the services which it commands from end-to-end to medium- and large-sized European 
companies. For destinations outside this context, Esprit has negotiated special agreements with 
some of the large international operators. 
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The group is planning to hire connections from other operators (cable networks, railways, 
'utilities') in order to reduce its costs. It could also construct its own connections in some 
circumstances; for the moment, only the United Kingdom offers this possibility at the 
regulatory level. In the immediate future, Esprit would be interested in opening its own 
connections in the Netherlands. 
The group is speeding up its policy for European expansion, since it hopes to gain an advance 
on its potential competitors when there is a general opening up to competition in 1998. 
The services offered by Esprit Telecom are addressed to companies with a volume of at least 
FF 20,000 a month in international communications. For the large accounts, contracts are 
carried out to order, on the basis of the customer's usage of international telephone 
communications. For clients with international bills between FF 20,000 and FF 80,000, there 
is a standard system of prices, which divides costs into three groups (Europe, North America, 
the rest of the world). The pricing principle is degressive, depending on the volume of calls. 
All the client's international communications (telephone and fax) pass in transit through the 
Esprit network by means of a computer system installed directly on the customer's 
telecommunications equipment, and which automatically directs outgoing calls to Esprit 
Telecom's national server. 
The system seems to be relatively transparent. There is no special subscription, no equipment 
change, and no special numbering system. 
Esprit Telecom is now present in a limited number of European countries (the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, France) but its aim is to position itself in each of 
the countries of the European Union. 
A2.4. The problems of competition 
Supplies 
Esprit Telecom itself only needs a relatively modest infrastructure, because its transmission 
capacity is leased from on-site operators. For switching, the group has been able to make a free 
choice among the offers available, and it has finally chosen Ericsson1 ' to equip it up to the 
present time. In early 1996, the Swedish group had its US$ 8 million contract confirmed for 
providing exchanges to serve intelligent network nodes for Europe from the London base of 
Esprit. 
As regards the supply of transmission capacity, the problems are quite different and more 
complex. According to Esprit Telecom, access to the dedicated lines of the historic operators 
is still difficult and cumbersome. Moreover, in 1994, it brought a case to the Commission to 
compel Telefonica to lease to it an international circuit at 512 kbits/s. The group is planning to 
lease connections from other operators (cable networks, railways, utilities) in order to reduce 
its costs. It might also, in some circumstances, build its own connections; for the moment, 
only the United Kingdom offers this possibility at the regulatory level. In the immediate 
future, Esprit would be interested in opening its own connections in the Netherlands. 
" The Swedish manufacturer is also the second supplier for BT. 
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A2.5. A real opening of the market 
Although Esprit Telecom deliberately places itself in the line of opening of the European 
telecommunications market, its directors do not hesitate to proffer some ascerbic criticism of 
the way the competition actually functions, and of the dead weight of the former monopolies 
on the sector. According to Michael Potter, the chairman of Esprit Telecom, although the 
European Commission is trying to open up the European market, the monopolies are putting 
up a formidable degree of resistance. 
Moreover, the group does not hesitate to intervene in the courts as soon as the need to do so is 
felt (see above). The firm has also filed a complaint with the European Commission about the 
plan by the Dutch government to 'open' the national market of voice telephony. 
In public speeches, Michael Potter, the chairman of Esprit, explained that 'Enertel is simply 
going to position its prices in relation to those of the post and telecommunications services', 
adding that in early 1995, the Dutch post and telecommunications service itself had still not 
given the Dutch or Community authorities the information about its costs which had been 
requested one year before.12 The fact that BellSouth is joining the consortium is not especially 
positive; according to the press, still quoting Mr Potter, the US operator has only limited 
experience on competitive markets (a monopoly on the telephone market in the United States 
and usually a duopoly in operations, especially mobiles, in which it takes part abroad). 
In the context of the Atlas and Phoenix projects, Esprit has also put forward a number of 
arguments against Sprint joining with France Télécom and Deutsche Telekom. This agreement 
would give the US operator an unwarranted advantage over the other European companies 
pending the opening-up in 1998. 
In the United Kingdom, the group is also vehemently opposed to Oftel's proposal to remove 
the constraints placed on Mercury in operating its international network. In recent press 
campaigns, Esprit leaders placed special emphasis on the constraints which continue to limit 
the ordinary development of competition in this sector: the high costs of specialist 
international connections, the insufficient opening of the infrastructure market (the 
liberalization called for in the Green Paper on the liberalization of the telecommunications 
infrastructure and cable television networks (Parts I and II) (COM(94) 440 and 
COM(94) 682)) is, of course, strongly supported by the group). More specifically, Esprit 
Telecom accuses Oftel of giving too much room for manoeuvre to Mercury in fixing its access 
costs and interconnection charges: overall, despite the competition from resellers of 
international traffic (ISR), Mercury has continually increased its presence on the market for 
international services in the United Kingdom for the past two years. 
At the other end of the chain, Esprit will increasingly find itself confronted with competition 
from new operators, like Viatel. The group is speeding up its European expansion policy in 
order to gain an advance on its potential competitors when the market is generally opened up 
from 1998. 
For this. Esprit has also requested compensation and interest from the Dutch regulator. In this case. Esprit has obtained 
the support of the National Association of major telecommunications users. BTG. 
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A3. Mannesmann Mobilfunk 
A3.1. Profile 
Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH 
Am Seestern 1 
D-40547 Düsseldorf 
Principal directors 
Chairman: Jürgen von Kuczkowski (previously deputy chairman; appointed in mid-1994 to 
replace Peter Mihatsch, who had been in office since 1990, conducting the entire development 
phase for the D2 network, and who was appointed a member of the governing body of the 
company) 
Head of the services department: Armin Toepfer 
Shareholders (October 1995) 
Mannesmann AG 61.6% 
AirTouch Communications 31.4% 
Miscellaneous 7.0% 
A3.2. Principal dates 
December 1989 Licence granted by the Federal Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications for the D2 licence (second German GSM network). 
January 1990 Creation of Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH and start-up of network 
construction. 
June 1991 Beginning of technical tests in 15 cities. 
June 1992 Commercial opening of the network. 
End 1992 Coverage of 60% of the territory and 80% of the population (117,000 
subscribers). 
End 1993 Coverage of 80% of the territory and 90% of the population (490,000 
subscribers). 
End 1994 Coverage of 90% of the territory and 95% of the population (842,000 
subscribers). 
May 1995 Launch of the D2 Fun service for residential clients; finally reaches 
1 million subscribers. 
September 1995 Coverage of 92% of the territory and 97% of the population (1,200,000 
subscribers). 
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A3.3. Key figures 
Table A2. Financial values (in million DM) 
On 31 December 
Turnover 
Operating profit 
Net profit 
Material investments 
Staff numbers 
Subscribers (x 1,000) 
1991 
0 
-330 
296 
1.015 
1992 
138 
-343 
-340 
491 
1.615 
117 
1993 
902 
-170 
-224 
737 
2.256 
490 
1994 
1.750 
237 
112 
667 
2.589 
842 
A3.4. Principal subsidiaries and shareholdings 
CERSA (Compañía Explotadora de Radiobúsqueda) radiomessaging (Spain) 5 % 
A3.5. Commentary 
In 1989, Mannesmann which was linked with national and international partners (PacTel, 
which has since become AirTouch; Cable & Wireless, DG Bank, etc.) set up the Mobilfunk 
consortium, which obtained a licence for the construction and operation of the second German 
digital cellular network, D2 Privat. 
The following year, Mobilfunk was authorized to extend its network to the new Lander. 
Mannesman was granted the status of second national operator by the Ministry of Press and 
Telecommunications, which enabled the company to receive line leasing tariffs based on the 
costs of its access to the German fixed network. 
The first D2 networks were open for technical tests in July 1991. Opened commercially in 
mid-1992, the network developed rapidly (see Section A3.3). Since August 1995, the number 
of subscribers to D2 is slightly above those for Dl (operated by DeTeMobil, a subsidiary of 
Deutsche Telekom, launched on the same date). 
Following the resale of shares by various partners (in 1994, DG Bank sold its 10% to the other 
shareholders, and in 1995 Cable & Wireless withdrew following its linkup with Vebacom), 
Mannesmann and AirTouch remain the two main shareholders of Mobilfunk. 
On the organizational plane, Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH has a general board, which 
defines the policy options of the group, and eight regional boards (the D2 centres). The 
group's commercial division is arranged into three customer groups: the large accounts, the 
small and medium-sized enterprises, and professional and residential customers. The 
distribution structure is in fact highly decentralized, with the company moreover relying on 13 
service-selling companies and 2,000 distributors (selling cards and terminals). 
Apart from the development of Mannesmann Mobilfunk, it is interesting to look at the strategy 
of the Mannesmann group in telecommunications. 
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Alongside its mobile activities, Mannesmann is interested more generally in the 
telecommunications market, taking part in various groups which may compete with Deutsche 
Telekom from 1997. 
Since obtaining the D2 licence, Mannesmann has invested considerable sums in 
telecommunications. In 1993, investment in telecommunications accounted for 41% of the 
total investment of the Mannesmann group, for only 3% of the group's revenue. In total, the 
group plans to invest at least DM 2.5 billion in telecommunications over the period 1995-98 
(more than has already been invested during the previous four years in the mobile network). 
In 1993 Mannesmann (50%), RWE (number one in energy in Germany, 25%) and Deutsche 
Bank (25%) set up the GfD consortium (Gesellschaft für Datenfunk) in the field of mobile 
data transmissions, to respond to the bid launched by the Federal Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications at the end of 1993. It was finally GfD which was chosen for the licence. 
A3.6. The problems of competition 
Supplies 
Mobilfunk has made sizeable investments since its establishment, a total of DM 2.4 billion 
between 1991 and 1994, intended to promote very rapid take-off of the network (see main 
dates in Section A3.2). By the year 2000, cumulative investment in the network should be 
DM 4 billion. 
Mobilfunk has had to go very fast to be competitive with respect to DeTeMobil, which had a 
certain head start, since it already had an analogue networking operation and very advanced 
investment potential. In fact, the advance of the Dl network has been slightly faster, but D2 
has been able to establish a more balanced distribution, and even to gain a lead in the networks 
of the former East Germany. 
Mobilfunk has looked to the opening of the market for its equipment, although it ultimately 
found itself with a much more concentrated set of suppliers than its competitor DeTeMobil. In 
this case, most of its infrastructure supplies (exchanges and base stations) come from Ericsson, 
while the subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom is broken up between Siemens (exchanges) and 
Philips, Alcatel and Motorola (base stations). Of course, this choice has an impact on costs, 
because of the economies of scale, but also on the quality of the network (quality of 
transmission and of security) which is regarded as being better for D2 in the light of tests 
carried out by an official inspection agency. 
As another element in the services it offers, Mobilfunk is increasingly using its own Hertzian 
connections for linking its base stations to its exchanges 'in order to be able to offer economic, 
high quality connections'. 
A3.7. Services offered 
Mannesman Mobilfunk has also practised a dynamic policy for establishing new services. 
Four points will highlight this policy: 
(a) The distribution through SMCs (service marketing companies). Although the share of 
direct sales is above 40% (see Table A3), which is markedly higher than that of its 
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competitor DeTeMobil. this actually reflects a strong commercial dynamic within the 
company. However, the SMCs (led by Debitel) are increasingly attacking practices 
regarded as anti-competitive, whereby the operators announce price reductions for 
potential customers even before they are known to the distributors. 
(b) A highly dynamic policy of international agreements. By May 1995, Mannesmann 
Mobilfunk had negotiated international roaming agreements with 35 operators in 22 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia. Finland, France, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Ireland. Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
South Africa. Sweden, Switzerland. Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
(c) A policy deliberately geared to added value services, services which are basically due to 
digital technology but which are rendered more competitive as the selection of materials 
and coverage have been brought under control. The services offered on the D2 network 
are divided into four major groups (see Table A4). 
(d) A rapid reaction to market changes. In May 1995, when E-Plus was just emerging from its 
start-up phase. Mannesmann Mobilfunk presented a new D2 fun service for individuals, 
offering particularly advantageous prices. 
A3.8. The real market opening 
The success so far encountered by Mannesmann Mobilfunk in its attempts to enter the 
telecommunications market raises the problem of genuine opening to competition. The choice 
of Mobilfunk for the GSM network and then of GfD for the mobile data network tends to 
reinforce duopoly, rather than producing a genuine market opening, especially as the third 
network, the micro-cellular E-Plus network, is experiencing only moderate success (120,000 
subscribers after one year's commercial operation). Mannesmann's position on the fixed 
telephony market, although approved by the regulator, may well strengthen this impression of 
restricted competition, whereas it seems that the multiplication of the number of players in this 
segment is only transitory and that only a few can claim to be viable. 
Table A3. Market shares of GSM distributors in Germany (September 1995) 
GSM distributors 
Dl direct 
D2 direct 
Debitel Bosch 
Martin Dawes 
Dekraphone 
Talkline 
Mobilcom 
Hutchison 
Motorola Telco 
TMG 
Drillisch 
E-Plus Service 
% 
17.0 
22.0 
18.8 
9.4 
8.1 
6.9 
5.0 
4.7 
4.1 
2.7 
0.4 
0.9 
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Table A4. The range of services of Mannesmann Mobilfunk 
GSM services Basic 
Supplementary 
Added value services 
Other services 
telephone 
fax and data 
text messages (short) 
call transfer 
call filtering 
call signal 
placing on hold 
information 
operator assisted calls 
reservation services 
traffic information 
repair services 
flight information 
travel service 
letterbox 
international roaming 
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